That view surfaced recently in remarks attributed to some in Iran’s parliament, including a proposal to “buy oil passing through Hormuz at $110 and sell it at $200.” The point, in this framing, is not a market trade but leverage: a geopolitical claim that control of the route can translate into control over pricing.
The article likens the approach to two historical methods of extracting wealth: charging passage fees at narrow corridors and profiting from intermediary trade by resetting prices at strategic hubs. It argues that Iran’s implied “toll” is broader than cash, extending to currency choice, payment systems and financial sovereignty — with references to the dollar, yuan, euro and rial as part of an effort to diversify settlement.
By the numbers, the logic rests on Hormuz’s role as a major artery for global seaborne oil shipments, with more than 20% passing through the strait. Alternative routes exist, the article says, but cannot fully replace it in the short term.
The problem, it adds, is that what appears coherent in theory may be difficult to sustain in practice. Unlike the past, when the counterpart might have been private merchant caravans with limited means of retaliation, today’s counterpart is states — including the United States, major industrial powers and global naval forces — operating under international legal norms and backed by tools ranging from financial sanctions to military action.
That is where the U.S. concept of a “counter-blockade” comes in, the article says: an attempt to close Hormuz would collide with efforts to force it open. It argues the United States has the capability, if needed, to reopen the passage militarily, and that the broader structure of maritime insurance, financial settlement and global shipping could make a prolonged blockade self-defeating. The longer disruption lasts, it says, the more strategic petroleum releases and alternative supply arrangements accelerate, potentially weakening the strait’s long-term strategic value.
The article says the “$200” figure captures the dilemma: prices rise when supply is constrained, but constraining supply can trigger swift international responses that drain leverage. It draws a historical parallel, arguing that excessive tolls have repeatedly encouraged the search for new routes.
Turning to the present, the article says these dynamics are already being tested. In 2026, it describes the Strait of Hormuz as moving beyond a symbol of tension into a theater where control, blockade and counter-blockade operate at the same time. It says Iran is selectively opening and closing the strait to control passage, while the United States is responding by blocking ships that enter and leave Iranian ports.
The article says traffic has fallen noticeably. Some vessels have turned back or rerouted, and some have moved with signals turned off — described as “shadow sailing.” It says oil prices jumped in the short term, with knock-on effects in financial markets and marine insurance.
Iran’s approach, as described, is not to cut the route entirely but to maximize uncertainty — letting some ships pass while stopping others — to influence both prices and fear. The article argues the U.S. response seeks leverage without directly closing the strait, portraying it as a contest in which Iran holds the “entrance” while the United States tightens the “exit” by targeting access to Iranian ports.
China’s role, the article says, adds another layer. It describes China as friendly to Iran but also the world’s largest energy importer, leaving it exposed to prolonged instability. In that view, China neither fully backs Iran nor fully aligns with a U.S.-led order, instead pursuing what the article calls a dual strategy: cooperation on payment systems while pushing diversification in supply chains.
The article concludes that Iran, the United States and China are pursuing the same objective — dominance over routes — through different means: physical control, military and financial order, and payment and supply-chain leverage. It argues the central question is not missiles and guns but who can open or close the route and set the cost — and says the answer remains unsettled.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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