◆ Absence of Cultural Policy
When citizens think about the purpose of national cultural institutions, their responses typically revolve around preserving cultural heritage for future generations, ensuring cultural enjoyment for all citizens, or showcasing the nation's dignity. Many believe that national cultural institutions exist solely as sanctuaries of pure beauty, but this is not the case.
With the establishment of nation-states in the late 18th and 19th centuries, national cultural institutions were designed as politically motivated entities to provide legitimacy to the state rather than merely to enjoy beauty. In the past, legitimacy was secured through divine power or military force, but in a nation-state devoid of these, it became imperative to create a shared history and aesthetic consciousness among the imagined community of citizens through cultural institutions like museums and theaters. Thus, these institutions were necessary for producing 'cultural hegemony' by narrativizing exhibitions and performances, as Antonio Gramsci described.
Conversely, these cultural institutions also possess a different face. While markets leave only what sells and politics erases minorities through majority rule, well-functioning cultural institutions expand the diversity of voices and thoughts by accommodating narratives that have been erased or ignored in social memory. This duality—where a tool that enforces common sense becomes a rebel that fractures it—characterizes cultural institutions, which embrace conflict and difference. Therefore, national cultural institutions are born with the contradiction of being both a means of integration and a tool of resistance, and this contradiction is not a flaw to be resolved but a condition of their very existence.
The challenge lies in how to manage this contradiction, and the answer is determined by governance structures. Institutional choices, such as job security for professionals and multi-year budgeting, cannot be replaced by mere words. When professional organizations are overwhelmed by administration, and the heads of theaters change with each regime, it demonstrates an attitude of using cultural institutions solely as tools for producing hegemony. In contrast, a structure that robustly guarantees the autonomy of professionals expresses a nation's historical and cultural identity by keeping cultural institutions open as spaces for debate and reflection.
◆ Different Governance Structures for the Same Institution
In South Korea, the governance structures of national cultural institutions, which serve as spaces for creating the nation's cultural appeal and act as guardians of the times, vary significantly. While the National Museum of Korea, the National Gugak Center, and the National Library operate as general administrative agencies under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art and the National Theater are designated as responsible management agencies, and the National World Writing Museum operates as a separate legal entity.
Institutions established before the 2000s began as general administrative agencies. However, following the 1997 financial crisis, the introduction of the responsible management agency system aimed at enhancing administrative efficiency and service quality led to the National Theater's establishment in 2000 and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art's incorporation in 2006, although they were changed to responsible management agencies. Discussions began in 2010 regarding the establishment and operation of a National Museum of Korea, but after nearly eight years of deliberation, it was abandoned by 2018.
The first national cultural institution to launch as a corporation was the 'Seoul Arts Center' in 1987. However, while the Ministry of Culture wasted time on discussions about incorporation, institutions like the Independence Hall (established in 1986) and the National Maritime Museum (converted to a special corporation in 2015) established advanced corporate governance structures ahead of the Ministry of Culture.
At that time, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology amended the law on the establishment and operation of science museums, leading to the incorporation of the National Science Museum in 2013, followed by the National Gwangju Science Museum and the National Busan Science Museum in 2015, and the National Aviation Museum in 2020. As a result, national cultural facilities under different ministries were established as special corporations with distinct governance structures, despite all being labeled 'national.'
The reason for this is clear. In the absence of a foundational philosophy for national cultural policy, there is no overarching body or unified law to oversee museum policy, leading each ministry to create museums as needed through individual legislation, resulting in varied organizational forms based on the timing of establishment and the policy judgments of the respective ministries.
In fact, the cultural policy adopted and implemented by a nation reflects how its government exercises power, views the market, and interacts with its citizens, serving as a definitive measure of the nation's character. The fact that the governance structures of national cultural institutions vary indicates a serious issue of 'lack of social consensus on a coherent national philosophy and identity.'
Many countries adopt different cultural policy principles based on their cultural policy goals. Notable cultural economists Harry Hillman Chartrand and Claire McCoy categorize these principles into four main types: the 'facilitator model,' where the government indirectly encourages private support for the arts through tax incentives, as seen in the U.S.; the 'patron model,' where the government provides funding but delegates specific support decisions to independent committees, as in the U.K.; the 'designer model,' where cultural support is integrated into the government's macro welfare and social policies, providing job security and welfare for artists, as in France; and the 'engineer model,' used by former communist countries, where the government controls the ownership of art and uses it as a tool for political purposes.
◆ Wandering Korean Cultural Policy
Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the foundation of Korean cultural policy has alternated among the four models of engineer, patron, designer, and facilitator with each change of government. This reflects not just differences in policy direction but a fundamental lack of philosophy regarding how the state views culture and the arts.
The Korea Arts and Culture Promotion Agency, established in 1973, is a prime example of a government-led engineer model, where the government directly plans and executes cultural policies and controls budgets, embodying a supply-driven model typical of developing countries. This model is an extension of the 'developmental state' model that dominated Korean administration at the time.
Subsequently, the establishment of the Korea Arts Council (ARKO) adopted a committee-based approach, officially espousing the patron model of 'supporting without interference.' However, the powerful central authority of the Ministry of Culture, which holds budgetary and personnel authority, has led to a hybrid form that combines French bureaucratic elements with British-style professional committees, where independence is often more of a slogan than a reality.
At the same time, the government has a strong tendency to set macro goals such as national development strategies, job creation, and regional balanced development, incorporating the cultural sector into these frameworks. As a result, culture and the arts are often treated as tools to achieve policy objectives rather than being respected for their intrinsic value.
More concerning is the fact that the engineer model from the military regime era has not been completely eradicated. Attempts to control culture and the arts based on the ideological leanings of the regime, as seen in the blacklist and whitelist incidents, have persisted into recent years, indicating that Korean cultural policy has not fully escaped the remnants of authoritarianism. The facilitator model, which is partially adopted, mimics tax incentives and encourages patronage activities, but the institutional and cultural soil necessary for the arts ecosystem to be self-sustaining is still not mature. Consequently, the reliance on government funding remains high.
