The recent revision of Japan's "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment" marks a significant turning point in the country's post-war security policy, which has long been constrained by restrictions on arms exports.
While the limitations are not entirely lifted, institutional constraints have been significantly eased, broadening the scope for defense exports. This change is not merely a shift in export policy; it is part of a structural transformation linked to increased defense spending, the acquisition of counter-strike capabilities, the development of long-range missiles, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan's expanding role in the Indo-Pacific strategy.
One area that South Korea should particularly focus on is submarines. Submarines are strategic platforms that combine shipbuilding technology, batteries, acoustic detection, combat systems, weapon integration, and operational experience. If a country like Japan, which has strengths in shipbuilding, electronics, materials, and batteries, enters the submarine market in earnest, its technological prowess and industrial base could become significant competitive factors.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has operated conventional submarines such as the Oyashio, Soryu, and Taigei classes for an extended period, accumulating low noise levels, underwater mobility, and long operational capabilities. The later Soryu-class submarines have introduced lithium-ion batteries, and the latest Taigei-class is regarded as a submarine that fully applies this technology.
However, the revision of Japan's defense export principles does not immediately imply an expansion of submarine exports. Given the strategic nature and sensitivity of submarines, actual exports will depend on various factors, including political considerations, technology protection, security relations with the operating country, and post-sale support capabilities. Nevertheless, the easing of institutional constraints increases the likelihood of Japan entering the high-performance conventional submarine market in the future, which South Korea should recognize as a medium- to long-term competitive variable.
South Korea's submarine technology has also accumulated significant competitiveness through an independent development path. From the Changbogo-I and Changbogo-II to the Changbogo-III class, South Korea has rapidly advanced its independent design and construction capabilities, combat system integration, weapon integration, and domestic production capabilities.
Notably, the Changbogo-III Batch-I, represented by the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class, is equipped with vertical launch systems, and the subsequent Batch-II is being developed to further enhance vertical launch capabilities and operational sustainability. This indicates that South Korean submarines are evolving into stealthy, strategically precise strike platforms beyond just anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities.
It is important to note that the competitive landscape between the two countries in the international defense market may become more pronounced. South Korea has grown by emphasizing price competitiveness, quick delivery, local production, industrial cooperation, and tailored support for operating countries.
In contrast, despite Japan's high technological capabilities, its presence in the international defense market has been limited due to export regulations and political constraints. However, if Japan actively enters the market, it is likely to leverage its advanced technology, quality reliability, close U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and long operational experience as strengths. While the situations of each country differ, a competitive dynamic may emerge in countries interested in high-performance conventional submarines, such as Canada, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
However, it is unnecessary to view the submarine competition between South Korea and Japan solely as a zero-sum game. While competition in the international defense market is inevitable, it does not necessarily mean a weakening of overall South Korea-Japan security cooperation. Issues such as the threat of North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the expansion of the Chinese navy, and the protection of underwater infrastructure are common security challenges that both countries face.
Therefore, South Korea should recognize the potential for Japan's submarine export expansion as a competitive factor while managing the competition in the defense market separately from the necessary cooperation in security matters.
What South Korea needs is not a short-term reaction but a strategic assessment. Simply relying on price and delivery times will no longer suffice. Quality, reliability, long-term logistical support, technological standards, and interoperability with allies will become more critical competitive factors.
South Korea's submarine exports should also evolve from merely providing platforms to developing long-term support models that encompass construction, operation, maintenance, and performance upgrades. Additionally, tailored packages should be presented that consider the security environment, budget constraints, operational personnel levels, and maintenance infrastructure of the exporting countries. Japan's opening of its defense industry presents both a new challenge and an opportunity for South Korea's defense sector. South Korea must connect this change to strengthening its defense competitiveness and enhancing its export models.
While the limitations are not entirely lifted, institutional constraints have been significantly eased, broadening the scope for defense exports. This change is not merely a shift in export policy; it is part of a structural transformation linked to increased defense spending, the acquisition of counter-strike capabilities, the development of long-range missiles, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan's expanding role in the Indo-Pacific strategy.
One area that South Korea should particularly focus on is submarines. Submarines are strategic platforms that combine shipbuilding technology, batteries, acoustic detection, combat systems, weapon integration, and operational experience. If a country like Japan, which has strengths in shipbuilding, electronics, materials, and batteries, enters the submarine market in earnest, its technological prowess and industrial base could become significant competitive factors.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has operated conventional submarines such as the Oyashio, Soryu, and Taigei classes for an extended period, accumulating low noise levels, underwater mobility, and long operational capabilities. The later Soryu-class submarines have introduced lithium-ion batteries, and the latest Taigei-class is regarded as a submarine that fully applies this technology.
However, the revision of Japan's defense export principles does not immediately imply an expansion of submarine exports. Given the strategic nature and sensitivity of submarines, actual exports will depend on various factors, including political considerations, technology protection, security relations with the operating country, and post-sale support capabilities. Nevertheless, the easing of institutional constraints increases the likelihood of Japan entering the high-performance conventional submarine market in the future, which South Korea should recognize as a medium- to long-term competitive variable.
South Korea's submarine technology has also accumulated significant competitiveness through an independent development path. From the Changbogo-I and Changbogo-II to the Changbogo-III class, South Korea has rapidly advanced its independent design and construction capabilities, combat system integration, weapon integration, and domestic production capabilities.
Notably, the Changbogo-III Batch-I, represented by the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class, is equipped with vertical launch systems, and the subsequent Batch-II is being developed to further enhance vertical launch capabilities and operational sustainability. This indicates that South Korean submarines are evolving into stealthy, strategically precise strike platforms beyond just anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities.
It is important to note that the competitive landscape between the two countries in the international defense market may become more pronounced. South Korea has grown by emphasizing price competitiveness, quick delivery, local production, industrial cooperation, and tailored support for operating countries.
In contrast, despite Japan's high technological capabilities, its presence in the international defense market has been limited due to export regulations and political constraints. However, if Japan actively enters the market, it is likely to leverage its advanced technology, quality reliability, close U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and long operational experience as strengths. While the situations of each country differ, a competitive dynamic may emerge in countries interested in high-performance conventional submarines, such as Canada, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
However, it is unnecessary to view the submarine competition between South Korea and Japan solely as a zero-sum game. While competition in the international defense market is inevitable, it does not necessarily mean a weakening of overall South Korea-Japan security cooperation. Issues such as the threat of North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the expansion of the Chinese navy, and the protection of underwater infrastructure are common security challenges that both countries face.
Therefore, South Korea should recognize the potential for Japan's submarine export expansion as a competitive factor while managing the competition in the defense market separately from the necessary cooperation in security matters.
What South Korea needs is not a short-term reaction but a strategic assessment. Simply relying on price and delivery times will no longer suffice. Quality, reliability, long-term logistical support, technological standards, and interoperability with allies will become more critical competitive factors.
South Korea's submarine exports should also evolve from merely providing platforms to developing long-term support models that encompass construction, operation, maintenance, and performance upgrades. Additionally, tailored packages should be presented that consider the security environment, budget constraints, operational personnel levels, and maintenance infrastructure of the exporting countries. Japan's opening of its defense industry presents both a new challenge and an opportunity for South Korea's defense sector. South Korea must connect this change to strengthening its defense competitiveness and enhancing its export models.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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