The government and ruling party are pushing to transfer the authority for designating redevelopment and reconstruction zones for projects with fewer than 500 units from the Seoul city government to local districts. The rationale is to expedite housing supply by reducing the procedures that involve the city. While this sounds reasonable, administrative actions should be evaluated based on outcomes rather than just intentions. Simply decentralizing authority does not automatically equate to reform.
Seoul is divided into 25 districts, yet it functions as a single city. The floor area ratio and building heights in one district affect not only its residents but also the surrounding infrastructure, including roads, subways, schools, parks, water supply, sunlight access, and views of the Han River and mountains. If development standards vary across district boundaries, Seoul's urban planning could become fragmented. Even if districts build housing, the entire city shares the benefits.
Currently, many powers related to establishing redevelopment associations, project implementation, and management are already exercised by local districts. The city retains key responsibilities, such as designating redevelopment zones and overseeing integrated reviews that require regional coordination. Proposing to strip these powers without identifying the actual bottlenecks causing delays in supply is akin to wielding a scalpel without first diagnosing the issue.
With authority concentrated in the city, oversight becomes more stringent. The Seoul City Council must conduct administrative audits, and the National Assembly's Administrative and Land Transport Committees also scrutinize the city's actions. Although not all local affairs are subject to national audits, the city's housing and urban planning undergoes annual nationwide scrutiny.
What happens if authority is divided among the 25 districts? Oversight does not disappear; district councils exist, and the city and audit offices can supervise. However, it becomes challenging for the National Assembly and media to track the designation processes and interests of hundreds of small redevelopment projects. If the majority party in local councils and district mayors share the same political interests, checks and balances may weaken. While authority may be closer to residents, oversight paradoxically becomes more distant.
This reflects a significant contradiction in local governance. While there is an advantage in quickly reflecting residents' wishes in administration, prolonged local power can lead to the formation of a shared interest community among local elites, developers, and politicians. The risks are magnified when development profits reach hundreds of billions or trillions of won. Local administration, which is supposed to be close to residents, can morph into one that is aligned with vested interests.
It is worth considering why the Seoul city government has been managing integrated personnel exchanges between city and district technical officials in civil engineering and architecture. This approach aims to balance the distribution of expertise while preventing long-term collusion with specific regions or developers. If significant development authority is concentrated in one place while personnel are rotated, the system becomes inconsistent.
The public remembers the Daejang-dong incident. Although the legal structures of Daejang-dong and Seoul's redevelopment and reconstruction differ, it is incorrect to assume that transferring authority will inevitably lead to a repeat of Daejang-dong. However, we must not ignore the lessons learned from Daejang-dong. We have already witnessed the suspicions and social costs that arise when development authority and developer profits intertwine opaquely without sufficient checks.
In this context, the government's proposal to reduce Seoul's regional review authority while expanding the powers of local leaders seems particularly ill-timed. This does not necessarily reflect their intentions, but to the public, it may appear as a case of 'another Daejang-dong incident.' The saying 'do not adjust your hat under the apricot tree' implies that one should act in a way that avoids unjust suspicion. If the government and ruling party still bear the scars of Daejang-dong, they should prioritize establishing tighter checks before distributing development authority.
The issue of the greenbelt is related. Past mayors of Seoul, regardless of their political affiliations, have generally been cautious about lifting greenbelt restrictions. While there have been some exceptions, the fundamental principle of viewing the greenbelt as an asset for future generations has been maintained. This is not merely a personal stubbornness of any one mayor but a minimal restraint that a densely populated city like Seoul must uphold.
In urgent need of housing supply, the government should not resort to using irreplaceable green spaces. Instead, it should first normalize redevelopment and reconstruction in urban areas where infrastructure is already established. The focus should be on rationally easing regulations that hinder projects, such as floor area ratios, loans, and the transfer of membership status, to accelerate ongoing projects. The greenbelt should remain a last resort, not a contingency fund to cover government policy failures.
This does not imply that the current system in Seoul is flawless. There is a need for greater transparency in reviews and shorter processing times. However, the fundamental structure that coordinates the entire city as a single living area and subjects it to multiple layers of oversight is more rational than dividing authority among districts. The issue to address is not the regional oversight mechanism but the slow procedures.
Politics should not focus on reducing Mayor Oh Se-hoon's authority, nor should the city aim to maintain its power for its own sake. The sole criterion should be which system can supply housing more quickly while effectively preventing haphazard development, favoritism, and local collusion.
Decentralization only occurs when responsibility and oversight are also delegated. If responsibility becomes blurred while development authority is transferred, that is not reform. The government should not feel compelled to adjust its hat under the apricot tree regarding Seoul's century-long urban planning and green spaces for future generations.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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