The amendment to the National Intelligence Service (NIS) Act passed the National Assembly on September 3. The revision expands the NIS's scope of duties to include 'economic security' and broadens its information-gathering activities in the field of cybersecurity to include cases where there is 'substantial reason to suspect' the involvement of international or state-sponsored hacking organizations based on hacking methods or damage patterns.
This measure is necessary considering the changing times. The concept of security has already transcended military and diplomatic realms. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), batteries, biotechnology, space, quantum technology, critical minerals, and supply chains now play crucial roles in national security. Particularly, identifying the perpetrators behind state-sponsored cyberattacks can take considerable time. If the NIS can only act after the perpetrators are confirmed, its very existence may be undermined.
The 'spy law amendment' passed in February also aligns with this context. This amendment expanded the application of the crime of espionage from 'enemy states' to 'foreign entities and equivalent organizations.' This change allows for the prosecution of espionage activities not only from North Korea but also from 'friendly nations,' thereby broadening the NIS's counterintelligence activities.
However, recent allegations surrounding the NIS have brought to mind its 'dark history.' The second comprehensive special investigation indicted former NIS Director Jo Tae-yong and former First Deputy Director Hong Jang-won, among four other political appointees from the NIS at the time, on August 19, related to the 12·3 martial law. The special investigation confirmed that the NIS had prepared a list of 'security threat forces' numbering in the hundreds in response to requests from the presidential office during the martial law situation, indicating that the NIS actively supported the martial law.
Allegations of civilian surveillance have also emerged. Democratic Party lawmaker Yoon Geon-young raised concerns on August 20 that the NIS had established a 'North Korean Influence Operations Response Task Force' during the Yoon Suk Yeol administration to monitor the activities of politicians and labor and civil society figures.
In response, the NIS launched a large-scale internal investigation on August 25. However, this issue is too significant to be resolved through a 'self-investigation.' In 2020, the NIS removed 'domestic information' from its scope of duties to prevent political interference, yet incidents reminiscent of those that occurred during the days of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Planning Agency are happening again.
Ultimately, there is no choice but to conclude that an 'external oversight system for the NIS' is necessary. First, the National Assembly's supervisory authority must be effectively strengthened. Although the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee currently oversees the NIS, it is limited by its reliance on the materials and explanations provided by the NIS. The Assembly should employ specialized personnel to continuously monitor intelligence agencies and directly verify the NIS's intelligence activities and budget under certain conditions.
The role of civil society must also be expanded. This does not mean that all classified information handled by the NIS should be disclosed to civil society. Information that must be protected for national security should, of course, remain protected. Instead, a structure should be established that allows civil society to raise issues and verify the legality of the NIS's expanded powers, budget, and potential violations of fundamental rights.
There is also a need to consider establishing an independent external oversight body. Civil society has been advocating for the introduction of an 'intelligence agency oversight body' and an 'intelligence inspector system' with the participation of experts, separate from the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee.
There is no reason to oppose the strengthening of the NIS's powers itself. However, as its powers increase, so must oversight. The NIS is not the information agency of the regime but rather 'the information agency of the state.' Only strong external oversight can break the cycle of political interference by the NIS.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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