May 1 is approaching, the first major test of the 60-day limit for a U.S. president to continue a war without congressional approval. The deadline is near, but the outcome remains unclear. A stalemate that is neither war nor peace, delays that are neither talks nor breakdown, and pressure that is neither blockade nor all-out conflict are squeezing the Middle East and the global economy.
At the core is a deadlock. The United States is pressing Iran to halt its nuclear program first, while Iran is demanding the lifting of restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz as a precondition. Both sides appear to believe time is on their side. But as time passes, the party paying the price is not the combatants — it is the world economy.
The Strait of Hormuz is more than a shipping lane. It is a main artery for crude oil, liquefied natural gas, petrochemical feedstocks and metal raw materials. If disruption there drags on, higher oil prices spread through freight costs, electricity bills, food prices and factory costs, hitting the real economy broadly.
Inflation that had begun to cool can flare again, central banks may be forced to shelve rate-cut plans, and emerging economies can face a double squeeze of fiscal stress and foreign-exchange pressure. That is why Reuters and other foreign media have reported that, just two months into the war, developing countries’ inflation and trade indicators have moved into “red alert.”
The United States is the world’s largest oil producer and has a service-heavy economic structure. For countries such as South Korea, Japan and India — more dependent on imported energy and more manufacturing-driven — an oil shock is not a wave but a tsunami. The paradox is that those who must endure the war can fall first, not those who started it.
If disruption around Hormuz becomes a “new normal” rather than a temporary shock, it stops being distant foreign-policy news and becomes a kitchen-table issue. South Korea’s core industries — semiconductors, autos, shipbuilding and steel — all rest on energy and logistics. Even if exports hold up, if import costs rise faster, the national economy’s resilience can be drained quickly.
Assigning blame to only one side misses the point. Iran’s attempt to control the strait is a risky gamble that shakes international maritime order. Prolonged U.S. military pressure can also end up holding the global economy hostage. Security requires principles, but those principles must be matched with restraint. Force is a tool; it cannot be an exit by itself.
The May 1 deadline carries symbolism beyond procedure. The U.S. War Powers Act limits military operations without congressional approval to 60 days. If that process is bypassed or hollowed out, the situation can spiral — with the purpose of the war and the conditions for ending it left undefined, and a cycle of restrictions and retaliation turning into a war of attrition.
The tragedy of a game of chicken is not only two drivers refusing to turn the wheel. It is the bystanders on the road who are smashed first. That is the position of the global economy now: oil, shipping, food and exchange rates are all tied to a single narrow strait.
South Korea needs a clear-eyed response. It should review energy stockpiles and diversify import sources, secure alternative logistics routes, and test industry-by-industry scenarios for cost shocks. Diplomatically, it should work within the alliance framework while clearly stating to the international community the scale of the economic damage. The principle is freedom of navigation; the practical goal is a swift end to the war.
The fighting may not stop after May 1. The deeper risk is that the world becomes accustomed to an abnormal situation. Stock markets in Seoul, New York and Tokyo are already showing signs of that, continuing an unusual rally.
But the moment disruption in Hormuz becomes a constant rather than an exception, the global economy will not be passing through a crisis — it will be living on top of one. The first countries to buckle will not be those with energy, but those that built growth on energy they must import. South Korea would not be an exception.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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