This mixture of models fundamentally undermines the sustainability of policies. With each change of government every five years, the direction of cultural policy swings from patron to designer, then back to engineer, leading the cultural sector to become accustomed to seeking government guidelines and connections while claiming creative autonomy. Although a fair public competition process is maintained, only proposals that align with government-defined key tasks tend to survive.
Of course, there are counterarguments that this mixture should not be viewed negatively. While the West has settled into specific models over centuries through civil society and cultural markets, Korea has experienced rapid growth through both government-led top-down support and the swift rise of the private sector, suggesting that rather than completely discarding this hybrid model, it may be more realistic to adopt a specific British or French model as a principle while refining it with the advantages of the American model.
Nevertheless, the diagnosis that current Korean cultural policy remains in a transitional phase, lacking a central principle, is undeniable. To advance toward becoming a true cultural advanced nation, it is imperative to establish a legal and institutional framework that firmly upholds the principle of 'supporting without interference' in cultural and artistic policy, regardless of the regime's inclinations.
◆ Museum Policy Without a Control Tower
The reason each national cultural institution has a different governance structure is that the logic of the times at which they were established has fossilized. The National Museum of Korea was established after liberation, while the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, the National Theater, and the National Gugak Center were mostly born as direct organizations under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture during the state-led modernization period of the 1960s to 1980s. During this time, the state understood culture not as autonomy but as part of governance, and thus these institutions inherited the bureaucratic structures of civil service, including job classifications and ranks.
In contrast, institutions like the Sejong Institute Foundation, the Korean Literature Translation Institute, and the Korea Creative Content Agency were established in the 2000s with the emergence of terms like 'cultural industry' and 'Korean Wave,' adopting relatively flexible quasi-governmental forms to align with their new missions of industry promotion.
According to Yang Hyun-mi's 2023 study on museum policy governance, South Korea operates six museum-related laws across five ministries, with 23 ministries establishing and operating a total of 98 national museums based on their own logic, highlighting the absence of an integrated policy governance structure.
The more fundamental reason for this situation is the lack of a higher body to oversee a 'national cultural philosophy.' The French Ministry of Culture has designed the status of all cultural institutions under a clear national philosophy of 'culture is not merely a commodity,' which has been in place since André Malraux, advocating for the legal protection and support of cultural goods and services.
In the U.S., the National Endowment for the Arts oversees museums, libraries, and archives through the Institute of Museum and Library Services, while the U.K. manages museums and libraries through independent public bodies based on the principle of 'arms-length.' France's Ministry of Culture oversees museums through the Directorate General of Heritage and Architecture, while the Directorate General of Media and Cultural Industries manages library policies.
In contrast, South Korea has individual establishment laws for each institution, such as the 'Museum and Art Museum Promotion Act' (1990) and the 'Science Museum Act' (1992), but lacks a unified philosophical framework governing all national cultural institutions. There is only a requirement for prior feasibility assessments by the Ministry of Culture when establishing museums.
As a result, each institution has been assigned a governance structure based solely on its political situation and the negotiating power of its respective ministry, leading to the patchwork system seen today. The government has created new institutions through separate laws and organizational principles without ever considering the museum's academic significance or integrating them into a cohesive system. Consequently, despite being under the umbrella of 'cultural administration,' the personnel regulations, budgeting methods, and degrees of political independence vary significantly among institutions, and over time, this has become a hegemonic characteristic of each institution. This proves that national cultural institutions have never been designed under a macro 'cultural philosophy' or a comprehensive 'master plan.'
Therefore, it is necessary to legislate that the Ministry of Culture oversees the establishment and operation of national cultural institutions, allowing it to determine governance structures from a broader cultural policy perspective. Additionally, leveraging the symbolic significance of the Sejong National Museum Complex as the first museum cluster in the country, efforts should be made to unify the project, which is currently dispersed among six agencies, including the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the Ministry of Interior and Safety, to ensure a cohesive museum policy. The current situation, where multiple agencies create facilities based on their own criteria, will inevitably lead to issues such as inconsistencies in collection management systems, lack of a unified brand, and fragmented financial planning. Therefore, structural flaws at the construction stage cannot be resolved merely through post-opening operational integration.
The common lesson from the Smithsonian Institution in the U.S., the French Ministry of Culture, and the U.K.'s DCMS is that a single governing body overseeing museum policy from the outset, while ensuring the professional autonomy of individual institutions, is effective. This overarching responsibility must be clear from the initial construction phase and cannot be postponed until after opening.
Thus, the Ministry of Culture, as the legal governing body for museum policy, should take on the overall responsibility of establishing and approving master plans and exhibition standards from the construction phase, while the Happy City Corporation should carry out infrastructure development according to those guidelines. The unification of operational entities post-opening will also be effective only if this overarching responsibility is established from the construction phase. The difficulties of inter-agency organizational and budget coordination and the utilization of individual ministries' expertise should continue to be examined, but this should not be a reason to defer the Ministry of Culture's overarching responsibility.
◆ Culture and Arts Sacrificed to Bureaucratic Greed
The absence of a control tower in museum policy is a result of the Ministry of Culture's bureaucratic organization, as well as the instinct of each ministry to protect its vested interests and engage in departmental self-interest, which obstructs the advanced transition of governance structures in cultural institutions. In particular, the Ministry of Culture and the Cultural Heritage Administration's love for general administrative agencies is boundless. They argue that preservation's public nature and strong enforcement are core justifications for direct state management. They assert that the irreplaceable preservation of cultural heritage necessitates long-term state involvement rather than relying on profit-driven private governance.
Moreover, they contend that strong regulations, such as restrictions on private property rights and the need for state legitimacy in exercising diplomatic representation, require general administrative agencies. The argument that stable budget acquisition and unlimited responsibility for policy failures can only be achieved through general administrative agencies also hinders governance changes. Above all, the belief that evaluating culture based on efficiency undermines the state's responsibilities is firmly entrenched. This stands in stark contrast to countries like France, the U.S., the U.K., and Germany, which have proven to be more effective in preserving and developing cultural heritage.
