U.S. President Donald Trump is widely seen as unpredictable yet intensely transactional, prompting American think tanks and analysts to try to piece together his intentions and speculate on his next moves.
The motivations behind the military operation remain unclear, though possible factors include the growing uncertainty of Trump's tariff policies following the Supreme Court's ruling against them, a deepening rivalry with China, and Russia's prolonged war in Ukraine, ahead of the upcoming midterm elections in early November.
First of all, his tariff fight is likely to continue despite last month's U.S. Supreme Court ruling that Trump's unilateral tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were illegal. The court found that foreign drug inflows and the U.S. trade deficit did not meet the conditions of the IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act (NEA).
However, Trump would still have a range of tools available to a U.S. president, such as Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to address trade deficits; Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to protect domestic industry; Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to penalize unfair trade practices; Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose temporary trade barriers; and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to respond to discriminatory trade practices.
The strike on Iran appears aimed at removing a source of instability in the Middle East. Israel's cooperation, along with the wave of anti-government protests inside Iran, may have signaled to Washington that conditions were ripe for action. Another possible calculation is that toppling Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's decades-long iron rule could weaken Iranian-backed armed groups such as Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.
Eliminating Iran's nuclear program may have been another driving factor, with the broader goal of stabilizing the region and helping bring the war in Ukraine to an end. The Trump administration had been negotiating both issues simultaneously, repeatedly saying that Ukraine talks were nearing a final agreement, even as nuclear talks with Iran had been stalled.
Iran's international isolation, similar to Venezuela's, may have encouraged him to resort to the strike. Trump may have believed that fully dismantling Iran's nuclear facilities could prompt regime change and that any Iranian retaliation would have limited impact on the U.S., while also potentially creating momentum for peace negotiations in Ukraine.
The ripple effects were already being felt across Europe. On March 2, French President Emmanuel Macron announced plans to expand France's nuclear weapons program and offer a nuclear umbrella to European allies, a move aimed at strengthening NATO's collective defense. The announcement echoed a demand Trump had pushed since his first term, that Europe do more to defend itself, and aligned with his broader strategy of transferring the burden of Ukraine's security onto NATO and its members.
If Ukraine and Iran are brought under control, Trump would have more room to pursue what may be his longer-term goal, i.e., containing China, a challenge that, as then-vice president-elect JD Vance said at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, could take 40 years or more.
The U.S. midterms will be another test of Trump's strategy, though he appears cautiously confident. Last year, Trump secured investment pledges totaling US$8.4 trillion from domestic and foreign companies and is now pressing to make good on those commitments. Even capturing just 10 percent of that, roughly $840 billion to $1 trillion, would deliver a significant economic boost. Bringing the wars in Ukraine and Iran to a close could further strengthen the U.S. economy by helping to stabilize global markets.
Even if Trump loses, U.S. policy toward China is unlikely to change, given that both parties in Congress take a hardline stance. This is one reason the midterms may not decisively affect his broader China strategy.
Meanwhile, Trump has taken a conspicuously silent approach on Taiwan. Unlike during his first term or the Biden administration when Washington weighed in carefully on Taiwan-related developments, he has not mentioned the island since returning to office. This may signal that, with budgets for Taiwan and the broader Indo-Pacific strategy already in place, there is less need to highlight the issue publicly.
Beginning in the second half of 2021, the White House, CIA, and Pentagon warned Congress of a scenario in which Chinese President Xi Jinping could invade Taiwan in 2027. These warnings helped secure funding through the 2023, 2024, and 2025 National Defense Authorization Acts.
Congress has steadily built up its financial commitment to Taiwan across successive defense bills. The 2023 NDAA authorized up to $10 billion in military aid through 2027, with annual loans of up to $2 billion and a dedicated regional stockpile of defense materials capped at $100 million. The following year's NDAA allocated $895 billion for Taiwan support, and Congress separately approved $300 million in military supplies and training. The fiscal 2025 NDAA added another $300 million for security cooperation and unlocked up to $1.5 billion in Pentagon stockpile transfers.
Indo-Pacific funding has been also secured across successive defense bills. The 2023 NDAA kicked off with $11.5 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, followed by $14.7 billion in 2024 and $9.9 billion in 2025. Additional funds covered $12.5 billion for Guam facilities, $17.5 billion for regional military infrastructure, and $25 billion for ships, aircraft, and munitions.
Trump has also refrained from publicly pressuring allies to increase direct cost-sharing payments, focusing instead on pushing them to raise defense budgets, a move that could translate into more purchases of U.S.-made weapons. Investment pledges have taken priority over cost-sharing demands, with the reasoning that the investment amounts are far larger and that Trump already secured his cost-sharing goals during his first term.
Within this strategic framework, North Korea does not appear to be a priority for him. While some had anticipated a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong‑un during Trump’s planned visit to China in late March, that prospect now seems nearly impossible. Trump is unlikely to risk a repeat of the 2019 Hanoi photo-op, as major obstacles remain unchanged: Washington continues to demand complete, irreversible denuclearization, a condition Pyongyang is unlikely to accept.
North Korea would likely be unsettled by the U.S. striking Iran during negotiations. With little common ground on denuclearization, neither side has reason to pursue a summit that would go nowhere. Meaningful talks with Pyongyang would likely become feasible only after the war in Ukraine ends, a scenario that would compel North Korea to make new strategic choices for its own survival.
As for South Korea, Trump's main concerns have centered on the swift implementation of investment pledges and the "discriminatory" treatment of American companies here. Some of the friction, however, stems from U.S. misunderstanding of South Korea's domestic business landscape, so resolving it will require candor and direct engagement.
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