Six years have passed since the introduction of the workplace harassment reporting system following the amendment of the Labor Standards Act in 2019. During this time, the number of reported cases to labor authorities has surged from 5,823 in 2020 to 16,373 last year, nearly tripling. While societal awareness and utilization of the system have increased, the operational framework has not significantly changed since its inception. The numbers have risen, but the system remains the same.
The current framework is based on what is known as 'self-investigation.' When a report is made, the company is generally responsible for conducting its own investigation. Although there are instances where external law firms are commissioned, the fundamental structure remains unchanged, as the employer ultimately selects and pays for the investigative entity. Even when a complainant files a complaint with the labor office, it is rare for the office to conduct a direct investigation. Typically, the labor office sends a formal notice to verify whether the employer has carried out the investigation and actions, and it concludes the case based on the report submitted by the workplace. This approach reflects a reluctance to involve public authority in internal workplace issues, compounded by a lack of personnel.
The problem becomes more pronounced when the perpetrator is the employer or a powerful figure within the organization. Last year, it was found that one in four reported cases (4,422 cases, or 27%) involved the employer as the perpetrator. When the person directing the investigation is essentially the same as the one being investigated, how can employees trust the results? The demand for 'self-judgment' undermines the premise of fairness.
Fortunately, there have been recent moves toward improvement. In April, the Ministry of Employment and Labor revised the 'Guidelines for Handling Workplace Harassment Reports' to mandate that labor inspectors directly investigate cases where the employer is the perpetrator or where there are repeated violations of investigation obligations. In July, the 'Prevention and Response Manual' was updated to exclude the identified perpetrator from the investigation process and to ensure objectivity through external commissions or labor-management councils. However, these changes remain at the level of internal guidelines and manuals, lacking legal binding force, which limits their enforceability and leaves room for regression in operational direction.
Of course, applying the same standards to all workplaces is not practical. Small businesses often struggle to secure internal personnel without conflicts of interest, and the costs of hiring external experts can be burdensome. For larger organizations, it would be effective to legally define the composition, qualifications, and grounds for disqualification of investigation committees, while providing support or cost assistance from labor offices or public institutions for smaller businesses.
Another approach is to strengthen the supervisory function of labor offices. The government plans to increase the number of labor inspectors from 3,131 in 2024 to 8,000 by 2028. However, there are significant concerns regarding not only the shortage of personnel but also their expertise and authority. This awareness has culminated in the 'Labor Inspector Job Execution Act,' which will take effect on December 8, 2026, consolidating the duties, powers, and investigation standards of labor inspectors into a single law.
Recently proposed enforcement regulations and rules specify that special supervision targets include workplaces where multiple victims have occurred or are at risk due to verbal abuse, physical violence, or workplace sexual harassment and bullying, providing grounds for proactive supervision without waiting for individual reports. Additionally, if a victim disagrees with the company's investigation results and re-reports, the labor office will review the case with an external expert committee instead of merely concluding it based on paperwork.
There are also legislative efforts aimed at addressing gaps where supervisory agencies lack the authority to mandate follow-up verification or supplementation of formal investigations and actions by employers. A proposed amendment to the Labor Standards Act, led by Representative Lee Seong-gwon, would allow the Minister of Employment and Labor to request documentation from employers in cases of victim requests for confirmation, significant harm, or non-compliance, with labor inspectors verifying the information. If the investigation or actions are deemed inadequate, a re-investigation or re-action would be mandated, with fines imposed for non-compliance.
International examples are also worth considering. In Ontario, Canada, labor department inspectors can order employers to designate qualified independent investigators, with the costs borne by the employer. In Australia, workers can directly apply to the Fair Work Commission for orders to stop harassment. Similarly, South Korea should explore a collaborative model that allows external experts, such as lawyers and certified labor consultants, to conduct investigations, with the government covering the costs, in addition to increasing labor office personnel.
The next challenge for the workplace harassment system is to ensure it operates fairly in practice. Legal mechanisms to guarantee the fairness of investigations must be established alongside the administrative power to support them. A system that only increases in numbers will lose credibility.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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