Cultural institutions such as libraries, museums, and the National Gugak Center are functional entities that provide cultural services to the public and conduct research and exhibitions. However, confining them within the framework of general administrative agencies is a clear example of bureaucratic self-interest that misapplies regulatory logic. It is nonsensical for the state to directly manage operational entities where the enforcement of public power is unnecessary. Instead, bureaucratic control and rotation stifle organizational expertise and lead to the subjugation of academic and artistic freedom to the whims of the regime. An administrative model bound by civil service personnel and budget regulations cannot respond flexibly to digital transformation and changing demands. The notion that the state and bureaucrats must lead and guide the people in an advanced Korea is outdated. A swift transition to advanced governance structures, such as independent incorporation, is essential to maximize autonomy and expertise.
Bureaucratic organizations instinctively resist relinquishing control over their personnel and related rotational positions. The intensity of this resistance varies depending on the nature of the institution. The larger and more symbolic the institution, the stronger the ministry's desire to maintain control, while relatively new or industry-promoting institutions can be placed at a distance without significant loss to the ministry or bureaucrats. Ultimately, the differences in governance structures today are not the result of philosophical judgments but rather the remnants of a long-standing power struggle between ministries and institutions.
Particularly in overlapping areas of jurisdiction between ministries, temporary fixes have been hastily applied. A typical example is the division of budget and operations for overseas Korean cultural centers, which fall under the Ministry of Culture for budget and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for oversight. This reflects a compromise between the interests of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than a system designed from a single philosophical standpoint. The recent absorption of the Overseas Cultural Promotion Agency into the Ministry of Culture's International Cultural Promotion Policy Office, followed by its reallocation under the Deputy Minister, and the shifting of the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art from the Cultural Infrastructure Division to the Visual Design Division, are all indicative of this fluidity. Such repeated adjustments occur not because a fundamental philosophical organization has been established, but rather because no such organization has ever existed, leading to a patchwork of administrative convenience.
Additionally, the pyramid-like promotion structure of central government exacerbates the problem. Positions such as the directors of the National Museum, the National Library, the National Gugak Center, and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art have functioned as honorable destinations for retiring bureaucrats and as administrative territories for advancing within the senior civil service. While it is true that administrative heads of general administrative agencies benefit from budget acquisition and organizational management, this has further slowed the change in governance structures.
In any case, the moment national cultural institutions are incorporated, the positions of administrative bureaucrats will disappear entirely, leading to anticipated resistance and opposition from the organization. The obsession with control over personnel and budgets also plays a role. To move toward advanced governance based on the principle of arms-length, budget and personnel authority must be fully transferred to the cultural institutions, but the power of bureaucratic organizations stems from that very 'control.' Therefore, expecting bureaucratic organizations to voluntarily relinquish power may have been unrealistic from the start.
The fragmented reality of museum and art policies across the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is not merely a product of profound national philosophy but rather a reflection of each ministry's desire to secure positions for retiring bureaucrats. However, it is also important to recognize that the practical dilemmas faced by the Korean institutional environment cannot be easily dismissed.
Notably, the most vehement opposition to incorporation comes not only from bureaucrats but also from curators and staff within the institutions. Incorporation signifies the loss of civil servant status, job insecurity, and pressure for profitability through increased admission fees or sponsorship acquisition. The past attempt to incorporate the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art was thwarted by internal staff fighting for their survival, demonstrating that these concerns are not unfounded.
Skepticism about the self-correcting ability of private board systems is not entirely unfounded. Concerns that conflicts over political appointments may intensify with each regime change have already been confirmed through incidents like the blacklist and whitelist controversies at the Korea Arts Council. Ironically, this has provided bureaucrats with a defense justification that 'it is better for civil servants to manage, as it is relatively neutral and stable.'
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the preconditions for the American-style private autonomy model, such as patronage and corporate or individual donations, have not yet matured in Korea. If the government reduces financial support under the pretext of incorporation, the very survival of the institutions could be jeopardized, which is a legitimate concern stemming from structural limitations.
Ultimately, the stagnation of governance in Korean cultural administration cannot be explained solely by the self-preservation of bureaucrats. The interplay of active factors, such as bureaucratic power obsession, demands for job security from the field, trial and error in implementing private autonomous governance, and a weak donation ecosystem, collectively delays reform. Therefore, achieving genuine transformation requires a balanced approach that includes criticism aimed at bureaucratic vested interests, institutional buffers that can guarantee job security and autonomy, and parallel strategies to cultivate the private donation ecosystem.
In any case, the underlying conclusion regarding the varying governance structures of national cultural institutions in Korea is that their differences stem not from a lack of philosophy but from the accumulation of historical needs, inter-ministerial power struggles, and bureaucratic self-preservation logic that have left little room for philosophical intervention.
◆ The Governance Structure of Cultural Institutions Reflects Cultural Policy
The governance structures of museums and galleries can be categorized based on who delegates ownership, financial, and decision-making authority to what type of organization. Examining cases from Europe, the U.S., and Japan reveals a trend away from direct state management toward securing both independence and accountability.
The most representative and advanced governance structure, characterized by strong autonomy for cultural institutions, is the U.K.'s 'Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB)' model. Most cultural institutions in the U.K., regardless of size, adopt this governance structure, which receives partial financial support from the state. For example, the British Museum has a board of up to 25 members, with one appointed by the monarch, 15 by the Prime Minister, and five by the board itself. The British Museum operates as a non-departmental public body, receiving support from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport while being accountable to Parliament.
The Imperial War Museum (IWM), another national museum in the U.K., is governed by a board under laws such as the Imperial War Museum Act of 1920 and 1955, as well as the Museums and Galleries Act of 1992, operating as a non-departmental public body with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport as its sponsoring body. The core of this system is a compromise where the government provides funding but delegates collection management and daily operations to the board, reducing political interference while ensuring accountability for public funds through Parliament.
France adopts a 'public institution' governance structure. The Louvre is not merely a state-run institution but operates as the 'Louvre Museum Public Institution,' possessing independent legal status. This structure allows the state to maintain ownership and final supervisory authority while granting autonomy in budget execution, personnel, and exhibition planning. It is more flexible than direct state administration but allows for greater state intervention than the U.K.'s board model, representing a middle-ground governance structure.
