SEOUL, July 09 (AJP) - For years, Türkiye occupied an uncomfortable place inside NATO: too important to expel, too difficult to embrace.
It was the ally that bought a Russian air defense system over Washington’s objections.
The country that refused to join Western sanctions against Moscow after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The state that could sell drones to Kyiv while keeping open channels to the Kremlin. The government whose president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, jailed critics at home while presenting himself abroad as a broker among presidents, generals and strongmen.
But at this week’s NATO summit in Ankara, the old language of irritation gave way to the language of necessity.
Türkiye was not the problem child standing outside the room. It was the host.
That fact alone captured one of the central shifts in the alliance since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022: NATO’s most awkward members can also become some of its most useful. And few countries have turned wartime disorder into strategic leverage as effectively as Türkiye.
The summit brought together the leaders of NATO’s 32 member states at a moment when the alliance is trying to rearm at speed, prepare for a diminished American security guarantee, sustain Ukraine, contain Russia and widen defense-industrial cooperation beyond Europe and North America. It was also attended by partner countries, including South Korea, whose president, Lee Jae Myung, used the gathering to pitch Seoul as a reliable supplier and co-producer in NATO’s expanding defense market.
Yet the summit’s deeper story belonged to Turkey. More precisely, it belonged to the strange return of Turkish power inside an alliance that had spent much of the past decade wondering whether Ankara was drifting away from the West.
The clearest sign came from President Donald Trump, who met Erdogan on the sidelines of the summit and said the United States would move to lift sanctions on Türkiye imposed over its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense system. Trump also said he would consider allowing Turkey to acquire F-35 fighter jets, though he stopped short of announcing a completed sale.
For Ankara, that was not just an arms issue. It was a symbolic reopening of a door that had been slammed shut in 2019, when the United States removed Türkiye from the F-35 program over fears that the Russian system could expose the stealth jet’s vulnerabilities to Moscow.
For NATO, it was something larger: a test of whether the alliance’s need for Türkiye has grown strong enough to overcome its mistrust of Türkiye.
The return of the indispensable ally
Türkiye’s rise has not come from a sudden ideological return to the West. It has come from the opposite: Ankara’s insistence on not fully belonging to any camp.
That ambiguity once made Türkiye suspect. Now, in a world of overlapping wars and unstable alliances, it has made Türkiye useful.
Türkiye sits at the hinge of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It controls the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, giving it influence over naval access between Russia’s Black Sea fleet and the wider world. It has the second-largest army in NATO after the United States. Its defense industry has become faster, cheaper and more export-oriented. Its drones, ships, armored vehicles and air defense systems are increasingly visible in conflicts from Ukraine to the Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East.
And unlike many Western governments, Ankara has kept open channels to Moscow.
That has allowed Erdogan to play a role that few other NATO leaders can plausibly attempt: arming one side while talking to the other.
“The initial boost to Türkiye’s role was the result of its efforts to mediate between the two sides, despite Ankara being inside NATO and providing TB2 drones to Ukraine to defend itself from Russia in 2022,” said Matteo Fumagalli, director of the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus Studies (MECACS) at the University of St Andrews.
“These included high-level meetings in Istanbul, which culminated in the Istanbul Protocol. Nothing came out of it in the end, but the efforts made Turkey an actor regarded as legitimate and acceptable by all parties.”
The Istanbul talks did not end the war. But they changed the diplomatic perception of Türkiye. Ankara was not neutral in the strict sense. It was a NATO member. It had sold weapons to Ukraine. It had blocked some naval movements through the Turkish Straits. But it also did not close its door to Russia.
That combination — partial alignment, partial distance — has become the core of Türkiye’s post-Ukraine-war influence.
Timo Kivimäki, professor of international relations at the University of Bath and a senior non-resident fellow at the Sejong Institute, described Türkiye as part of a new category of states whose value lies not in unquestioned loyalty but in diplomatic independence.
“I think Türkiye has earned its peace superpower role by working independently and competently for peace,” he said. “They are a NATO country, yet, in many international conflict they can take distance from their NATO commitments, and that is what makes them valuable.”
For decades, Western alliance politics rewarded predictability. The Ukraine war has rewarded a different quality: access. Access to Moscow. Access to Kyiv. Access to Washington. Access to the Middle East. Access to military production capacity.
Türkiye has all of them.
A war that weakened Russia and strengthened Türkiye
The Ukraine war has helped Türkiye in both direct and indirect ways.
Directly, it made Türkiye a necessary actor in the Black Sea. Ankara helped broker the Black Sea grain corridor, one of the few diplomatic arrangements that temporarily eased the war’s global economic fallout. It also launched a minesweeping initiative with Romania and Bulgaria to keep parts of the western Black Sea safer for shipping.
