SEOUL, February 07 (AJP) - As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches its fifth year, the war shows signs of diplomatic motion without political resolution — inching toward talks, yet anchored by irreconcilable claims over land, security and identity.
According to a recent report by Reuters, Washington is pressing Moscow and Kyiv to explore a tentative peace framework, with March floated as an ambitious target for progress. U.S. and Ukrainian negotiators, led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and former presidential adviser Jared Kushner, have discussed proposals that could eventually be put to a Ukrainian referendum.
Yet diplomats on both sides acknowledge that the timeline is fragile. Russia remains adamant about retaining occupied territories, while Ukraine refuses to legitimize territorial loss. For now, the war grinds on — suspended between battlefield exhaustion and diplomatic paralysis.
A Goliath Wounded
What began on Feb. 24, 2022, as a rapid campaign envisioned by President Vladimir Putin has hardened into a prolonged war of attrition. Russia failed to seize Kyiv, lost tens of thousands of elite troops, and settled into incremental advances measured in meters rather than kilometers.
Ukrainian losses are estimated at 500,000 to 600,000, according to CNN, while Britain’s UK Ministry of Defence said Russia crossed the threshold of one million killed or wounded by mid-2024.
Despite sustained offensives, Russian units in some sectors have advanced by no more than 70 meters per day — slower than the pace of trench warfare at the Somme in 1916.
The Logic of Attrition
Unable to secure a decisive breakthrough, the Kremlin has embraced a strategy of exhaustion — wearing down Ukraine’s infrastructure, economy and manpower through steady artillery fire, drone strikes and missile barrages.
Russia now controls about one-fifth of Ukrainian territory. Most of those gains, however, have come at extraordinary human cost.
Economically, Moscow’s war footing rests on narrow foundations. Manufacturing output weakened through much of 2025, consumer demand softened, and growth slowed to around 0.6 percent. Demographic decline and labor shortages have deepened structural fragilities. Russia, once eager to present itself as a technology power, no longer hosts a single firm among the world’s top 100 by market value.
Yet the war machine persists, sustained in part by external lifelines. Western intelligence agencies say Chinese exports of dual-use goods have enabled Russian factories to expand missile production, while North Korea supplies ammunition in exchange for economic and technological support. Iran, too, remains a critical drone supplier.
These networks have allowed Moscow to absorb losses that would have crippled most economies — but at the price of deeper strategic dependence.
A Fraying Western Consensus
The war has also tested Western cohesion.
“The West is showing fatigue,” said Berthold Rittberger of LMU Munich. “Without the U.S., Europe still lacks the capability to contain Putin. Populists and pro-Russian forces are exploiting this to deepen polarization.”
Across the Atlantic, Joseph Parent of the University of Notre Dame offers a bleaker assessment.
“The war was effectively over in its first six months,” he said. “Both sides lost. Ukraine won’t get its old borders back, and Russia won’t keep Ukraine out of the West. The longer it drags on, the weaker both societies become.”
Europe’s Strategic Dilemma
For Europe, the war has been both a geopolitical awakening and a fiscal burden.
In the early months of the invasion, European leaders moved with unusual unity, imposing sanctions, expanding defense budgets and funneling military aid to Kyiv. Nearly five years on, that consensus has thinned.
Energy prices have stabilized, but political cohesion has not. Far-right and Eurosceptic parties — many openly sympathetic to Moscow — are gaining ground from Paris to Prague. Governments face rising defense bills at a time of slowing growth and voter fatigue.
“Europe has done more than it ever imagined it would,” said Berthold Rittberger of LMU Munich. “But it is reaching the limits of what it can sustain politically and economically.”
While European Union members have pledged tens of billions of euros in military and financial assistance, much of their security architecture still depends on American power.
Without U.S. leadership, Europe struggles to translate resources into credible deterrence.
“Without the United States,” Rittberger added, “Europe still lacks the military capacity and institutional coordination to contain Russia on its own.”
Privately, European diplomats now speak less about “victory” and more about “managing decline”: preventing Ukraine’s collapse, limiting escalation, and preserving NATO’s credibility.
The change in tone reflects hard arithmetic. Ammunition stocks are depleted. Defense industries are struggling to scale up production. And public patience is eroding.
“Support for Ukraine remains strong in principle,” one senior EU official said, “but weaker in practice. Every budget cycle becomes harder.”
For Moscow, this erosion is strategic.
Russia’s war planners have long calculated that Western unity would fray before Ukrainian resistance. Europe’s growing ambivalence — amplified by domestic politics — suggests that calculation may yet prove correct.
Seoul’s Strategic Lens
In South Korea, the war is increasingly viewed not only as a European crisis, but as a rehearsal for geopolitical realignment in Asia and feels too closely at home with the same global superpowers deeply involved in the war including North Korea.
Kwon Young-se, a senior lawmaker of the People Power Party and former ambassador to China, observed Trump’s return to had reshaped the conflict.
“Trump is unlikely to invest large sums of money in a war he considers unrelated to U.S. interests. That is why Washington is now pushing ceasefire ideas that Kyiv can hardly accept.”
For Seoul, the war’s most troubling byproduct lies farther east.
Another former ambassador and lawmaker Kim Gunn traced the conflict to deeper historical anxieties, invoking British geographer Halford Mackinder’s theory of Eurasian power.
“Russia believes that without controlling its neighbors, it is vulnerable,” he said. “But recognizing spheres of influence is dangerous. That logic justified past imperialism. It invites endless expansion.”
“After the war, Russia will seek new partners,” Kim said. “Its Far East development could become central. Korea may emerge as an important economic partner.”
Between War and Peace
The current diplomatic push reflects exhaustion more than reconciliation. Russia seeks recognition of its territorial gains. Ukraine seeks security guarantees and sovereignty. The United States wants stability before electoral uncertainty intensifies.
None of these goals align easily.
For now, negotiations resemble parallel monologues rather than genuine compromise. The front lines barely shift. Casualties accumulate. Reconstruction plans outpace peace prospects.
For South Korea, the lesson is strategic duality: maintain solidarity with Western allies while preserving diplomatic channels across Eurasia.
“Korea must strengthen its military and work with value-sharing partners,” Kwon said. “But we must also remain pragmatic.” He suggests Seoul must have eyes on post-war order.
“It may sound cold,” he said, “but once reconstruction begins, there will be a huge economic stage. Korea should position itself early.”
Nearly five years in, Russia’s war has become more than a territorial dispute. It is a test of endurance, governance and global resolve. It has exposed the limits of military power, the fragility of alliances, and the costs of strategic ambiguity.
Whether March produces a ceasefire or another missed deadline, the deeper reckoning will persist. The conflict has already reshaped Europe’s security order and Asia’s strategic calculations.
As one empire’s ambitions erode under the weight of reality, the fault lines of the next global contest are taking shape — slowly, relentlessly, and at immense human cost.
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