Germany operates national cultural institutions based on a 'foundation' governance structure. For instance, the National Museums of Berlin are not individual institutions but are integrated under the 'Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation,' which encompasses five institutions, including the National Museums of Berlin, the National Library, the Secret State Archives, the Ibero-American Institute, and the National Institute for Music Research. This system was established after royal collections were converted into public foundations in 1918. This foundation model, funded jointly by the federal and state governments, emphasizes integrated planning and resource allocation over the independent management of individual museums, differing from the U.K. and French models.
Japan employs an 'Independent Administrative Institution (IAA)' governance structure. Introduced as part of administrative reforms aimed at achieving a 'small government with high efficiency' in 2001, it shares similarities with South Korea's responsible management agencies and some public institutions, but it has been criticized for leading to the decline of Japanese museums. The Tokyo National Museum is operated by the National Cultural Properties Organization, an independent administrative institution that encompasses national museums and cultural property research institutes, including local museums in Kyoto, Nara, and Kyushu. The IAA system separates national museums from central government organizations, granting budget and personnel autonomy while allowing the relevant ministry to manage medium-term goals and evaluations. This model is similar to the foundation model in Germany, as it maintains state ownership while delegating management.
In February 2026, Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology presented goals for national museums and art galleries for 2026-2030, stating that if the ratio of self-generated income from admission fees to exhibition project costs falls below 40% by 2029, they would be subject to reorganization, including closure, and would be encouraged to implement a 'dual pricing system' that charges higher fees to foreign tourists. Furthermore, they are required to achieve 100% self-sufficiency by 2031-2035, which has sparked backlash.
The Netherlands employs a 'privatized foundation' governance structure. After the completion of privatization, all 24 national museums and galleries were incorporated as foundations, still receiving subsidies from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. While ownership of buildings and collections remains with the state, some have completely removed the designation of 'national' or 'municipal,' although they retain the title of 'National Gallery.'
Through administrative reforms in the 1990s, national galleries were 'decentralized,' with the government entrusting operations to independent foundations while reducing subsidies, granting discretion over marketing and private fundraising. The growth of the National Gallery and the Van Gogh Museum into global tourist brands is rooted in this reform of governance structures. These museums rely on government subsidies for over 70% of their total budgets, and to ensure continued accountability to the minister, all foundation charters stipulate that amendments cannot be made without the minister's approval.
◆ The Future and Governance of National Cultural Institutions
The issue of governance structures in national cultural institutions is not merely an organizational management problem. It expresses the government's philosophy and vision regarding culture and the arts and how it intends to shape the future civilization of South Korea. Nevertheless, major cultural institutions such as the National Theater, the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, the National Museum, the Seoul Arts Center, and the National World Writing Museum are each placed under different legal statuses and governance structures, making it difficult to establish consistent and directional policies. Therefore, the issue of governance structures is both unavoidable and timely.
Given the realities in Korea, it is challenging to adopt any one of the governance models discussed earlier directly. Korea has a strong centralized administrative culture built on a civil law tradition, so forcibly introducing the British trust board model or the Dutch privatization model could lead to financial instability and cultural dissonance due to the absence of a donation culture and a tradition of civic boards.
However, it is also not feasible to maintain a direct state administration system. The appointment of heads of institutions and program directions have fluctuated with each regime change, and the scars of political interference, such as the blacklist incidents, have been painful lessons from the past. Most national cultural institutions cannot sustain their operating costs solely through private funding, making government financial support an unavoidable prerequisite for the time being.
Considering these conditions, the most realistic alternative for Korea is to cautiously propose a hybrid model based on the French public institution type, incorporating elements of performance management from the Japanese model. This is because a public institution type allows the government to bear financial responsibility while providing legal status and an independent board to prevent government or bureaucratic interference in personnel and program decisions, thus satisfying both the demands for government-dependent financial structures and political independence.
Secondly, since incorporation alone will not completely resolve the politicization of leadership appointments, legalizing medium-term management goals and external evaluation committees in the Japanese style could ensure continuity of operations regardless of regime changes. Thirdly, while the integrated foundation model, like the German model, is attractive in terms of policy consistency, it poses a significant risk of bloating and rigidity in management due to the diverse nature of the institutions already under its umbrella, such as performing arts, visual arts, museums, and libraries. Therefore, it may be reasonable to prioritize the incorporation of individual institutions while establishing small advisory committees for specific sectors, such as visual arts and performing arts, as needed.
Of course, there will be differing opinions on these conclusions. Some argue that given the deeply rooted bureaucratic control practices in Korea, mere incorporation will not guarantee substantial autonomy, suggesting that if a compromise is to be made, the British board model should be adopted, with institutional mechanisms ensuring substantial participation from the arts community and civil society in the board nomination process. Conversely, those emphasizing financial soundness may argue for a gradual attempt at Dutch-style foundation models for institutions like the National Museum of Korea or the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, which already have a certain visitor base and self-revenue structure. This perspective strongly suggests that a differentiated approach reflecting the varying degrees of financial independence and political sensitivity of each institution is necessary, rather than seeking a single solution.
However, the issue of governance structures for national cultural institutions can no longer be postponed. The reason national cultural institutions in Korea must establish a unified governance structure is that it is the minimum condition for ensuring the consistency and unity of national cultural policy. Politicians often quote Kim Gu's phrase, "What I desire most is the power of high culture," from his 'My Wish.' Yet, their understanding and commitment to culture rarely resonate.
The reason their words often sound hollow is that they cannot even resolve the governance structure of national cultural institutions. It is perplexing why the government, which is currently enjoying a surplus from the semiconductor boom and contemplating its allocation, is particularly stingy in the cultural sector and hesitant about nurturing talent, leaving cultural welfare to individuals. While the government is aware of the prioritization of budgets for welfare and security and the difficulty of quantifying the outcomes of cultural and artistic investments, such challenges cannot justify postponing governance restructuring. Rather, a clear governance structure is a prerequisite for efficient budget execution and performance management, making the current passive attitude a reversal of cause and effect.