Rick Fawn, professor of international relations at the University of St Andrews, said Turkey had emerged as one of the clearest beneficiaries of the war’s strategic disruption.
“If there is one single conclusion it is that Türkiye is the ‘winner.’ Ankara cleverly does its own thing,” he said.
Fawn said Türkiye had become the “lynchpin to Black Sea security and that of NATO’s eastern flank,” but always “on its own terms.”
That phrase — on its own terms — is essential. Türkiye’s usefulness to NATO has not made it more obedient. It has made it more demanding.
Ankara has used its leverage to seek relief from defense restrictions, access to European security initiatives and the revival of a weapons relationship with Washington. At the summit, Erdogan called for NATO allies to remove defense-industry restrictions against one another, arguing that exclusionary practices, including those linked to European Union membership, risked creating artificial divisions inside Europe.
The indirect effects of the Ukraine war may be just as important.
Stefanie Ortmann, professor of international relations at the University of Sussex, said Russia’s weakening has opened strategic space for Türkiye beyond Ukraine itself.
“Some of this is a direct effect, as Erdogan has been able to maintain and indeed extend good relations with Russia, while also maintaining and extending relations with Ukraine," she observed, while noting the war weakened Russia’s ability to sustain influence in other regions.
“Russia has been weakened by the invasion insofar as it has been unable to maintain its engagement in other parts of the world,” she said. “Russia has stopped supporting Armenia in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has led to the ethnic cleansing of the enclave in 2023 by Azerbaijan, supported by Türkiye both militarily and diplomatically.”
She also pointed to Syria, where Russia’s reduced capacity to support Bashar al-Assad has created room for Türkiye to shape outcomes more directly.
In other words, the Ukraine war did not merely increase Türkiye’s value inside NATO. It weakened Türkiye’s rivals in regions where Ankara had already been competing for influence.
Trump and Erdogan, two transactional leaders
Erdogan’s fortunes have also been helped by the return of Trump, a president who often treats alliances less as institutions than as negotiations among leaders.
Trump’s relationship with Erdogan has long been unusually warm compared with Washington’s broader view of Türkiye. In his first term, Trump sometimes expressed sympathy for Ankara’s frustration over the F-35 dispute, even as U.S. officials warned that Türkiye’s S-400 system posed unacceptable risks to the stealth fighter program.
Now, in his second term, Trump appears more willing to reopen the issue.
Michael Plouffe, professor of international political economy at University College London, said the potential F-35 sale should be understood within Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy.
“Trump’s well-known affinity for strongman leaders put Erdogan in a rather favorable position when Russia invaded Ukraine, and he’s managed to leverage this affinity quite well to increase Türkiye’s regional influence,” he said.
He added that Türkiye’s outsider status in Europe may have become an advantage.
“Türkiye’s outsider status when it comes to Europe was something he was able to use to great effect when acting as an intermediary between Trump, Zelenskyy and Putin, as something of a less hawkish and more moderate voice in comparison to European members of NATO, and perhaps more closely attuned to Trump’s and Putin’s desires.”
The relationship is not built on shared democratic values. It is built on a shared preference for leader-to-leader bargaining, visible strength and short-term deals.
Plouffe was blunt about the F-35 question.
“I would view the F-35 sale as a reward for Türkiye’s support for the Trump administration over the past couple of years, and as a warning to Netanyahu over Israel’s repeated sabotaging of the U.S.-Iranian efforts to de-escalate conflict,” he said.
That interpretation highlights the complexity of the issue. A possible F-35 sale to Türkiye is not only about Türkiye and NATO. It is also about Israel, Iran, Syria, the balance of air power in the Middle East and Trump’s shifting relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel.
Israel has long enjoyed a qualitative military edge in the region, and the spread of F-35s to other Middle Eastern powers would raise difficult questions in Washington. Türkiye is a NATO ally, but it is also a regional competitor whose relations with Israel have deteriorated sharply under Erdogan.
That is why the F-35 issue remains a signal rather than a settlement.
Andrew Scott, lecturer in the department of political science at University College London, cautioned against treating Trump’s comments as a done deal.
“I’m also not entirely sure about the F-35 part,” he said. “He’s said he would ‘certainly consider’ selling them but nothing was actually approved yet. It was a signal, rather than a deal and I’m not sure how much you can trust Trump here."
The F-35 as a measure of trust
The F-35 is not merely another aircraft. It is a flying intelligence platform, a stealth strike system and a symbol of the most sensitive tier of American defense cooperation.
That is why Türkiye’s removal from the program was so damaging. Ankara had been a partner in the F-35’s international development network and had invested heavily in the program. Turkish companies had expected a role in the jet’s supply chain. Türkiye had expected to modernize its air force around the aircraft.
