Recent analyses by U.S. media and think tanks underscore the scale of consumption. After the “Grand Rage” operation, the U.S. military has used more than 1,100 JASSM-ER long-range stealth cruise missiles, with remaining stockpiles down to about 1,500. Each missile costs about 1.6 billion won and was originally positioned as a strategic asset for a full-scale conflict with China, but nearly half has been spent in the Iran theater. More than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles have been fired — about 5.3 billion won each, roughly 10 times the annual purchase volume. More than 1,200 Patriot interceptor missiles have also been used, exceeding twice last year’s total production.
War is measured not only in gunfire but in numbers. Analysts estimate the cost of munitions used in the first two days alone at $5.6 billion, with total war costs already exceeding $28 billion to $35 billion. Daily costs are nearing $1 billion. That spending is not abstract: it could have gone to health insurance for the U.S. middle class, student loans for young people, or repairs to aging urban infrastructure.
Ultimately, the public pays the price.
But the deeper problem is not only U.S. depletion. Israel, too, is not in a position to sustain “unlimited defense.” The Iron Dome and Israel’s layered air defenses — long regarded as among the world’s strongest — have shown clear limits in prolonged fighting. When short-range rockets and drones, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles arrive in waves, Iron Dome must prioritize targets, and saturation has appeared in some key areas. One interceptor can cost more than dozens of attack drones. Once defense becomes more expensive than offense, a long war becomes harder to sustain.
Israel has also had to manage the northern Hezbollah front, Gaza and long-range threats aimed at Iran itself at the same time. Air defense is not only a technology issue but a stockpile issue; the depth of ammunition reserves can determine national security. Even the most advanced system fails if interceptors run short. Some strategic facilities and industrial infrastructure have been threatened, and civilian psychological fatigue has risen sharply. The idea of a “perfect shield” has been tested.
Iran’s situation is no less severe, and in some ways more structural. Iran has maintained an “axis of resistance” centered on the Revolutionary Guard, but in a prolonged war its missile production bases and underground storage sites, drone assembly plants, air-defense radar networks and command-and-control systems have been hit repeatedly. Losses to long-range ballistic missile production lines and key air-defense bases are difficult to restore quickly. Missile launches may continue, but if sustainable production capacity collapses, Iran’s ability to wage war can weaken rapidly.
Sanctions, dwindling foreign currency reserves, difficulty sourcing industrial parts and restrictions on importing precision guidance systems are already squeezing Iran’s economy. Missiles are not built on willpower alone; they require semiconductors, specialized metals, precision machinery and supply chains. The longer the war lasts, the more likely Iran’s economy is to break before its military does.
Israel and Iran, the article argues, are no longer calculating victory so much as trying to avoid mutual ruin. One side’s defenses are thinning; the other’s production base is being damaged. The United States is drawing down its own stockpiles, while allied cohesion in Europe and Asia is weakening. The central issue is not who wins, but that continued fighting leaves everyone weaker.
The rationale for the war is also wearing thin. The United States has spoken of removing a nuclear threat; Israel has described its actions as self-defense for survival; Iran has invoked resistance, dignity and anti-imperialism. Over time, each justification has lost persuasive force as fatigue accumulates among civilians, the international community and allies. The question “Why are we fighting?” has become harder to answer clearly.
The article says wars tend to be most political when short and more commercial as they drag on: the arms industry benefits while daily life deteriorates. Oil prices rise, exchange rates swing and supply chains become unstable again. For a trade-dependent country such as South Korea, that becomes a matter of survival. A spike in oil prices can ripple from petrochemicals to aviation, logistics and food. Currency volatility can chill corporate investment and push up household costs. A war without a convincing purpose can hold the global economy hostage.
The question, it says, is whether to keep fighting or to survive.
Negotiations are difficult for several reasons. First is regime security. For Iran, nuclear capability is described as more than technology — it is insurance for the system’s survival. Iran, the article says, remembers Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi and what happened after he gave up nuclear ambitions. For Israel, Iran’s nuclear capability is seen as an existential threat; one side’s insecurity becomes the other’s fear.
Second is domestic politics. Israel’s leadership risks political instability if it appears less hard-line. Iran’s revolutionary system is not positioned to choose retreat easily. The United States, facing a presidential election, also finds it politically difficult to accept a perceived retreat in the Middle East. Peace may be necessary, the article says, but politicians often calculate approval ratings first.
Third is the regional order. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and also Russia and China all have interests at stake. The Middle East is not a simple chessboard, the article argues, but a multilayered board where one move can shift several directions. That is why a structural agreement, not a simple ceasefire, is needed.
The article calls for a new framework it labels a “Noah Accord,” beyond the Abraham Accords.
The Abraham Accords, brokered by the United States in 2020, marked a diplomatic turning point as Israel and the UAE and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations, later joined by Sudan and Morocco. The core shift was that the long-standing formula — no normalization with Israel before resolving the Palestinian issue — weakened under political realities. The United States offered security assurances, arms sales and economic support, while Arab states chose to counter Iran and pursue practical interests. The process moved through strong U.S. diplomatic coordination, quiet working-level talks and formal signing at the White House.
But that was mainly an adjustment of state interests, the article says. What is needed now is a deeper civilizational understanding — returning to a more fundamental shared ancestor than Abraham, namely Noah. Citing Genesis 10, it says Elam, understood as an ancestor of Iran, is placed in the line of Shem, Noah’s son. Israel is also described as descending from Shem, with Abraham within that genealogy. The article notes interpretations linking Eber to the origin of the term “Hebrew,” concluding that Iran and Israel are not civilizational strangers but nations that split from the same roots.
AJP, the English news service of Aju News Corporation, says it has long been uncomfortable with media framing that reduces the region to “Arabs versus Israel.” The Middle East includes Persians, Turks, Kurds and Jews, it says, and Iran is not an Arab country. Persia’s 5,000-year civilization is distinct, and the article argues that any serious regional expert should understand that basic historical structure.
The article cites Jeremiah’s judgment of Elam’s pride while also quoting, “In the last days I will restore the fortunes of Elam” (Jeremiah 49:39). It argues that judgment and recovery can coexist, and that total destruction does not create a sustainable order; only a peace that allows recovery can shape the future.
It says a “Noah Accord” should start from three points: addressing the nuclear issue within a framework of regime security guarantees; redesigning a multilateral regional security architecture that includes Iran and Israel; and linking economic cooperation, supply-chain stability and joint energy management. Peace does not arrive by declaration alone, it argues, but by building shared structures for daily life.
If the Abraham Accords were a diplomatic agreement, the article says, a Noah Accord must be an agreement for survival. In a reality where no one can win completely and no one can disappear completely, coexistence is presented as the only exit.
The article cites Sun Tzu’s maxim that the best victory is won without fighting, the Tao Te Ching’s line that the strong are broken while the soft survive, and the Bible’s blessing on peacemakers. Civilization, it argues, is built not on the edge of a sword but on order.
What Iran and Israel need now is not more missiles, the article concludes, but more imagination and trust. With munitions depleted and justifications fading, it says the remaining choice is whether to keep fighting and collapse together, or remember shared roots and live together. It adds that Middle East peace is no longer only a regional issue, but tied to global economic stability, South Korea’s national interest and the next chapter of human civilization — and that it is time for agreements, not gunfire, to change history.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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