Editor's Note: The following opinion article was contributed by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Seoul.
SEOUL, September 04 (AJP) - No policy exists in a vacuum. A measure designed to pressure one country can, over time, alter the calculations of many others.
Companies look for new ways to trade. Banks develop new approaches to managing risk. Governments seek to reduce their dependence on financial networks and supply chains that can become instruments of political pressure.
This raises a broader question: when sanctions remain in place for years, do they continue to function simply as a tool of pressure, or do they begin to reshape the economic environment itself?
Iran offers one of the clearest long-term cases through which to examine this question.
Years of sanctions have imposed significant costs on Iran. They have restricted access to financial resources, complicated payments, raised the cost of trade and increased uncertainty for businesses.
But economic pressure does not produce a single, predictable response. Over time, countries adapt.
Iran has sought to diversify its trade relationships, develop alternative channels for payments and commerce, strengthen domestic capacity and reduce its vulnerability to external restrictions.
This does not mean sanctions have no effect. They clearly do. The issue is more complicated:
Pressure changes behavior but not necessarily in the way those applying the pressure intend.
Every new round of sanctions can create another shock. It can disrupt an established channel, increase costs or make an existing transaction more difficult. But for a country that has lived under sanctions for years, a new restriction does not necessarily mean starting from zero.
Experience matters.
Over time, countries learn where their vulnerabilities lie, develop alternatives and adjust their economic networks. A new sanction may close one route, but the response may be to find another. It may increase the cost of a transaction without necessarily stopping it altogether.
This is particularly relevant as Washington continues to expand its sanctions regime against Iran, including measures that extend pressure to financial institutions and other actors outside Iran. The question is not whether such measures create pressure. They do. The more important question is whether each new layer of pressure produces the political outcome intended — or whether it also accelerates adaptation and the search for alternatives.
A new sanction can create a new obstacle without necessarily creating a new outcome.
The longer sanctions remain in place, the more significant this dynamic becomes.
The targeted country is not the only actor that adapts. Banks and companies elsewhere also change how they assess markets. Political and sanctions-related risks become part of ordinary business calculations. Governments may seek alternative trading partners, energy sources and financial channels to reduce their exposure to decisions made elsewhere.
The growing use of secondary sanctions makes this effect even clearer. Pressure can extend beyond its original target and influence the decisions of banks, companies and governments that were never parties to the initial dispute.
Sanctions can therefore produce effects well beyond their original purpose. They can change the calculations of actors who were never part of the original conflict.
Consider the experience of an Iranian living, studying or working abroad. A routine bank transaction or the transfer of money for everyday expenses can sometimes become difficult because of restrictions that have little to do with that individual's own actions.
It is a small example of a much larger phenomenon: decisions made at the government level can eventually reshape ordinary economic interactions.
But the central issue remains political.
If sanctions are intended to change a country's behavior, how should their success be measured?
Is imposing greater economic costs enough? Or should success ultimately be judged by whether those costs produce the political outcome they were intended to achieve?
Iran raises this question clearly. After years of sanctions, many of the underlying political disputes remain unresolved. At the same time, Iran and its economic partners have developed new channels of trade and cooperation, while businesses have adapted to the constraints.
This suggests an important distinction between raising the cost and achieving the objective.
Sanctions can raise costs. But higher costs are not, by themselves, a political solution.
The issue extends beyond Iran.
As economic tools have become more prominent in geopolitical competition, countries have begun to rethink what economic security means. It is no longer simply about financial strength or military capability. Access to energy, trade routes, supply chains, payment systems and the ability to make independent economic decisions are increasingly part of the equation.
The more sanctions are used as a foreign-policy instrument, the stronger the incentive becomes to develop alternatives.
This is the paradox at the heart of long-term sanctions:
They are designed to narrow a country's choices, yet they can also encourage the creation of new ones.
Iran has experienced this process over time. External pressure has created costs, but it has also encouraged greater diversification of economic relationships and investment in capacities designed to reduce vulnerability to external restrictions.
None of this means sanctions are ineffective or cost-free. It means that pressure rarely produces only the response intended by those who apply it.
Countries learn. They adapt. They look for alternatives.
That is why sanctions should perhaps be assessed by a broader measure — not simply by asking how much pressure they have created, but by asking what they have changed, and where those changes have led.
If the ultimate goal is to resolve a political dispute, economic pressure must eventually connect to a political path toward resolution. Sanctions may be one instrument of foreign policy, but they cannot permanently substitute for diplomacy.
Otherwise, a temporary instrument can become a permanent condition — one that gradually changes not only the targeted country, but also its economic partners, markets and the wider rules of global economic interaction.
So perhaps the more useful question is no longer:
“Do sanctions work?”
It is:
“After years of sanctions, what have they changed?”
The targeted country?
The behavior of its economic partners?
The routes of trade and energy?
Or even the rules of the global economic system itself?
The answer matters far beyond Iran. It tells us something about how the international system responds when economic pressure becomes a permanent feature of geopolitical competition.
Because sanctions may begin as a tool of pressure.
But when they become permanent, they do not change only the country they target. They change the world around it.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the contributor and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position, analysis, or views of AJP, its editors, or its parent organization. AJP publishes contributed opinion pieces from governments, diplomatic missions, experts, and other external contributors as part of its commitment to presenting diverse international perspectives. Publication does not constitute endorsement of the opinions or factual claims contained in the article.
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