Japan was ahead, the United States held the core technology, and Taiwan was opening up a new path called foundry manufacturing.
Yet Korea did not give up. Companies worked through the night, engineers pushed past the limits of process technology, and the state eventually recognized, however belatedly, how vital this industry was.
The result: Samsung Electronics and SK hynix became the twin pillars of the world's memory chip industry, and Korea, despite its small domestic market and scarce natural resources, rose into the ranks of the world's semiconductor powers.
Now the country stands once again at a historic crossroads.
The government's announcement of an 800-trillion-won ($520 billion) semiconductor investment plan for the Honam region is not simply a regional development project.
It is a national strategy to build four memory fabs in the southwestern region and expand semiconductor production hubs — currently concentrated in the capital area — nationwide.
The government's plan includes 800 trillion won for building a semiconductor production base in the southwest, 550 trillion won for AI data center construction, and next-generation semiconductor R&D, and when the long-term investment blueprints of Samsung Electronics and the SK Group are added, the scale of the industrial strategy becomes even larger.
The announcement immediately triggered debate in political circles and local communities. Why Honam? Why now? Was the site selection process transparent? Is there enough electricity and water? How will the workforce be secured?
Indeed, some in political circles argued that the criteria and review process behind the site selection had not been sufficiently explained, and the ruling party countered that this was a national balanced-development strategy that goes beyond concentration in the capital region.
But the most important point here is this: this project must not be consumed by the frame of regional sentiment.
The 800-trillion-won Honam semiconductor project is not a fight between Yeongnam and Honam. Nor is it a zero-sum game between the capital region and the provinces. The real battlefield is not domestic — it is global.
Taiwan's TSMC, America's Intel and Micron, China's state-led semiconductor drive, Japan's revival strategy in materials and equipment, and Europe's effort to rebuild its semiconductor supply chain are all moving on that same battlefield.
If Korea falls behind here, it is not one region that loses — the entire nation loses.
That is why this project must succeed. But saying it must succeed does not mean we should support it unconditionally.
Quite the opposite. Precisely because it must succeed, we need to scrutinize it more coolly.
We must not be dazzled by big numbers; we must ask the "5W1H" questions. Who will carry it out? Where will it be built? When will it begin? What will be produced? Why must it be there? And how will it be made to succeed? Unless these questions are answered, 800 trillion won remains a slogan, not a vision.
Semiconductors are not an industry built on declarations. Building a single fab takes years, costs tens of trillions of won, and requires thousands of highly skilled workers. Ultrapure water, electricity, gas, chemicals, equipment, logistics, wastewater treatment, environmental permitting, cleanrooms, subcontractors, universities, and research institutes all have to move together.
A semiconductor cluster is not a handful of factories — it is an entire industrial ecosystem. Having land is not enough. Having electricity is not enough. Attaching a corporate name to a project does not guarantee success.
Even so, Korea must take this path. The capital-region semiconductor belt is already world-class, but it is also showing its limits. Land is scarce, the power grid is under strain, and securing water, permits, transportation, housing, and dealing with environmental concerns are all becoming harder.
This is the backdrop against which the government is pushing to move beyond a capital-region-only system toward a nationally distributed network of semiconductor production hubs.
The Honam semiconductor project sits at the core of this national repositioning strategy.
If Korea's semiconductor industry has entered an era in which Yongin, Pyeongtaek, and Icheon alone can no longer bear the load, then a second production hub is not a choice — it is a necessity.
Memory demand in the AI era is different from the era of PCs and smartphones. Generative AI, autonomous driving, robotics, physical AI, defense AI, medical AI, and data centers all require enormous memory and computing infrastructure.
High-bandwidth memory, next-generation DRAM, NAND, packaging, and AI data centers do not exist in isolation — they are all connected within one massive industrial network.
So the success of the Honam semiconductor project is not Honam's success alone. It is a question of whether Korea can achieve a second leap in the AI semiconductor era — whether it can move from being a memory powerhouse to an AI manufacturing powerhouse, and whether regions beyond the capital can become genuine engines of national growth, rather than the capital-centered growth model continuing unchallenged.
The voices criticizing this project deserve to be heard as well. But the goal of criticism should be success, not collapse.
