SEOUL, October 13 (AJP) - South Korea risks losing a seat at the negotiating table as Washington and Pyongyang size each other up for a possible return to summit diplomacy, leaving Seoul to confront a growing missile threat with diminishing influence over how it might be addressed.
North Korea launched its 16th ballistic missile barrage of the year on Monday while U.S. President Donald Trump, on the other side of the Pacific, floated the possibility of meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his visit to Asia in November.
Asked at the White House whether he planned to meet Kim, Trump replied, “I may,” before adding, “That’ll be exciting, won’t it? But I get along with him.”
For President Lee Jae Myung, who has sought to encourage renewed U.S.–North Korea dialogue, the prospect presents a dilemma. Getting Trump and Kim back to the table could open a path toward easing tensions. It could also leave South Korea dependent on negotiations in which its security interests are not the overriding concern.
Eric J. Ballbach, a Korea Foundation Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, said Seoul’s traditional role as an intermediary has weakened as Washington and Pyongyang have developed a more direct relationship.
“The main difference is that, in the past, North Korea often used diplomatic openings with South Korea in order to get to the US,” he told AJP.
“Since the Trump administration has established a direct channel to North Korea, Pyongyang is no longer required to take the ‘detour’ via South Korea.”
Lee has described his desired role as that of a “pacemaker,” helping create conditions for negotiations while Trump serves as the principal “peacemaker.”
But facilitating talks does not necessarily secure Seoul a say in their outcome.
“There is a realistic danger that, under Trump — should dialogue with North Korea take place — the U.S. will fail to take South Korea’s foreign and security policy interests into account in order to reach a ‘deal’, or will do so only inadequately,” Ballbach said.
“The Trump administration pursues its own interests with regard to North Korea — and these do not necessarily coincide with those of South Korea.”
The potential divergence carries direct military consequences. An agreement focused on intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States would not automatically address the shorter-range weapons threatening South Korean cities and military installations.
Seoul could help bring about a diplomatic breakthrough without securing equivalent protection for itself.
In a September interview with The New York Times, Lee proposed easing sanctions in exchange for Pyongyang halting the development of additional nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile technology.
The proposal reflects his administration’s view that an immediate demand for complete denuclearization is unlikely to succeed and that smaller, reciprocal steps could create conditions for broader negotiations. Seoul has nevertheless maintained that North Korea’s ballistic missile launches violate international law.
The difficulty is that Pyongyang approaches any potential talks with more options than it had during the previous round of summit diplomacy.
Closer ties with Russia and China have strengthened its diplomatic position, while its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine has created opportunities to assess its weapons under combat conditions.
“If Pyongyang can obtain economic resources, military assistance and diplomatic backing from Moscow, the incentives that previously encouraged it to seek sanctions relief from Washington become weaker,” Ballbach said.
North Korea has supplied Russia with missiles, ammunition and military personnel. Its weapons’ performance against Ukrainian air defenses could provide information on accuracy, reliability and weaknesses that controlled tests alone cannot reveal.
“The most important contribution may be the feedback North Korea is receiving from actual combat, rather than any single technological transfer,” Ballbach said.
He cautioned, however, that the extent of direct Russian technological assistance remains difficult to establish. Attributing specific North Korean advances to Moscow would therefore be premature.
Patrick Köllner, vice president of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies and director of its Institute for Asian Studies, also qualified how far the Russian relationship has changed Pyongyang’s calculations.
North Korea may be in a somewhat stronger position than during its unsuccessful 2019 summit with Trump in Hanoi, particularly because of its intensified military cooperation with Moscow. But Russia cannot satisfy all its objectives.
“Yet that cooperation does not help to achieve many other objectives beyond the military realm,” Köllner told AJP. “So, things like sanctions relief remain of interest to the DPRK.”
“Most fundamentally, not much has thus changed with respect to the arms control agenda,” he said.
The two assessments point to a North Korea with greater room to maneuver, but still with reasons to negotiate. The question is what concessions it would seek — and what Washington would be willing to accept.
Pyongyang continues to build the military capabilities that would shape those negotiations.
The state-run Korean Central News Agency reported Tuesday that Monday’s launch involved a tactical ballistic missile intended to verify improvements to a key weapons-system component. It described the test as a major technological success but disclosed few technical details.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said several missiles of different types were launched from the Pyongyang area beginning at approximately 9:20 a.m., with at least one traveling more than 900 kilometers.