Instead, the S-400 purchase triggered sanctions and exclusion.
The American concern was straightforward: If Türkiye operated both the Russian S-400 system and the F-35, Moscow might gain insight into how to detect or defeat the jet’s stealth capabilities.
Ankara argued that the punishment was unjust. Washington insisted the risk was intolerable.
The dispute became one of the clearest signs that Türkiye’s relationship with the United States had moved from alliance tension to strategic mistrust.
Now, Trump’s willingness to revisit the issue suggests that the balance of pressure has shifted. Türkiye is no longer asking from a position of isolation. It is asking while hosting NATO, contributing to Black Sea security, expanding defense production and positioning itself as a mediator in multiple conflicts.
But legal and political obstacles remain. Congress could resist any F-35 transfer. Israel could lobby against it. U.S. defense officials could insist that the S-400 system be removed, dismantled or transferred before any sale proceeds.
That means Türkiye’s NATO comeback is real, but incomplete.
Scott noted that Türkiye still faces major constraints.
“It’s not all good though,” he said. “Israel still has air dominance over Syria, the economic situation is still very fragile and even in spite of their leverage in certain areas their EU accession has been frozen for years and shows no sign of being revived.”
Türkiye may be more powerful than it was in 2022. But power has not erased vulnerability.
South Korea enters the NATO market
While Türkiye used the Ankara summit to demonstrate geopolitical leverage, South Korea used it to demonstrate industrial relevance.
President Lee Jae Myung arrived in Ankara on July 7 as the leader of a NATO partner country at the invitation of Secretary General Mark Rutte. His schedule reflected Seoul’s ambitions: a meeting with Rutte, participation in talks with the Indo-Pacific Four partners — South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand — and a keynote speech at a NATO defense industry forum titled “Shared Values, Stronger Industrial Base.”
In his meeting with Rutte, South Korea and NATO agreed to launch negotiations on a basic procurement agreement that Seoul officials said would create an institutional foundation for Korean companies to participate in NATO’s joint defense procurement market.
At the defense forum, Lee proposed what he called a “South Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0,” calling for cooperation to move beyond weapons sales toward joint research, production and operation of weapons systems.
The timing was important. NATO is no longer focused only on military readiness in the abstract. It is trying to solve a production problem.
Ukraine’s war has exposed the limits of Western stockpiles, ammunition output and industrial mobilization. NATO countries are spending more, but they also need suppliers that can produce quickly and reliably. That has opened space for countries like South Korea, whose defense industry has already expanded rapidly in Europe through major arms deals with Poland and other partners.
Lee’s presence in Ankara therefore fit into the summit’s larger theme: the globalization of NATO’s defense-industrial base.
Türkiye and South Korea represent two different answers to the same problem. Türkiye offers geography, wartime access and an increasingly capable domestic arms industry. South Korea offers scale, manufacturing discipline and a record of rapid delivery.
Both are outside the traditional core of NATO power. Both are increasingly difficult for NATO to ignore.
A summit about weapons, not only values
The Ankara summit revealed a hard truth about the alliance: NATO still speaks the language of democracy, freedom and shared values, but its immediate needs are increasingly industrial and strategic.
It needs ammunition. It needs drones. It needs air defense systems. It needs shipyards, missiles, armored vehicles and production lines that can expand faster than Russia’s. It needs partners that can help fill gaps.
That reality has given Türkiye new bargaining power despite concerns over Erdogan’s domestic record.
For years, European leaders criticized Türkiye’s democratic backsliding, its crackdown on opposition politicians, its pressure on the press and its expansive use of state power against critics. Those concerns have not disappeared. But at the Ankara summit, they were overshadowed by defense spending, Ukraine, weapons production and the search for new security arrangements.
This is one of the uncomfortable lessons of the Ukraine war. Strategic utility can soften democratic criticism. Not erase it, but push it to the margins.
Albert Weale, emeritus professor of political science at University College London, said Trump was unlikely to be troubled by Erdogan’s domestic authoritarianism.
“Erdogan’s crackdown on the Turkish opposition will not be a problem for Trump,” he said. “Trump is so volatile and transactional that seeking a strategic rationale for his foreign policy may be fruitless.”
Weale also warned that Türkiye’s rise should not be seen only through the Ukraine lens.
“Türkiye’s rise to prominence in Trump’s eyes not unlikely to be connected with Ukraine,” he said. “Rather Türkiye has been vying with Israel to be the regional hegemon.”
That competition with Israel adds another layer to the F-35 debate. If Washington allows Türkiye back into the program, it may strengthen NATO cohesion in one theater while complicating American relationships in another.