Ultimately, the restructuring of governance for national cultural institutions is not a problem that can be solved by simply transplanting a model from another country. It requires designing a system that can incorporate Korea's administrative traditions, financial realities, and urgent demands for political independence. A framework based on France's public institution model or the U.K.'s non-departmental public body, enhanced with a performance management system for transparency, and a sophisticated approach that varies the degree of autonomy according to the nature of the institution is the direction that Korean cultural administration should pursue.
* This article has been translated by AI.
When citizens think about the purpose of national cultural institutions, their responses typically revolve around preserving cultural heritage for future generations, ensuring cultural enjoyment for all citizens, or showcasing the nation's dignity. Many believe that national cultural institutions exist solely as sanctuaries of pure beauty, but this is not the case.
With the establishment of nation-states in the late 18th and 19th centuries, national cultural institutions were designed as politically motivated entities to provide legitimacy to the state rather than merely to enjoy beauty. In the past, legitimacy was secured through divine power or military force, but in a nation-state devoid of these, it became imperative to create a shared history and aesthetic consciousness among the imagined community of citizens through cultural institutions like museums and theaters. Thus, these institutions were necessary for producing 'cultural hegemony' by narrativizing exhibitions and performances, as Antonio Gramsci described.
Conversely, these cultural institutions also possess a different face. While markets leave only what sells and politics erases minorities through majority rule, well-functioning cultural institutions expand the diversity of voices and thoughts by accommodating narratives that have been erased or ignored in social memory. This duality—where a tool that enforces common sense becomes a rebel that fractures it—characterizes cultural institutions, which embrace conflict and difference. Therefore, national cultural institutions are born with the contradiction of being both a means of integration and a tool of resistance, and this contradiction is not a flaw to be resolved but a condition of their very existence.
The challenge lies in how to manage this contradiction, and the answer is determined by governance structures. Institutional choices, such as job security for professionals and multi-year budgeting, cannot be replaced by mere words. When professional organizations are overwhelmed by administration, and the heads of theaters change with each regime, it demonstrates an attitude of using cultural institutions solely as tools for producing hegemony. In contrast, a structure that robustly guarantees the autonomy of professionals expresses a nation's historical and cultural identity by keeping cultural institutions open as spaces for debate and reflection.
◆ Different Governance Structures for the Same Institution
In South Korea, the governance structures of national cultural institutions, which serve as spaces for creating the nation's cultural appeal and act as guardians of the times, vary significantly. While the National Museum of Korea, the National Gugak Center, and the National Library operate as general administrative agencies under the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art and the National Theater are designated as responsible management agencies, and the National World Writing Museum operates as a separate legal entity.
Institutions established before the 2000s began as general administrative agencies. However, following the 1997 financial crisis, the introduction of the responsible management agency system aimed at enhancing administrative efficiency and service quality led to the National Theater's establishment in 2000 and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art's incorporation in 2006, although they were changed to responsible management agencies. Discussions began in 2010 regarding the establishment and operation of a National Museum of Korea, but after nearly eight years of deliberation, it was abandoned by 2018.
The first national cultural institution to launch as a corporation was the 'Seoul Arts Center' in 1987. However, while the Ministry of Culture wasted time on discussions about incorporation, institutions like the Independence Hall (established in 1986) and the National Maritime Museum (converted to a special corporation in 2015) established advanced corporate governance structures ahead of the Ministry of Culture.
At that time, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology amended the law on the establishment and operation of science museums, leading to the incorporation of the National Science Museum in 2013, followed by the National Gwangju Science Museum and the National Busan Science Museum in 2015, and the National Aviation Museum in 2020. As a result, national cultural facilities under different ministries were established as special corporations with distinct governance structures, despite all being labeled 'national.'
The reason for this is clear. In the absence of a foundational philosophy for national cultural policy, there is no overarching body or unified law to oversee museum policy, leading each ministry to create museums as needed through individual legislation, resulting in varied organizational forms based on the timing of establishment and the policy judgments of the respective ministries.
In fact, the cultural policy adopted and implemented by a nation reflects how its government exercises power, views the market, and interacts with its citizens, serving as a definitive measure of the nation's character. The fact that the governance structures of national cultural institutions vary indicates a serious issue of 'lack of social consensus on a coherent national philosophy and identity.'
Many countries adopt different cultural policy principles based on their cultural policy goals. Notable cultural economists Harry Hillman Chartrand and Claire McCoy categorize these principles into four main types: the 'facilitator model,' where the government indirectly encourages private support for the arts through tax incentives, as seen in the U.S.; the 'patron model,' where the government provides funding but delegates specific support decisions to independent committees, as in the U.K.; the 'designer model,' where cultural support is integrated into the government's macro welfare and social policies, providing job security and welfare for artists, as in France; and the 'engineer model,' used by former communist countries, where the government controls the ownership of art and uses it as a tool for political purposes.
◆ Wandering Korean Cultural Policy
Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the foundation of Korean cultural policy has alternated among the four models of engineer, patron, designer, and facilitator with each change of government. This reflects not just differences in policy direction but a fundamental lack of philosophy regarding how the state views culture and the arts.
The Korea Arts and Culture Promotion Agency, established in 1973, is a prime example of a government-led engineer model, where the government directly plans and executes cultural policies and controls budgets, embodying a supply-driven model typical of developing countries. This model is an extension of the 'developmental state' model that dominated Korean administration at the time.
Subsequently, the establishment of the Korea Arts Council (ARKO) adopted a committee-based approach, officially espousing the patron model of 'supporting without interference.' However, the powerful central authority of the Ministry of Culture, which holds budgetary and personnel authority, has led to a hybrid form that combines French bureaucratic elements with British-style professional committees, where independence is often more of a slogan than a reality.
At the same time, the government has a strong tendency to set macro goals such as national development strategies, job creation, and regional balanced development, incorporating the cultural sector into these frameworks. As a result, culture and the arts are often treated as tools to achieve policy objectives rather than being respected for their intrinsic value.