We should scrutinize it not to make it fail, but to make it succeed. The bigger the numbers, the bigger the risks. The bigger the expectations, the bigger the responsibility. This is all the more true for a project announced with the president and corporate leaders standing side by side. The figure of 800 trillion won is a promise made to the public. A promise does not end with applause. It must be proven through timelines, accountable officials, budgets, sites, and infrastructure.
The Odds
For the 800-trillion-won Honam semiconductor plan to succeed, we must first face its odd points head-on. Pointing out oddities does not mean opposing the project — it means being honest, starting now, so that the project can succeed.
There are five critical risks. The first is infrastructure risk: if power, water, wastewater treatment, and transmission networks are not ready in time, the fabs simply cannot be built.
The second is workforce risk: if people arrive later than the factories, mass production will be delayed.
The third is supply-chain risk: if the materials-and-equipment ecosystem does not follow, costs, quality, and maintenance will all suffer.
The fourth is the memory industry's boom-and-bust cycle: memory chips go through repeated cycles of boom and downturn, and a mismatch between investment timing and production timing can create enormous financial strain.
The fifth is political risk: as administrations change and regional conflict intensifies, a long-term project like this can be shaken.
What is needed now, therefore, is not a debate between supporters and opponents, but a design for execution.
Building the Conditions for Success
First, the government must publicly release a national roadmap for the 800-trillion-won Honam semiconductor project — annual investment plans, responsible ministries, each company's role, infrastructure-building schedules, permitting targets, and workforce-training plans. What matters more than the number is the execution plan.
Second, the power grid must be built first. Power planning must come before fab construction begins. A special semiconductor power plan is needed that integrates nuclear power, renewables, LNG, energy storage systems, transmission networks, and substation infrastructure. Connecting Honam's renewable energy potential to semiconductor fabs and AI data centers is a very meaningful model, but stability and quality must be secured alongside it.
Third, a special plan for ultrapure water and water supply must be established — dams, rivers, seawater desalination, water reuse, wastewater treatment, and localization of ultrapure-water technology. For semiconductors, water is not merely infrastructure — it is competitiveness itself.
Fourth, workforce training must become a national project. A network connecting universities in Gwangju, Jeonnam, Jeonbuk, Chungcheong, and the capital region should be built around contract-based semiconductor departments and hands-on training systems, with professors, equipment, practical training lines, scholarships, and job placement all working together. Whether a provincial semiconductor cluster succeeds ultimately depends on whether young people choose to stay.
Fifth, a plan for relocating materials-and-equipment companies and supporting shared growth must be prepared. If only the fabs move south while suppliers stay behind, the result is a half-formed cluster. Tax incentives, site support, leased factory space, R&D subsidies, and logistics support should encourage equipment, materials, and parts companies to move together.
Sixth, rather than competing with Yongin, Pyeongtaek, and Icheon, roles must be divided. The capital-region cluster and the Honam cluster must not end up poaching each other's workforce or splitting investment. A national semiconductor production portfolio needs to be designed, with existing clusters focused on cutting-edge technology and core production, and Honam developing into a new production base and a hub connected to future memory and AI data centers.
Seventh, the project must be linked with the Chungcheong HBM packaging hub. In the AI semiconductor era, back-end processes and packaging matter as much as front-end fabrication. HBM is an industry where memory, packaging, testing, and customer qualification are all intertwined. The Honam production base, the Chungcheong packaging hub, and capital-region R&D need to be woven into a single network.
Eighth, the project should connect with physical AI hubs in Jeonbuk and Gyeongnam. Semiconductors are the heart of physical AI, and physical AI is the future of semiconductor demand. Jeonbuk could serve as a testbed for physical AI, dark factories, digital twins, and startups — a demonstration ground where semiconductors expand into actual manufacturing floors, robotics, mobility, agri-bio, and logistics. If the Honam semiconductor project connects with Jeonbuk's physical AI initiatives, the result would not be a simple production base, but an AI manufacturing-innovation belt.
Ninth, the project must be managed as an industrial matter, not a political one. Some reports mention the need for a direct oversight system under the presidential office, but that alone is not enough. An independent steering committee involving companies, government, local authorities, universities, research institutes, and financial institutions is needed. Progress should be reviewed quarterly, causes of delay disclosed, and problems resolved immediately.