The appeal of strategic ambiguity
Türkiye’s foreign policy is sometimes described as hedging, though that word does not fully capture Ankara’s posture. Hedging implies cautious balancing. Türkiye’s approach is often more assertive: it pushes, bargains, delays, obstructs and mediates, depending on the issue.
It blocked Sweden’s NATO accession for months before extracting concessions. It challenged Greece and Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. It maintained ties with Russia while selling drones to Ukraine. It presented itself as a Muslim-majority NATO power, a Black Sea gatekeeper, a Middle Eastern actor, a Caucasus power and a Eurasian bridge.
To critics, this is opportunism. To supporters, it is strategic autonomy.
To many middle powers watching from outside Europe, it may look like a model.
Fumagalli said Türkiye’s ability to maintain relations with the United States, Russia, China and regional actors may appeal to countries facing similar pressure to choose sides.
“The fact that Ankara has been able to navigate very choppy waters geopolitically, maintaining decent relations with all parties, from the U.S. to Russia, China, and others is perhaps a lesson that other countries in its immediate neighborhood — South Caucasus? Central Asia? — might be interested in, since they face similar constraints,” he said.
“It is difficult not to choose in today’s geopolitically fraught world, but hedging remains an appealing, and for the time being, feasible foreign policy strategy for a number of countries. Although Ankara does not quite hedge as such, its foreign policy conduct reminds of us of some of the aspects of this foreign policy strategy,” he added.
This may be Türkiye’s most important export: not drones or armored vehicles, but a method.
It is a method built on refusing permanent alignment, cultivating personal ties with powerful leaders, developing domestic defense capacity and using geography as leverage. It is risky, but in Türkiye’s case it has produced results.
The limits of Türkiye’s comeback
Still, Türkiye’s rise has boundaries.
Its economy remains fragile, with inflation, currency weakness and investor concerns limiting Erdogan’s room for maneuver. Its EU accession process is frozen and shows little sign of revival. Its relations with several European governments remain strained. Its domestic politics continue to raise concerns among allies that define NATO as a democratic alliance, not merely a military one.
Its relationship with Russia is also a source of both leverage and suspicion. The very channels that make Türkiye useful as a mediator also make some allies question Ankara’s reliability.
The F-35 issue captures all of these contradictions.
If the United States restores Türkiye’s access to the fighter, Erdogan can claim a major victory. It would show that Ankara endured years of pressure and emerged with its strategic importance recognized. It would also strengthen Türkiye’s hand against Greece and reassure its defense establishment that Türkiye has not been permanently downgraded in the American security hierarchy.
But if the deal stalls in Congress, or if Washington demands unacceptable conditions on the S-400, the episode could deepen Turkish grievances and reinforce Ankara’s belief that the West will never fully trust it.
Either outcome carries risks.
For NATO, the dilemma is familiar but sharper than before: Türkiye is often difficult when it is weak, but it may be even more difficult when it is strong.
What Ankara showed
The Ankara summit did not resolve NATO’s Turkey problem. It reframed it.
Türkiye is no longer just a source of friction. It is a source of capacity. It can shape Black Sea access, influence talks over Ukraine, complicate Russia’s naval posture, expand defense production and act as a bridge to regions where many Western governments have limited reach.
That makes Türkiye valuable. It does not necessarily make it trusted.
The same independence that allows Ankara to talk to Moscow makes allies nervous. The same defense industry that strengthens NATO’s capacity also gives Turkey more autonomy. The same personal diplomacy that appeals to Trump may weaken the institutional predictability on which alliances depend.
Kivimäki argued that Trump’s “deal-orientation” has a positive side because it focuses on relationships between countries rather than dividing the world into democracies and autocracies.
“There is research that show that such relation-orientation does help foster peace,” he said.
But he also warned that Trump’s disregard for supranational institutions creates long-term risks.
“At the same time, Trump does not have any respect for supranational realities such as the international law and the UN,” he said.
“The development of supranational governance is the long-term hope for world peace, and thus Trump’s attitude that does not respect the UN or the law is problematic.”
That tension — between deal-making and rules, between usefulness and values, between power and trust — ran through the summit.
Türkiye has learned to thrive in that space.
A new NATO, whether Europe likes it or not
The image of NATO as a tidy club of like-minded democracies has always been partly myth. During the Cold War, the alliance included authoritarian members when strategic necessity demanded it. Today, the return of large-scale war to Europe has again made necessity more powerful than discomfort.
Türkiye understands this. So does South Korea, though in a different way.
Ankara is selling NATO its geography, its access and its ambiguity. Seoul is selling NATO its factories, its technology and its reliability. Both are beneficiaries of a new defense era in which production capacity has become a form of geopolitical power.
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