More concerning is the fact that the engineer model from the military regime era has not been completely eradicated. Attempts to control culture and the arts based on the ideological leanings of the regime, as seen in the blacklist and whitelist incidents, have persisted into recent years, indicating that Korean cultural policy has not fully escaped the remnants of authoritarianism. The facilitator model, which is partially adopted, mimics tax incentives and encourages patronage activities, but the institutional and cultural soil necessary for the arts ecosystem to be self-sustaining is still not mature. Consequently, the reliance on government funding remains high.
This mixture of models fundamentally undermines the sustainability of policies. With each change of government every five years, the direction of cultural policy swings from patron to designer, then back to engineer, leading the cultural sector to become accustomed to seeking government guidelines and connections while claiming creative autonomy. Although a fair public competition process is maintained, only proposals that align with government-defined key tasks tend to survive.
Of course, there are counterarguments that this mixture should not be viewed negatively. While the West has settled into specific models over centuries through civil society and cultural markets, Korea has experienced rapid growth through both government-led top-down support and the swift rise of the private sector, suggesting that rather than completely discarding this hybrid model, it may be more realistic to adopt a specific British or French model as a principle while refining it with the advantages of the American model.
Nevertheless, the diagnosis that current Korean cultural policy remains in a transitional phase, lacking a central principle, is undeniable. To advance toward becoming a true cultural advanced nation, it is imperative to establish a legal and institutional framework that firmly upholds the principle of 'supporting without interference' in cultural and artistic policy, regardless of the regime's inclinations.
◆ Museum Policy Without a Control Tower
The reason each national cultural institution has a different governance structure is that the logic of the times at which they were established has fossilized. The National Museum of Korea was established after liberation, while the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, the National Theater, and the National Gugak Center were mostly born as direct organizations under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture during the state-led modernization period of the 1960s to 1980s. During this time, the state understood culture not as autonomy but as part of governance, and thus these institutions inherited the bureaucratic structures of civil service, including job classifications and ranks.
In contrast, institutions like the Sejong Institute Foundation, the Korean Literature Translation Institute, and the Korea Creative Content Agency were established in the 2000s with the emergence of terms like 'cultural industry' and 'Korean Wave,' adopting relatively flexible quasi-governmental forms to align with their new missions of industry promotion.
According to Yang Hyun-mi's 2023 study on museum policy governance, South Korea operates six museum-related laws across five ministries, with 23 ministries establishing and operating a total of 98 national museums based on their own logic, highlighting the absence of an integrated policy governance structure.
The more fundamental reason for this situation is the lack of a higher body to oversee a 'national cultural philosophy.' The French Ministry of Culture has designed the status of all cultural institutions under a clear national philosophy of 'culture is not merely a commodity,' which has been in place since André Malraux, advocating for the legal protection and support of cultural goods and services.
In the U.S., the National Endowment for the Arts oversees museums, libraries, and archives through the Institute of Museum and Library Services, while the U.K. manages museums and libraries through independent public bodies based on the principle of 'arms-length.' France's Ministry of Culture oversees museums through the Directorate General of Heritage and Architecture, while the Directorate General of Media and Cultural Industries manages library policies.
In contrast, South Korea has individual establishment laws for each institution, such as the 'Museum and Art Museum Promotion Act' (1990) and the 'Science Museum Act' (1992), but lacks a unified philosophical framework governing all national cultural institutions. There is only a requirement for prior feasibility assessments by the Ministry of Culture when establishing museums.
As a result, each institution has been assigned a governance structure based solely on its political situation and the negotiating power of its respective ministry, leading to the patchwork system seen today. The government has created new institutions through separate laws and organizational principles without ever considering the museum's academic significance or integrating them into a cohesive system. Consequently, despite being under the umbrella of 'cultural administration,' the personnel regulations, budgeting methods, and degrees of political independence vary significantly among institutions, and over time, this has become a hegemonic characteristic of each institution. This proves that national cultural institutions have never been designed under a macro 'cultural philosophy' or a comprehensive 'master plan.'
Therefore, it is necessary to legislate that the Ministry of Culture oversees the establishment and operation of national cultural institutions, allowing it to determine governance structures from a broader cultural policy perspective. Additionally, leveraging the symbolic significance of the Sejong National Museum Complex as the first museum cluster in the country, efforts should be made to unify the project, which is currently dispersed among six agencies, including the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the Ministry of Interior and Safety, to ensure a cohesive museum policy. The current situation, where multiple agencies create facilities based on their own criteria, will inevitably lead to issues such as inconsistencies in collection management systems, lack of a unified brand, and fragmented financial planning. Therefore, structural flaws at the construction stage cannot be resolved merely through post-opening operational integration.
The common lesson from the Smithsonian Institution in the U.S., the French Ministry of Culture, and the U.K.'s DCMS is that a single governing body overseeing museum policy from the outset, while ensuring the professional autonomy of individual institutions, is effective. This overarching responsibility must be clear from the initial construction phase and cannot be postponed until after opening.
Thus, the Ministry of Culture, as the legal governing body for museum policy, should take on the overall responsibility of establishing and approving master plans and exhibition standards from the construction phase, while the Happy City Corporation should carry out infrastructure development according to those guidelines. The unification of operational entities post-opening will also be effective only if this overarching responsibility is established from the construction phase. The difficulties of inter-agency organizational and budget coordination and the utilization of individual ministries' expertise should continue to be examined, but this should not be a reason to defer the Ministry of Culture's overarching responsibility.
◆ Culture and Arts Sacrificed to Bureaucratic Greed
The absence of a control tower in museum policy is a result of the Ministry of Culture's bureaucratic organization, as well as the instinct of each ministry to protect its vested interests and engage in departmental self-interest, which obstructs the advanced transition of governance structures in cultural institutions. In particular, the Ministry of Culture and the Cultural Heritage Administration's love for general administrative agencies is boundless. They argue that preservation's public nature and strong enforcement are core justifications for direct state management. They assert that the irreplaceable preservation of cultural heritage necessitates long-term state involvement rather than relying on profit-driven private governance.
Moreover, they contend that strong regulations, such as restrictions on private property rights and the need for state legitimacy in exercising diplomatic representation, require general administrative agencies. The argument that stable budget acquisition and unlimited responsibility for policy failures can only be achieved through general administrative agencies also hinders governance changes. Above all, the belief that evaluating culture based on efficiency undermines the state's responsibilities is firmly entrenched. This stands in stark contrast to countries like France, the U.S., the U.K., and Germany, which have proven to be more effective in preserving and developing cultural heritage.
