A year has passed since the declaration and swift lifting of martial law on Dec. 3, and eight months since former President Yoon Suk Yeol was removed from office by the Constitutional Court’s impeachment ruling on April 4. Yet the political reckoning is far from complete.
That unresolved mood was reflected in a Gallup Korea survey released on Nov. 28 assessing the achievements and failures of 11 former presidents. Yoon recorded the highest negative ratings and the lowest positive ones.
The martial law episode weighed heavily, but respondents also pointed to early personnel decisions that placed many former prosecutors in key posts, policy missteps such as the abrupt expansion of medical school admissions and deep cuts to the national R&D budget, and what critics described as a closed and stubborn response to allegations involving the first lady.
When the Yoon administration took office in 2022, it advanced three major reform agendas — labor, education and pensions — alongside a broader campaign to eradicate what it called “cartels.”
The rhetoric intensified in July 2023 and again in Yoon’s 2024 New Year’s address, where he warned against “clique cartels.” He cited alleged collusion involving labor unions, research funding allocations, CSAT exam writers and improper ties between pharmaceutical firms and medical professionals. In principle, dismantling cartels — closed systems of collusion for private gain — is a goal few would dispute.
History shows that such crackdowns can succeed. In 1993, President Kim Young-sam abruptly dismantled Hanahoe, a secretive military faction that had dominated senior posts and helped propel Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae -woo to power after the Dec. 12 coup. Its dissolution widened the pool of military leadership and weakened entrenched networks.
The Yoon administration also moved against what it labeled a “construction union cartel,” accusing unions of coercive hiring practices, forced equipment use and extortion. Over time, privileged clauses in collective bargaining agreements — including preferential hiring for union members’ children and special leave provisions abolished under labor law — have been gradually revised across administrations.
Other initiatives, however, produced damaging consequences. One was the attack on what Yoon called a “research funding cartel,” arguing that national R&D resources had been “shared out” and “split up.” Following his call for a “zero-base” review, the 2024 R&D budget was slashed by 16.6 percent, or 5.2 trillion won.
The cut dealt a severe blow to South Korea’s research ecosystem, one that could take more than a decade to repair. Because science and engineering research is conducted primarily through university laboratories, funding cuts immediately disrupt scholarships, wages and ongoing projects. The decision was especially ill-timed as South Korea seeks to become a global leader in artificial intelligence amid intensifying competition for talent.
Another controversy arose from the government’s handling of the so-called “private education cartel” in CSAT test writing. A small number of teachers who had sold exam questions to private tutoring firms were used to justify branding thousands of committee members as cartel participants.
Claims that CSAT writers are monopolized by graduates of a few universities were also disputed. From parents’ perspective, what matters most is exam difficulty — measured by correct-answer rates — rather than abstract assurances of validity. Ensuring appropriate difficulty requires experienced writers, and committees cannot function if staffed solely with newcomers.
Beyond these reform agendas, two deeper tasks demand attention. The first is dismantling a “prosecutors’ cartel” — cases in which authority is abused or allegations are selectively ignored. Prosecutors swear to uphold justice and human rights as guardians of the public interest. Those who conducted investigations or indictments to suit political power must be held accountable.
The second is confronting a “political cartel” shaped by outdated military and prosecutorial thinking. In a democracy, a president and ruling party must secure public support and parliamentary majorities to implement policy. Attempting to overcome political resistance through martial law belongs to another era.
The People Power Party, which produced Yoon, bears responsibility for failing to apologize for a declaration made in circumstances far removed from war or national emergency, instead attributing blame to the opposition’s legislative tactics.
The lesson is broader. It is undesirable for individuals trained to view society primarily through the lens of criminal investigation to move directly into politics. Prosecutors and judges must remain politically neutral, and those who choose a political path should first resign their posts. At the same time, sweeping institutional abolition or the creation of vague new crimes risks overreach when existing laws already allow for prosecution or impeachment of wrongdoing.
As South Korea approaches 2026, it would do well to return to the Constitution’s first principle: the Republic of Korea is a democratic republic, and sovereignty resides in the people. The task ahead is not to amplify slogans — “cartel eradication,” “clearing deep-rooted evils,” “ending insurrection” — but to build a political culture in which democracy and popular sovereignty operate quietly, consistently and without coercion.
About the author
▷Graduated from Seoul National University, College of Education, English Education ▷Ph.D. in education, Seoul National University ▷Senior researcher, Korea Educational Development Institute ▷Research professor, University of Texas at Austin ▷President, Korean Association of Primary English Education ▷Sixth president, Gyeongin National University of Education ▷President, International Graduate School of Language Education
* This article, published by Aju Business Daily, was translated by AI and edited by AJP.
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