Why Did Agencies Proliferate? A Flawed Consolidation
The government announced on September 3, 2026, a plan to significantly consolidate agencies under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) that have similar or overlapping functions. Criticism regarding the excessive number of agencies under the ministry and their redundant functions has been ongoing, especially given that the total budget of the MCST is less than that of other ministries at the bureau level. This has led to repeated calls from the cultural and arts community, academia, and the media for a reevaluation of the ministry's structure. While there is broad consensus on the need for some level of consolidation, the proposed plan lacks reflection on why these agencies proliferated in the first place.
Historically, the number of agencies under the MCST was relatively small until the early 2000s, with key institutions like the Korea Arts Council and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art. However, since around 2005, the very bureaucrats from the MCST who now point to the proliferation of agencies as a problem have been responsible for establishing and operating new agencies continuously.
The proliferation began when the Korean Culture and Arts Foundation (KCAF), established in 1973, transitioned into the Arts Council Korea (ARKO) in 2005. The KCAF was a subordinate body of the MCST, with most decision-making power resting with the ministry. Following democratization, a wave of reforms led to a significant turnover of MCST officials at ARKO, which was transformed into a private autonomous committee. Despite considerable internal resistance, the restructuring was ultimately successful.
Accountability for Disappearing Unlawful Establishment Practices
The MCST has frequently employed dubious methods when creating new agencies. To avoid the lengthy and complex process of establishing special corporations that require National Assembly approval, the ministry has often opted to create non-profit foundations under civil law, which can be established with just the minister's seal in a single day. These foundations then receive funding in the form of private contracts or project grants, allowing them to grow in size. Once they have a substantial number of employees, the ministry pressures the National Assembly and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance to designate them as official public institutions.
This practice has led to numerous issues, including the creation of agencies that do not require democratic oversight through budget reviews and audits by the National Assembly. Particularly, foundations with weak legal bases have made it difficult for the National Assembly to scrutinize personnel and operational costs, effectively turning them into conduits for the ministry's discretionary funds.
More critically, cultural projects have devolved into subcontracting arrangements, where agencies without legal independence become mere extensions of the ministry, executing projects that align with the political agenda rather than pursuing autonomous initiatives.
Reorganization Without Principles or Logic
Before consolidating agencies, the MCST should first assess and reorganize its own headquarters. The root cause of the proliferation of agencies lies in the ministry's own inefficient operations.
Many of the newly established agencies were created to meet the individual needs and conveniences of various divisions within the ministry. For instance, the Korea Traditional Performing Arts Foundation was established in 2007 to manage national projects related to traditional music, as the ministry's performing arts division found it challenging to operate within the bureaucratic structure of the National Gugak Center.
The Korea Cultural Information Center, initially established as a foundation in December 2002, was elevated to a foundation to secure project funding and manage subcontracted tasks as the government pushed for public data and digital initiatives. The expansion of these agencies reflects the fragmentation and siloed administration within the ministry, which has effectively turned them into subcontractors for the ministry's projects. Yet, the ministry now seeks to consolidate these agencies while distancing itself from the very institutions it created to fulfill its own responsibilities.
This approach to reform, which addresses only the outcomes while leaving the underlying causes intact, is fundamentally flawed. If the ministry does not address the distribution of responsibilities and the coordination of tasks with the Cultural Heritage Administration, the consolidation will likely lead to the reemergence of similar agencies in the future.
Persistent Bureaucratic Barriers and Resource Sharing
Critics argue that the proposed consolidation is hasty because it fails to address the overlapping functions and jurisdictions between the MCST and the Cultural Heritage Administration. The UNESCO World Heritage system categorizes cultural heritage, natural heritage, and intangible heritage, yet the recent revision of the National Heritage Law in 2024 has attempted to forcefully integrate these categories into a single administrative structure, leading to inconsistencies with international standards.
The MCST has been executing similar projects as the Cultural Heritage Administration, such as digital archiving of museum and exhibition content, promoting traditional crafts, and developing regional cultural tourism content. Despite reducing its agencies from 18 to 7, the ministry has not examined the overlapping functions with the Cultural Heritage Administration, which highlights a fundamental limitation of the current reform.
Future actions should include a thorough investigation of overlapping functions between the MCST and the Cultural Heritage Administration, particularly in areas like traditional crafts, regional cultural content, and digital archiving. Additionally, a higher-level organization within the MCST is needed to oversee all museums dealing with tangible cultural heritage, while the Cultural Heritage Administration should focus on natural and intangible heritage.
Ultimately, the consolidation's greatest weakness lies in the perception that it is driven by numerical targets rather than the homogeneity of functions. Many of these agencies were created by MCST officials to manage revenue-generating projects that were difficult to handle within the bureaucratic framework. The inconsistency in how agencies are created and dissolved based on convenience raises concerns about the integrity of the reform process.
While reducing the number of public institutions is necessary, the success of the consolidation will depend on whether the newly formed organization can generate real synergy. If disparate agencies are grouped together under the vague justification of "industry promotion," internal conflicts will likely persist. The government must reassess the nature of each agency's work and clarify overlapping responsibilities between the MCST and the Cultural Heritage Administration. Without this, the consolidation will merely result in superficial changes, leading to further restructuring in the future.
Moreover, the issue of personnel remains significant. The new Korean Cultural and Arts Industry Promotion Agency, formed by merging four agencies into a 274-member organization, will not reduce the number of employees, as the government has pledged to maintain existing staff levels. This undermines the original goal of the consolidation, which is to eliminate inefficiencies and reduce management costs. If the consolidation merely changes the name of the organization without reducing personnel, it will only incur additional costs without achieving meaningful reform.
Reflecting on the 2008 public institution reform under the Lee Myung-bak administration, which merged 36 agencies into 16, it resulted in a chaotic expansion of responsibilities and allegations of favoritism in personnel appointments. To avoid repeating past mistakes, the focus should be on principles rather than speed. The government must first finalize the restructuring of the MCST and then develop a comprehensive plan for the repositioning of agencies based on sound cultural administration principles. Otherwise, the consolidation will only reduce numbers while leaving the underlying issues unresolved.
In conclusion, for this consolidation to hold true significance, it must represent a shift from a government-centric approach to one that fosters an ecosystem where authority is delegated to specialized areas. If the ministry cannot break free from the practice of expanding organizations to alleviate promotion bottlenecks, it will likely find itself announcing yet another reorganization in a few years, repeating the same issues. The evaluation of South Korea's cultural administration should focus on the coherence of functions rather than the size of organizations. This is the last opportunity for such a transition.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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