Political scientist Samuel Huntington defined true 'Objective Civilian Control' as a system where civilian political authority fully recognizes the military's operational and technical domains, ensuring their independence and expertise. In contrast, direct involvement in military personnel and operations politicizes the military and leads to 'Subjective Civilian Control,' which merely weakens military effectiveness. The Ministry of National Defense is facing criticism for practicing the most dangerous form of subjective civilian control under the guise of civilian oversight.
The most pressing issue is the Ministry's routine infringement on the JCS's operational command authority. As stipulated in Article 9 of the Military Organization Act, the authority to command and supervise operational units, whose primary mission is combat, belongs solely to the Chairman of the JCS. The Minister of National Defense, as the military administrator overseeing policy and administration, is responsible for relaying orders to the JCS Chairman but is not an operational commander who mobilizes troops or alters the positions of sentries.
In this regard, the U.S. defense system exemplifies an ideal model of civilian control. The U.S. Department of Defense does not maintain direct military operational commands. While it handles administration and policy, operational command authority is fully delegated to Combatant Commands, which are the domain of military experts. Military orders are relayed through the JCS, composed of military security specialists. This separation of policy (military administration) and operations (military command) allows for mutual checks and the manifestation of expertise.
However, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense appears to operate as a large field command, overseeing numerous direct units and commands. It is contradictory for an administrative organization lacking military judgment expertise to lead high-level tactical and operational decisions, such as coordinating the northward movement of the civilian control line or discussing the disbandment of drone operational commands. This is akin to administrative staff in a sports federation directly interfering with a national team coach's tactical planning and timing of player substitutions.
The Ministry has neglected or excluded the JCS's expert opinions on critical national security decisions, from the September 19 military agreement and adjustments to joint exercises to discussions on relocating the Army Academy, merging military academies, personnel verification, privatizing logistics, and even selecting specific weapon systems like nuclear-powered submarines. When security policies and military personnel decisions, which should be based on military rationality and expertise, are swayed by political logic or the interests of specific groups, military professionalism is depleted, and only opportunistic soldiers are produced.
Carl von Clausewitz, author of 'On War,' emphasized through his 'trinity theory' that achieving the objectives of war requires a full expression and harmony of military rationality. The current Ministry of National Defense is not supporting or coordinating military rationality but rather undermining military expertise.
Unless the Ministry ends its abnormal practice of overstepping military command authority, South Korea's military security will inevitably suffer severe damage. The Ministry must boldly reorganize its oversized direct units, return to its primary role of policy planning within the JCS, and fully respect military operational judgment and expertise. This is the only way to prevent the collapse of the military command structure and restore our military as a 'winning defense organization' rather than a 'political administrative scapegoat.' Additionally, the JCS leadership must also awaken to the true meaning of civilian control and the value of expertise.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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