On June 21, U.S. and Iranian delegations commenced serious diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending hostilities in Lebanon during a 60-day period at the Bürgenstock Resort in Switzerland. However, the talks were marked by a palpable tension, exacerbated by Israel's airstrikes on Hezbollah, an Iran-aligned militant group in Lebanon. In response, Iran hinted at the possibility of re-blockading the Strait of Hormuz. Compounding the situation, President Donald Trump issued a warning on his social media platform Truth Social, stating, "If Iran cannot control Hezbollah, we will strike them hard again," which nearly derailed the negotiations.
Despite these tensions, the first round of marathon negotiations, conducted over two days, concluded early on June 22 with some visible achievements. The mediating countries, Qatar and Pakistan, released a joint statement praising the "positive and constructive atmosphere" that led to encouraging progress. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi expressed satisfaction with the results, stating on X (formerly Twitter) that there had been significant advancements toward ending the conflict in Lebanon.
Before the talks, the U.S. and Iran had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at ceasing military operations across all fronts in the Middle East, including Lebanon. However, Israel is expected to pose a significant obstacle to reaching a final peace agreement. Ironically, the military actions of Israel, which is not a party to the agreement, could determine the fate of the negotiations. If Israel continues its airstrikes in Lebanon, Iran could use the MOU's violation as justification to reintroduce the blockade of Hormuz. The U.S. faces a dilemma: appeasing its ally could jeopardize the negotiations, while preserving the talks could anger Israel.
During the Swiss talks, the mediators agreed to establish a conflict prevention mechanism to ensure compliance with military operation cessation agreements between Israel and Hezbollah. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism is questionable, given Israel's reluctance to heed U.S. directives. Iran prioritizes the Lebanon issue in the peace negotiations, and should Israel resume military actions, Iran is prepared to withdraw from the negotiating table at any time.
Just days before, the U.S. and Iran had signed an MOU containing 14 articles, which included commitments to cease military operations in Lebanon, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, resume Iranian oil exports, and initiate nuclear negotiations over the next 60 days. The international community expressed relief, and oil prices dropped from $110 to around $80 per barrel.
However, before the ink could dry, Israel disrupted the situation. The Israeli military announced it had struck 80 Hezbollah-linked targets, prompting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to declare that Israel's attacks on Lebanon violated the U.S.-Iran agreement and to reimpose the blockade of Hormuz. Iran unilaterally postponed the Swiss talks, employing a brinkmanship strategy.
After much back and forth, the first round of negotiations in Switzerland concluded early on June 22 with three apparent outcomes. First, an agreement was reached on a roadmap aimed at achieving a final agreement within 60 days and establishing a high-level committee. Second, a "de-confliction cell" will be created to monitor the cessation of military operations in Lebanon, involving the U.S., Iran, and Lebanon, with Qatar and Pakistan mediating. Third, a communication channel between the U.S. and Iran will be established to ensure the safety of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.
Iranian officials viewed the results of the talks positively. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei stated in a national broadcast that there had been "good progress" regarding the safety of maritime navigation in Hormuz, the authorization for Iranian oil sales, and the release of frozen assets. However, as U.S. Vice President Vance noted, this initial negotiation was merely a "starting point for practical discussions." Araghchi also referred to the de-confliction cell as the "first real test" of the negotiations.
Nevertheless, Israel has yet to find a reason to halt its military actions in Lebanon, contrary to the wishes of the U.S. and the mediators. Thus, the greatest risk in these negotiations lies not with Iran, but with Israel, a U.S. ally. While Iran is at the negotiating table, Israel is undermining it.
Trump's administration will likely frame this agreement as a success. With the reopening of Hormuz, oil prices have fallen, and Iran has come to the negotiating table. As the fall midterm elections approach, the narrative of having ended a war that was crippling the global economy and threatening peace in the Middle East will resonate with voters. The U.S. also aims to shift the direct financial burden of rebuilding Iran onto Gulf Arab states.
However, examining the other side of the ledger reveals a different picture. The Trump administration initially justified the war by aiming to "destroy" Iran's missile capabilities and "eradicate" proxy forces like Hezbollah and the Houthis. Yet, the key issues in the publicly released MOU focus on the nuclear program, while missile capabilities and proxy networks have been sidelined. A deeper concern is the precedent set: Iran has demonstrated that it can draw a superpower to the negotiating table through asymmetric tactics, such as blockading the Strait of Hormuz, despite its conventional military disadvantages.
