President Lee Jae-myung's approval ratings are now under threat, dipping below 40%. A survey released by Realmeter on August 24 showed a positive rating of 40.2%, marking a six-week decline, while negative evaluations surged to 56.9%. A separate poll by Gallup Korea also indicated a 'dead cross,' where negative ratings surpassed positive ones. Although the exact figures vary by polling agency, it is clear that a warning signal from the public has been activated.
Discontent that had been obscured by high approval ratings at the start of his administration has surfaced, driven by issues related to real estate, public welfare, and internal conflicts within the ruling party. The president and the ruling party must not dismiss this as a temporary fluctuation in public opinion or blame it on opposition attacks; they need to take it seriously. It is time to reflect on where they have lost the public's trust in governance.
However, listening to public sentiment is different from changing government direction based solely on poll numbers. A government that reverses policies due to falling approval ratings and increases exceptions in response to backlash will struggle to gain trust. Mistakes must be corrected swiftly, but the goals and principles of necessary national policies should not be abandoned. It is essential to distinguish what needs to be fixed and what must be upheld.
One immediate issue to address is the factional politics within the ruling party, exemplified by the so-called 'Myung-Cheong conflict.' The clashes between President Lee and former Democratic Party leader Jeong Cheong-rae, along with the power struggle between pro-Lee and pro-Cheong factions, have given the impression that the ruling party is more focused on power struggles than on public welfare. If the party and the administration continue to show discord over policies and appointments while vying for control, it is natural for the public to turn away. The president must take the lead in resolving these conflicts and refocus the ruling party on public welfare and governance achievements.
The approach to advancing key legislation, including judicial reform, also needs reevaluation. Even if there is a need for institutional reform, pushing through changes solely based on the ruling party's majority without sufficient deliberation and measures to prevent adverse effects can provoke backlash from moderate voters. If procedures, speed, and detailed designs are flawed, they must be boldly revised. Politics that dismiss opposing views as resistance from vested interests or only heed the voices of hardline supporters will find it difficult to gain public consensus.
In real estate policy, mistakes must be corrected promptly. Uniform loan volume regulations should not leave first-time homebuyers and those seeking relocation or balance loans struggling at bank counters. Tax reforms that increase market uncertainty without adequate explanation and notice must be addressed. Regulations that fail to distinguish between speculative demand and genuine need, resulting in innocent victims, are not sound policies.
However, the government must not retreat from the goal of stabilizing housing prices and managing household debt. Lowering tax burdens indiscriminately and loosening loan restrictions in an attempt to boost approval ratings could send the wrong signal that the government will prevent housing prices from falling. It is crucial to correct the structure that allows excessive debt and speculative demand to inflate housing prices while ensuring protection for actual residents and first-time buyers. Consistent efforts must also be made to ensure that redevelopment and urban supply lead to actual housing availability.
Ignoring public warnings or abandoning principles under the pretext of public sentiment is unacceptable. The political missteps of the Myung-Cheong conflict, discord between the party and the administration, and unilateral legislative approaches must be corrected immediately. Conversely, the normalization of the real estate market, management of household debt, and necessary institutional reforms are not policies to abandon simply because public opinion is unfavorable. While addressing side effects, the goals and principles must be maintained.
What President Lee needs to do is not seek quick-fix popularity strategies to boost approval ratings. He must resolve the power struggles within the ruling party and the confusion in governance, swiftly correct poorly designed policies, and persuade the public to pursue necessary tasks. Approval ratings should recover through the results of policies, not by reversing them. Turning the current crisis into an opportunity lies in that approach.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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