Chinese aircraft carriers entered waters under South Korean jurisdiction eight times in 2025, the highest annual figure since the Joint Chiefs of Staff began compiling such data in 2020, the office of People Power Party Rep. Yu Yong-weon said Wednesday.
Warship movements showed a similar trajectory. Chinese naval vessels entered South Korean jurisdiction roughly 350 times in 2025, up from about 330 the previous year.
Military aircraft also increased their presence, entering South Korea’s air defense identification zone more than 100 times, compared with over 90 in 2024.
Carrier activity has steadily built over time: two entries in 2020, seven in 2022, five in 2023, six in 2024 and eight in 2025.
The momentum has carried into this year. In the first quarter alone, a Chinese naval vessel approached within about 50 kilometers of South Korea’s territorial waters off the Taean Peninsula — roughly 140 kilometers from Seosan Air Base and about 180 kilometers from U.S. installations at Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys.
While remaining outside territorial waters, such proximity allows Chinese vessels to potentially collect radar, communications and other electronic signals linked to South Korean and U.S. military operations. The area sits near key approaches to Seoul, major air bases and critical U.S. facilities central to any contingency involving North Korea or Taiwan.
Officials across South Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia say the pattern is forcing closer surveillance of Chinese ships and aircraft, even when encounters stop short of direct violations.
In Seoul, concerns are growing that Beijing is seeking to normalize its presence in nearby waters while extending its naval reach deeper into the Pacific. The buildup coincides with China’s expansion of its carrier fleet, enhanced amphibious capabilities and more assertive claims in contested seas.
China, for its part, maintains that its maritime operations are lawful and defensive, frequently accusing the United States and its allies of heightening tensions through increased military cooperation near its coastline.
To governments from Seoul to Tokyo to Manila, however, the pattern increasingly resembles not routine patrols but the emergence of a new maritime order in Asia.
South Korea defines “jurisdictional waters” as areas where it exercises sovereignty or sovereign rights, including territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. While international law permits foreign warships to transit EEZs, the South Korean military tracks such movements closely and deploys patrol assets when vessels approach sensitive zones.
The Yellow Sea has long been strategically sensitive, given Chinese naval and missile facilities positioned along its coastline facing the Korean Peninsula.
Han Ki-ho, a member of the National Defense Committee and a former army lieutenant general, said the growing activity should be viewed within a broader strategic context.
China’s effort to expand its control in the Yellow Sea “should not be viewed narrowly as targeting South Korea alone,” Han said.
“We must be firm in protecting our maritime sovereignty in the West Sea,” he added.
Ksenia Kirkham, a scholar at King’s College London, offered a more cautious interpretation.
"China’s increased naval activities in the South China Sea and in the West Sea, near the borders of South Korea, although perceived by South Korea as ‘aggressive’ and as being contrary to international law, should not be understood as aggression against Seoul itself, but rather as a response to what China interprets as provocative US military build-up in the region," she said.
She added that Seoul should handle any breaches of airspace or territorial waters through diplomatic channels while maintaining stable relations with Beijing and avoiding entanglement in escalating great-power rivalry.
Her assessment underscores a deeper dilemma for South Korea. China remains a key trading partner, creating strong incentives to avoid escalation. At the same time, Seoul’s alliance with the United States leaves little room to ignore repeated Chinese military activity near its coast, airspace and critical infrastructure.
For policymakers, the immediate challenge lies in distinguishing lawful passage from strategic signaling. A single carrier transit through an EEZ may be legal, but repeated operations — combined with rising warship entries and air incursions — carry broader military and political implications.
Experts broadly agree that the trend should not be viewed as a series of isolated incidents but as part of a wider maritime strategy.
Sarah Tzinieris of King’s College London said “China’s naval expansion is about shifting from coastal defense to sustained power projection in the Indo-Pacific,” noting that the Chinese military is “designed not just to defend its shores, but rather to shape the strategic environment beyond them.”
Central to this effort is control over maritime approaches and sea lanes, reinforced by what she described as an “expansionist dimension,” including land reclamation that has turned reefs into fortified outposts equipped with runways and radar systems. The use of maritime militia and fishing fleets further enables China to operate at scale while maintaining plausible deniability.
“China’s naval build-up is not just about capability; it is about changing the rules of the game at sea,” Tzinieris said, with incremental actions — often described as “salami-slicing” — gradually normalizing its presence in contested waters.
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