Cultural institutions such as libraries, museums, and the National Gugak Center are functional entities that provide cultural services to the public and conduct research and exhibitions. However, confining them within the framework of general administrative agencies is a clear example of bureaucratic self-interest that misapplies regulatory logic. It is nonsensical for the state to directly manage operational entities where the enforcement of public power is unnecessary. Instead, bureaucratic control and rotation stifle organizational expertise and lead to the subjugation of academic and artistic freedom to the whims of the regime. An administrative model bound by civil service personnel and budget regulations cannot respond flexibly to digital transformation and changing demands. The notion that the state and bureaucrats must lead and guide the people in an advanced Korea is outdated. A swift transition to advanced governance structures, such as independent incorporation, is essential to maximize autonomy and expertise.
Bureaucratic organizations instinctively resist relinquishing control over their personnel and related rotational positions. The intensity of this resistance varies depending on the nature of the institution. The larger and more symbolic the institution, the stronger the ministry's desire to maintain control, while relatively new or industry-promoting institutions can be placed at a distance without significant loss to the ministry or bureaucrats. Ultimately, the differences in governance structures today are not the result of philosophical judgments but rather the remnants of a long-standing power struggle between ministries and institutions.
Particularly in overlapping areas of jurisdiction between ministries, temporary fixes have been hastily applied. A typical example is the division of budget and operations for overseas Korean cultural centers, which fall under the Ministry of Culture for budget and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for oversight. This reflects a compromise between the interests of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than a system designed from a single philosophical standpoint. The recent absorption of the Overseas Cultural Promotion Agency into the Ministry of Culture's International Cultural Promotion Policy Office, followed by its reallocation under the Deputy Minister, and the shifting of the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art from the Cultural Infrastructure Division to the Visual Design Division, are all indicative of this fluidity. Such repeated adjustments occur not because a fundamental philosophical organization has been established, but rather because no such organization has ever existed, leading to a patchwork of administrative convenience.
Additionally, the pyramid-like promotion structure of central government exacerbates the problem. Positions such as the directors of the National Museum, the National Library, the National Gugak Center, and the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art have functioned as honorable destinations for retiring bureaucrats and as administrative territories for advancing within the senior civil service. While it is true that administrative heads of general administrative agencies benefit from budget acquisition and organizational management, this has further slowed the change in governance structures.
In any case, the moment national cultural institutions are incorporated, the positions of administrative bureaucrats will disappear entirely, leading to anticipated resistance and opposition from the organization. The obsession with control over personnel and budgets also plays a role. To move toward advanced governance based on the principle of arms-length, budget and personnel authority must be fully transferred to the cultural institutions, but the power of bureaucratic organizations stems from that very 'control.' Therefore, expecting bureaucratic organizations to voluntarily relinquish power may have been unrealistic from the start.
The fragmented reality of museum and art policies across the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is not merely a product of profound national philosophy but rather a reflection of each ministry's desire to secure positions for retiring bureaucrats. However, it is also important to recognize that the practical dilemmas faced by the Korean institutional environment cannot be easily dismissed.
Notably, the most vehement opposition to incorporation comes not only from bureaucrats but also from curators and staff within the institutions. Incorporation signifies the loss of civil servant status, job insecurity, and pressure for profitability through increased admission fees or sponsorship acquisition. The past attempt to incorporate the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art was thwarted by internal staff fighting for their survival, demonstrating that these concerns are not unfounded.
Skepticism about the self-correcting ability of private board systems is not entirely unfounded. Concerns that conflicts over political appointments may intensify with each regime change have already been confirmed through incidents like the blacklist and whitelist controversies at the Korea Arts Council. Ironically, this has provided bureaucrats with a defense justification that 'it is better for civil servants to manage, as it is relatively neutral and stable.'
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the preconditions for the American-style private autonomy model, such as patronage and corporate or individual donations, have not yet matured in Korea. If the government reduces financial support under the pretext of incorporation, the very survival of the institutions could be jeopardized, which is a legitimate concern stemming from structural limitations.
Ultimately, the stagnation of governance in Korean cultural administration cannot be explained solely by the self-preservation of bureaucrats. The interplay of active factors, such as bureaucratic power obsession, demands for job security from the field, trial and error in implementing private autonomous governance, and a weak donation ecosystem, collectively delays reform. Therefore, achieving genuine transformation requires a balanced approach that includes criticism aimed at bureaucratic vested interests, institutional buffers that can guarantee job security and autonomy, and parallel strategies to cultivate the private donation ecosystem.
In any case, the underlying conclusion regarding the varying governance structures of national cultural institutions in Korea is that their differences stem not from a lack of philosophy but from the accumulation of historical needs, inter-ministerial power struggles, and bureaucratic self-preservation logic that have left little room for philosophical intervention.
◆ The Governance Structure of Cultural Institutions Reflects Cultural Policy
The governance structures of museums and galleries can be categorized based on who delegates ownership, financial, and decision-making authority to what type of organization. Examining cases from Europe, the U.S., and Japan reveals a trend away from direct state management toward securing both independence and accountability.
The most representative and advanced governance structure, characterized by strong autonomy for cultural institutions, is the U.K.'s 'Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB)' model. Most cultural institutions in the U.K., regardless of size, adopt this governance structure, which receives partial financial support from the state. For example, the British Museum has a board of up to 25 members, with one appointed by the monarch, 15 by the Prime Minister, and five by the board itself. The British Museum operates as a non-departmental public body, receiving support from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport while being accountable to Parliament.
The Imperial War Museum (IWM), another national museum in the U.K., is governed by a board under laws such as the Imperial War Museum Act of 1920 and 1955, as well as the Museums and Galleries Act of 1992, operating as a non-departmental public body with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport as its sponsoring body. The core of this system is a compromise where the government provides funding but delegates collection management and daily operations to the board, reducing political interference while ensuring accountability for public funds through Parliament.