Tenth, the meaning of this project must be explained clearly to the public. The 800-trillion-won Honam semiconductor project is not a gift to a particular region — it is an investment in Korea's industrial security. It eases the burden on the capital region, strengthens the industrial base of the provinces, and expands Korea's production capacity in the global AI semiconductor war. Unless this is communicated to the public, the project will remain vulnerable to disruption.
The key to success is connection. Gwangju and Jeonnam can become a semiconductor production hub; Jeonbuk, a physical-AI demonstration hub; Chungcheong, an HBM packaging hub; the capital region, a hub for R&D and cutting-edge production; Yeongnam, a hub for materials and equipment manufacturing; Daegu-Gyeongbuk, a hub for parts and advanced materials; and Gangwon, a hub for power and data infrastructure. Connected this way, Korea becomes one enormous AI semiconductor nation.
The Real Battlefield Is Not Yeongnam vs. Honam — It Is Taiwan and China
What Korea must guard against most is wasting its energy on internal competition. Honam does not lose out because semiconductors go there. The capital region does not weaken because HBM packaging goes to Chungcheong. Gwangju and Jeonnam's semiconductor project does not weaken because Jeonbuk pursues physical AI.
When each region takes on its own role within a single connected industrial network, Korea as a whole grows stronger.
The real competitors are not other regions within Korea. They are Taiwan, China, the United States, and Japan. Taiwan, centered on TSMC, remains the absolute leader in the global foundry business. China, despite U.S. sanctions, continues to pour state funds into pursuing semiconductor self-sufficiency.
The United States treats semiconductors not merely as an economic issue but as a matter of national security. Japan dreams of a revival through materials, equipment, advanced packaging, and the Rapidus project. If Korea gets trapped in internal regional disputes amid this massive global contest, it risks losing its future.
Korea's strength in semiconductors lies in memory. But memory alone will not be enough going forward. The country must extend into HBM, next-generation DRAM, NAND, AI chips, packaging, power semiconductors, automotive chips, defense semiconductors, and physical-AI chips. Semiconductors are no longer a single industry — they are the foundation of every industry. Cars cannot move without them, robots cannot think without them, and data centers cannot compute without them.
That is why the Honam semiconductor project must succeed. If it does, Korea will move beyond its single-axis, capital-centered structure and become a multi-polar semiconductor nation. If it fails, the 800-trillion-won figure will remain a political scar, and Korea's entire semiconductor strategy will be shaken. This project is simply too large to have the luxury of failing.
Honam, too, must prepare. Attracting a semiconductor project is not the finish line — it is the starting point. The local community must transform its education, housing, healthcare, transportation, culture, and administrative speed together. If permitting is slow, complaints pile up, workers leave, and suppliers fail to settle, the semiconductor cluster will end up as a name without substance. Gwangju and Jeonnam must be prepared to transform the very fabric of their cities and industries with the resolve to become Korea's second semiconductor production hub.
Jeonbuk, too, should look for its opportunity. There is no need for disappointment simply because it did not receive a fab directly under the Gwangju-Jeonnam semiconductor plan. Instead, Jeonbuk should aim to become a demonstration hub for physical AI. If semiconductors are the brain, physical AI is the body.
An era is coming in which AI runs factories, robots handle logistics, autonomous vehicles connect industrial complexes, and digital twins predict productivity. Built on Saemangeum and its strengths in future mobility, agri-bio, renewable energy, and industrial land, Jeonbuk can become a testbed for physical AI. If the Honam semiconductor project and Jeonbuk's physical-AI initiatives come together, Korea will move beyond being a country that makes chips to becoming a country that demonstrates to the world how chips move.
The 800-trillion-won Honam semiconductor project must succeed. But to succeed, we must scrutinize it more honestly, prepare it more meticulously, and connect it on a far larger scale.
Honam's success must become Korea's success. Jeonbuk's success in physical AI must become Korea's success in manufacturing innovation. And Korea's success in semiconductors must become the livelihood, the jobs, and the dream of the next generation. That is the path we must take.
*The author is a columnist of AJP.
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