At 4:20 a.m. on October 29, 2022, drones descended upon the naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet was stationed. According to the governor appointed by Russia, the attack involved nine aerial drones and seven surface suicide drones.
The Russian Defense Ministry acknowledged damage to one minesweeper, while Ukraine claimed that several naval vessels, including the frigate Admiral Makarov, were hit. This marked the largest assault on the Black Sea Fleet since the war began, with Ukraine, significantly outmatched in naval power, managing to disrupt the fleet using inexpensive drones. Just ten days prior, an Iranian-made suicide drone, the Shahed, struck the heart of Kyiv, killing four civilians, including a pregnant woman.
Drones dominate the battlefield: A new era of aerial warfare
Four years later, drones have transitioned from supporting roles to becoming the main actors in warfare. Hundreds now fill the skies overnight, targeting cities and air bases far from the front lines. According to Ukraine's Security Service, in June of last year, Ukraine used small drones hidden in trucks to attack four Russian air bases deep within Russian territory.
In an era where a single drone costing tens of thousands of dollars can prompt the launch of millions of dollars worth of intercept missiles, the calculus of war is fundamentally changing.
The cost advantage: Cheap drones versus expensive missiles
Drones have emerged as the most lethal weapon on the Ukrainian front. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, short-range drones caused more civilian casualties than any other weapon in January of last year. In southern Kherson, 70% of civilian casualties were attributed to drone strikes. For soldiers, the threat is even greater. A study published in a Russian military medical journal found that up to 75% of Russian military casualties were inflicted by Ukrainian attack drones. The New York Times reported that Ukrainian commanders indicated drone-related casualties exceeded those from all other weapons combined.
The number of drones in the air is staggering. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on October 24, Russia launched 153 attack drones in a single night. On the same day, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed to have shot down 532 Ukrainian drones. What began with dozens of drones taking flight has now escalated to hundreds filling the skies.
Is South Korea prepared for drone threats?
The drone warfare phenomenon has also spread beyond Ukraine. In Sudan, where civil war has persisted for over three years, drones have become the primary weapon for both government forces and rebels. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked the government-held Red Sea port city of Port Sudan with drones in May of last year. On October 19, drone strikes in the conflict area of Abyei, straddling Sudan and South Sudan, resulted in at least 153 deaths. The South Sudanese government identified the Sudanese military as the perpetrator. The BBC reported that over 300 people died within two days due to attacks on a funeral convoy in the region.
In the Middle East, the Houthi rebels demonstrated the power of drones early on. In September 2019, they claimed to have attacked Saudi Arabia's state-owned oil company Aramco's Abqaiq and Khurais facilities with ten drones, disrupting nearly half of Saudi oil production, equivalent to about 5% of global oil supply. This month, the Houthis again targeted Riyadh's airport with a mix of ballistic missiles and drones.
The primary reason drones have taken center stage in warfare is their cost. According to the Pakistani military analysis outlet Quwa, the production cost of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 suicide drone is estimated to be between $20,000 and $50,000. In contrast, a single U.S.-made Patriot missile (PAC-3 MSE) costs about $4.1 million. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercept missile costs approximately $12.7 million. This means that to shoot down one drone, defense forces must expend dozens, if not hundreds, of times that amount.
This disparity becomes an increasingly burdensome challenge as wars drag on. Quwa estimates that the U.S. military spent over $3 billion in the first six months of the Iran War just to intercept Shahed drones, while Iran's cost to produce 200 Shahed drones was only $4 million to $10 million per month. Russia is also reported to have the capability to produce up to 6,000 drones modeled after the Shahed at the Yelabuga factory. Quwa noted that the Shahed imposes a cost structure that no Western air defense system was designed to handle.
From the attacker's perspective, deploying drones is a 'profitable business.' By launching dozens or hundreds of inexpensive drones, the opposing side is forced to expend costly intercept missiles for each one. Unlike the defender, who cannot afford to miss a single drone, the attacker only needs a few to succeed. Even if all drones are intercepted, they still deplete the opponent's missile stockpiles and defense budgets. This strategy of 'cost imposition' explains why countries with limited military power and defense budgets are increasingly relying on drones against adversaries.
Consequently, nations are seeking ways to 'cheaply intercept' drones. One solution is to use drones to counter drones. The Ukrainian 'Wild Hornets' have developed an intercept drone called 'Sting,' which costs between $2,500 and $5,000. It can fly at speeds of up to 343 km/h, chasing and colliding with Shahed drones traveling at around 185 km/h. It can disable drones by crashing into their wings or propellers without explosives.
Germany's Rheinmetall has developed an anti-aircraft system called 'SkyNet,' which costs about $500 per 35mm round. Laser weapons can be fired at a cost of only $1 to $10 per shot. This layered defense strategy, which preserves expensive missiles for significant threats while using cheaper means to intercept drones, is becoming the new standard.
The drone threat is not just a foreign issue for South Korea. In March 2014, a North Korean drone that crashed in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, captured 193 photos of sensitive sites, including the Blue House and Gyeongbokgung Palace. The drone flew over the metropolitan area multiple times, but air defense radars failed to detect it.
Eight years later, the situation has not improved significantly. On December 26, 2022, five North Korean drones crossed the military demarcation line, with one reaching the skies over Seoul. Although it was intermittently detected by radar, the military could not identify it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff initially denied that the drones had violated the no-fly zone around the presidential office but later acknowledged the possibility of a breach after about ten days, facing criticism for the change in stance.
The military is now accelerating its response. In June, the Defense Ministry announced plans to acquire over 20,000 inexpensive expendable drones, including suicide drones, and to expedite the deployment of a Korean long-range suicide drone, 'K-Lukas,' modeled after the Shahed. Next year, verified commercial anti-drone equipment will be deployed to the front lines, and long-term plans include the development of laser and high-power microwave weapons, as well as low-cost intercept drones. On October 1, during Armed Forces Day, the Defense Science Research Institute unveiled a laser anti-aircraft weapon called 'Cheongkwang,' which successfully shot down four small drones in a demonstration. The cost per shot is estimated to be around 10,000 to 20,000 won.
However, there is still a long way to go. The range of Cheongkwang is limited to 500 meters to 2 kilometers, and it is unclear when it will be deployed in real combat. The Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, is set to be restructured into a 'Defense Drone Headquarters' without operational authority, raising questions about who will lead drone capabilities. Currently, South Korea's defense investment remains heavily focused on expensive weapons like advanced fighter jets and missiles. As the war of drones consumes expensive missiles with relatively inexpensive drones, it is time to critically assess whether South Korea is prepared to win such conflicts.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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