The second special investigation team, led by Special Prosecutor Kwon Chang-young, is shifting its focus from the "executors" to the "decision-makers" in the investigation of Kim Geon-hee. The inquiry is concentrating on the decision-making processes of the prosecution and military leadership regarding allegations of covering up the investigation into Kim Geon-hee and the martial law declared on December 3. However, the investigation's direction is contingent on securing testimonies and evidence from key suspects, which has proven challenging.
According to legal sources on June 16, the special prosecutors summoned Choi Jae-hoon, the former head of the anti-corruption investigation division at the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office, for questioning as a suspect in the case of falsifying official documents. Choi was the lead prosecutor overseeing the investigation into Kim Geon-hee during the Deutsche Motors case. The special prosecutors are scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the alteration of the investigation report date to a time before the non-indictment decision was made.
The special prosecutors suspect that the prosecution established a non-indictment policy before finalizing their conclusions and subsequently organized the rationale for it. They are also investigating whether the prosecution leadership intervened in the process of the non-public investigation and the non-indictment decision regarding Kim Geon-hee. Previously, the special prosecutors questioned Lee Chang-soo, the former chief prosecutor of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office, and Jo Sang-won, the former deputy chief prosecutor. They have also included Shim Woo-jung, the former Prosecutor General, as a suspect. Choi's questioning is interpreted as a step to clarify the decision-making processes of the prosecution leadership beyond just the operational level.
The investigation into the martial law is also focusing more on the judgments and responsibilities of military leaders rather than the execution process. The special prosecutors view whether Kim Myung-soo, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized the illegality of the martial law while holding military command authority and chose to ignore or condone it as a key issue.
On June 15, the Seoul Central District Court rejected the arrest warrant for Kim Myung-soo. The court determined that "there is room for dispute regarding the main criminal charges, and there is no risk of flight or evidence destruction." In contrast, the court approved the arrest warrants for Lee Jae-sik, the former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's readiness inspection division, Jeong Jin-pal, the former deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Kim Heung-jun, the former policy director of the Army Headquarters.
The special prosecutors have reportedly secured testimonies from key Joint Chiefs of Staff officials indicating that they repeatedly advised Kim Myung-soo to halt the martial law, withdraw troops, and address the illegality of the proclamation. Former military support chief Kang Dong-gil, former operations chief Lee Seung-oh, and former legal affairs chief Park Myung-jae have all pointed out issues with the martial law. Based on these testimonies, the special prosecutors suspect that Kim Myung-soo complied with the martial law despite being aware of the repeated concerns raised.
The special prosecutors' failure to secure the arrest of Kim Myung-soo means that the investigation into the responsibilities of military leadership will proceed without him in custody for now. The court has determined that there is still room for dispute regarding Kim's involvement in insurrection and the extent of his actual command authority. Kim's side argues that after the declaration of martial law, the Minister of National Defense directly commanded the martial law troops and that he was excluded from the decision-making process.
The special prosecutors are expanding their investigation into both the allegations of covering up the investigation into Kim Geon-hee and the martial law, focusing more on who made the decisions and who condoned them rather than who executed them. The lack of sufficient documentation or objective records to confirm the prosecution's non-indictment process and the final decision-making processes during the martial law remains a burden for the ongoing investigation. Legal experts suggest that the success of the investigation will hinge on how much tangible evidence the special prosecutors can secure to substantiate the actual command and reporting structures beyond the testimonies they have obtained.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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