The launches brought North Korea’s ballistic missile firing episodes this year to 16, compared with six throughout 2025. Those figures count launch occasions, each of which can involve multiple weapons.
On Tuesday, KCNA also released images of Kim visiting a newly opened defense industry museum displaying weapons developed under his leadership, including the Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile.
Ballbach identified three overlapping objectives behind the accelerated testing: military modernization, deterrence and diplomatic leverage.
“Repeated launches allow North Korea to test weapons under different conditions, refine delivery systems, and potentially improve the reliability, readiness, and operational flexibility of its missile forces,” he said.
A successful test does not automatically establish that a weapon is reliable or ready for deployment, he cautioned. Testing new technology and demonstrating an existing system’s operational readiness are different things.
For Seoul, however, the immediate question is whether its defenses could withstand an attack involving several types of missiles at once.
“The question is whether we can accurately determine the speed, range and missile-defense evasion capabilities of North Korea’s missiles, and whether we can detect and intercept them if the North launches simultaneous missile attacks,” Yoo Seong-min, a former chair of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, told AJP.
The challenge is becoming more complex as both Koreas develop increasingly maneuverable hypersonic weapons.
On Oct. 8, South Korea announced the successful flight test of its first domestically developed hypersonic glide vehicle, conducted by the Agency for Defense Development and observed by Lee.
According to Cheong Wa Dae, the vehicle separated from its booster, maneuvered during flight and struck its designated target.
The test demonstrated progress in South Korea’s offensive strike capabilities. It did not establish whether its missile defenses could intercept similar weapons launched by the North.
Pyongyang had conducted its own intermediate-range missile test on Oct. 3, describing it as involving a hypersonic strategic weapon. South Korea’s military subsequently assessed that Monday’s launches were partly intended as a show of force in response to Seoul’s test.
South Korea relies on a layered missile-defense network involving Patriot and domestically developed Cheongung-II interceptors, complemented by a U.S.-operated Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, battery. Deployment of its domestically developed L-SAM interceptor system is scheduled to begin in 2027.
The South Korean systems form part of Korea Air and Missile Defense, the interception component of the country’s broader three-axis defense strategy, which also includes preemptive strike and retaliatory capabilities.
Yet the effectiveness of that network depends on the number and availability of interceptors as well as their technical capabilities.
“We do not have enough domestically developed interceptor missiles or Patriot systems, and the THAAD system belongs to U.S. Forces Korea. Our own military does not possess THAAD,” Yoo said.
The precise inventory and operational readiness of South Korea’s interceptors are not publicly disclosed, making it difficult to independently assess whether existing defenses could withstand a sustained assault.
Even successful detection would leave commanders facing another uncertainty.
“Another problem is how we can determine whether a missile is carrying a nuclear warhead or a conventional one,” Yoo said.
Some North Korean missile systems could potentially carry either. Radar can help establish a missile’s speed, trajectory and probable type, but cannot necessarily determine its payload.
Those threats would remain central to Seoul’s security calculations even if Washington secured limits on weapons capable of reaching American territory.
Ballbach considered another round of U.S.–North Korea negotiations plausible, but doubted that Kim would enter talks with the intention of giving up his nuclear arsenal.
“While I think that another round of US-North Korea talks is realistically possible, I do not believe that Kim Jong-un would engage in a dialogue aimed at a full denuclearization of North Korea,” he said.
Köllner questioned whether Washington had the political will and institutional capacity to sustain the negotiations required for a substantive arms control agreement.
Trump was primarily interested in “quick newsworthy deals,” he argued, while officials responsible for implementing an agreement faced competing international demands and a shortage of capable personnel.
A summit could be arranged far more readily than an agreement that could be negotiated, verified and sustained.
For Lee, the challenge is therefore larger than helping Trump and Kim meet. It is ensuring that South Korea retains a voice in deciding which threats are addressed, which concessions are offered and what guarantees accompany any deal.
The greatest risk to his “pacemaker” strategy may not be that talks fail to materialize. It may be that they succeed on terms that leave Seoul’s most immediate security concerns unresolved.
Ballbach’s warning was succinct.
“Be careful what you wish for.”
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