The South Korean government is considering enhancing the role of the Cheonghae Unit in the Strait of Hormuz as a means to contribute to regional security. This comes as the precedent set in 2020, when the operational area was expanded, is being revisited. While protecting South Korean vessels under independent command is seen as a viable option, the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict raises questions about the need for parliamentary approval and the potential for combat involvement.
On September 21, the government announced it is reviewing plans to strengthen the Cheonghae Unit's role to protect domestic shipping and oil transport routes, as well as ensure the safety of its citizens. President Lee Jae-myung stated at a press conference on September 18 that there would be no deployment involving direct engagement in the war, suggesting that instead of sending a new unit, the existing Cheonghae Unit's mission could be expanded.
The expansion of the Cheonghae Unit's operational scope is considered a realistic option, given past precedents.
In January 2020, amid rising tensions between the U.S. and Iran, the previous administration temporarily expanded the Cheonghae Unit's deployment area from the Gulf of Aden to include the Oman Sea and the Arabian/Persian Gulf. At that time, the unit sent two liaison officers to the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) to facilitate information sharing without formally joining the coalition.
The government expanded the operational area without additional parliamentary approval, citing a clause in the existing deployment agreement that allowed for operations in designated areas during emergencies to protect South Korean citizens.
However, unlike the previous case, the current situation involves active combat, leading to speculation that parliamentary consent may be necessary. The extent of response to attacks on commercial vessels or naval ships, as well as the level of information sharing with the U.S., could blur the lines between 'protecting our citizens' and 'engaging in war.'
A key issue is whether this mission exceeds the original purpose and scope approved by the National Assembly. Article 60, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the National Assembly the authority to approve overseas deployments of the military. Unlike the previous agreement aimed at combating piracy and ensuring safe navigation, escorting commercial vessels and responding to attacks in a combat zone could be seen as a significant change in mission and risk level.
Defense Minister An Gyu-baek also stated in March that the situations in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz are “on different levels,” emphasizing the need for parliamentary approval.
Relations with Iran must also be considered. Even if the South Korean military protects its vessels under independent command, Iran may perceive this as support for U.S. operations in the Strait. It may be difficult to expect the same benefits of avoiding direct conflict with Iran as in the past.
Political analyst Lee Jong-hoon noted, “Even if the Cheonghae Unit shifts to a commercial vessel protection mission, the possibility of being drawn into combat cannot be ruled out,” adding that the boundaries of 'non-combat deployment' could become unclear in actual attack scenarios.
Coordination between the U.S. and South Korea regarding the level of contribution remains a challenge. Foreign Minister Park Jin expressed on September 18 during a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio that South Korea intends to make a substantial contribution to restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. State Department has emphasized the importance of cooperation to ensure freedom of navigation. Following reports interpreting President Lee's statement about “no deployment involving war engagement” as a rejection of U.S. requests, the Blue House refuted those claims.
As various issues, including semiconductor cooperation and prompt fulfillment of investment commitments to the U.S., are being discussed, differing expectations regarding the Cheonghae Unit's mission and level of contribution could become an additional burden on U.S.-South Korea relations.
Sung Il-gwang, a professor at Sogang University’s Euro-Mena Research Institute, stated, “Expanding the operational scope of the Cheonghae Unit is the minimum contribution the government can consider,” urging that the president's statement about not engaging in war should not be interpreted as a rejection of contributions to ensure safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and that feasible support measures should be thoroughly explained and coordinated in advance.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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