Iran, despite suffering military losses, has paradoxically reaffirmed its most potent weapon through the MOU. The war has shown that a nation at a conventional military disadvantage can shake a superpower not by occupying cities but by tightening its economic lifelines.
'Suez Moment' vs. 'Hormuz Moment'
In 1956, when Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain and France attempted to reclaim it through military force. However, they succumbed to U.S. pressure, Soviet threats, and global public disapproval. This event marked the end of British hegemony and is remembered as the "Suez Moment."
Recently, Sun Degang, director of the Middle East Research Center at Fudan University in Shanghai, posed a question in the Chinese state-run Global Times: "Is the shadow of the Suez Crisis now being cast over the U.S. in the Strait of Hormuz?"
The facts that U.S. military power is not as overwhelming as imagined, that Western alliances have not coalesced, and that the costs of waging war against a single isolated adversary like Iran have escalated exponentially suggest that a "Hormuz Moment" may be approaching for the U.S.
The "Suez Moment" that signaled the end of British dominance was not solely due to a weakened fleet. The critical moment was when the political, economic, and diplomatic costs of maintaining control over the canal became untenable. The current "Hormuz Moment" reflects a similar situation. The issue is not whether the U.S. Navy can "open" the strait, but rather the cumulative costs—military tensions, alliance management, rising insurance premiums, risks of maritime conflict, and market panic—required to keep it open, which are rapidly diminishing the efficacy of U.S. hegemony.
60-Day Negotiation's Three Minefields
The first round of talks in Geneva established a roadmap. However, this roadmap effectively sits atop a 60-day timer, within which at least three minefields exist.
First, the effectiveness of the de-confliction mechanism. The most notable achievement of this round of talks is the agreement to establish a "de-confliction cell" for Lebanon. However, skepticism arises from its structure. This mechanism involves a five-party framework with the U.S., Iran, and Lebanon participating, while Israel, the aggressor, is excluded. If Israel continues to strike Hezbollah, Iran will have justification to withdraw from the negotiations citing an "MOU violation."
Second, the limitations of the Hormuz communication channel. The newly established communication line between the U.S. and Iran aims to prevent accidental clashes. While this is a meaningful advancement, having a communication channel does not eliminate the intent to blockade. Unless Iran completes its mine-clearing operations, shipping insurance premiums will remain high, and commercial vessels will continue to fear navigating the strait. Although Hormuz has been declared open, it is not yet fully operational.
Lastly, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait poses a significant risk. It is crucial to remember that Iran's weaponry extends beyond Hormuz. The Houthi rebels in Yemen have previously attacked over 190 vessels in the Red Sea from 2024 to 2025, reducing traffic through the Suez Canal by 90%. If negotiations turn unfavorable for Iran and Bab-el-Mandeb closes again—resulting in the worst-case scenario of simultaneous blockades of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Suez—the shockwaves could once again disrupt the global economy.
Quiet Winner: China
Amid all this chaos, the nation that has quietly gained the most is China. Through this war, China has secured rare diplomatic gains. As the conflict began, it continued purchasing Iranian oil and issued critical statements against the U.S. while avoiding direct confrontation. President Xi Jinping proposed a four-point peace plan, and Iran's foreign minister visited Beijing, followed by the Pakistani prime minister. Trump himself praised Xi at the G7 for maintaining neutrality and assisting in the resolution. Notably, Qatar and Pakistan, the mediators in the Geneva talks, have close ties with China. As the repeated scenes of U.S. military dominance failing to yield desired outcomes unfold, the world is naturally lowering the psychological threshold for a multipolar order.
The first round of Geneva talks has concluded, but practical discussions will continue this week. How the de-confliction cell addresses Israel's military actions, how the release of frozen funds for Iran navigates congressional barriers, and whether the Hormuz communication channel functions effectively in crises will determine the course of the next 60 days.
As mentioned earlier, the greatest variable in these negotiations may not be Iran but Israel. In this scenario, every choice the U.S. makes incurs costs. Ignoring Israel could destabilize the negotiations and increase the risks in Hormuz. Pressuring Israel could weaken alliance cohesion and expose cracks in U.S. influence in the Middle East.
This dilemma encapsulates the essence of the "Hormuz Moment." Hegemony is measured not by the size of power but by the totality of contradictions that can be managed simultaneously.
Lee Su-wan's Major Career Highlights
▷ Reporter for Korea Times ▷ Senior Correspondent for Reuters ▷ Editor at Reuters ▷ President of the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club ▷ Global Head of Ajou Economics ░ Editorial Writer at Ajou Economics
* This article has been translated by AI.
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