France adopts a 'public institution' governance structure. The Louvre is not merely a state-run institution but operates as the 'Louvre Museum Public Institution,' possessing independent legal status. This structure allows the state to maintain ownership and final supervisory authority while granting autonomy in budget execution, personnel, and exhibition planning. It is more flexible than direct state administration but allows for greater state intervention than the U.K.'s board model, representing a middle-ground governance structure.
Germany operates national cultural institutions based on a 'foundation' governance structure. For instance, the National Museums of Berlin are not individual institutions but are integrated under the 'Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation,' which encompasses five institutions, including the National Museums of Berlin, the National Library, the Secret State Archives, the Ibero-American Institute, and the National Institute for Music Research. This system was established after royal collections were converted into public foundations in 1918. This foundation model, funded jointly by the federal and state governments, emphasizes integrated planning and resource allocation over the independent management of individual museums, differing from the U.K. and French models.
Japan employs an 'Independent Administrative Institution (IAA)' governance structure. Introduced as part of administrative reforms aimed at achieving a 'small government with high efficiency' in 2001, it shares similarities with South Korea's responsible management agencies and some public institutions, but it has been criticized for leading to the decline of Japanese museums. The Tokyo National Museum is operated by the National Cultural Properties Organization, an independent administrative institution that encompasses national museums and cultural property research institutes, including local museums in Kyoto, Nara, and Kyushu. The IAA system separates national museums from central government organizations, granting budget and personnel autonomy while allowing the relevant ministry to manage medium-term goals and evaluations. This model is similar to the foundation model in Germany, as it maintains state ownership while delegating management.
In February 2026, Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology presented goals for national museums and art galleries for 2026-2030, stating that if the ratio of self-generated income from admission fees to exhibition project costs falls below 40% by 2029, they would be subject to reorganization, including closure, and would be encouraged to implement a 'dual pricing system' that charges higher fees to foreign tourists. Furthermore, they are required to achieve 100% self-sufficiency by 2031-2035, which has sparked backlash.
The Netherlands employs a 'privatized foundation' governance structure. After the completion of privatization, all 24 national museums and galleries were incorporated as foundations, still receiving subsidies from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. While ownership of buildings and collections remains with the state, some have completely removed the designation of 'national' or 'municipal,' although they retain the title of 'National Gallery.'
Through administrative reforms in the 1990s, national galleries were 'decentralized,' with the government entrusting operations to independent foundations while reducing subsidies, granting discretion over marketing and private fundraising. The growth of the National Gallery and the Van Gogh Museum into global tourist brands is rooted in this reform of governance structures. These museums rely on government subsidies for over 70% of their total budgets, and to ensure continued accountability to the minister, all foundation charters stipulate that amendments cannot be made without the minister's approval.
◆ The Future and Governance of National Cultural Institutions
The issue of governance structures in national cultural institutions is not merely an organizational management problem. It expresses the government's philosophy and vision regarding culture and the arts and how it intends to shape the future civilization of South Korea. Nevertheless, major cultural institutions such as the National Theater, the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, the National Museum, the Seoul Arts Center, and the National World Writing Museum are each placed under different legal statuses and governance structures, making it difficult to establish consistent and directional policies. Therefore, the issue of governance structures is both unavoidable and timely.
Given the realities in Korea, it is challenging to adopt any one of the governance models discussed earlier directly. Korea has a strong centralized administrative culture built on a civil law tradition, so forcibly introducing the British trust board model or the Dutch privatization model could lead to financial instability and cultural dissonance due to the absence of a donation culture and a tradition of civic boards.
However, it is also not feasible to maintain a direct state administration system. The appointment of heads of institutions and program directions have fluctuated with each regime change, and the scars of political interference, such as the blacklist incidents, have been painful lessons from the past. Most national cultural institutions cannot sustain their operating costs solely through private funding, making government financial support an unavoidable prerequisite for the time being.
Considering these conditions, the most realistic alternative for Korea is to cautiously propose a hybrid model based on the French public institution type, incorporating elements of performance management from the Japanese model. This is because a public institution type allows the government to bear financial responsibility while providing legal status and an independent board to prevent government or bureaucratic interference in personnel and program decisions, thus satisfying both the demands for government-dependent financial structures and political independence.
Secondly, since incorporation alone will not completely resolve the politicization of leadership appointments, legalizing medium-term management goals and external evaluation committees in the Japanese style could ensure continuity of operations regardless of regime changes. Thirdly, while the integrated foundation model, like the German model, is attractive in terms of policy consistency, it poses a significant risk of bloating and rigidity in management due to the diverse nature of the institutions already under its umbrella, such as performing arts, visual arts, museums, and libraries. Therefore, it may be reasonable to prioritize the incorporation of individual institutions while establishing small advisory committees for specific sectors, such as visual arts and performing arts, as needed.
Of course, there will be differing opinions on these conclusions. Some argue that given the deeply rooted bureaucratic control practices in Korea, mere incorporation will not guarantee substantial autonomy, suggesting that if a compromise is to be made, the British board model should be adopted, with institutional mechanisms ensuring substantial participation from the arts community and civil society in the board nomination process. Conversely, those emphasizing financial soundness may argue for a gradual attempt at Dutch-style foundation models for institutions like the National Museum of Korea or the National Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, which already have a certain visitor base and self-revenue structure. This perspective strongly suggests that a differentiated approach reflecting the varying degrees of financial independence and political sensitivity of each institution is necessary, rather than seeking a single solution.
However, the issue of governance structures for national cultural institutions can no longer be postponed. The reason national cultural institutions in Korea must establish a unified governance structure is that it is the minimum condition for ensuring the consistency and unity of national cultural policy. Politicians often quote Kim Gu's phrase, "What I desire most is the power of high culture," from his 'My Wish.' Yet, their understanding and commitment to culture rarely resonate.
The reason their words often sound hollow is that they cannot even resolve the governance structure of national cultural institutions. It is perplexing why the government, which is currently enjoying a surplus from the semiconductor boom and contemplating its allocation, is particularly stingy in the cultural sector and hesitant about nurturing talent, leaving cultural welfare to individuals. While the government is aware of the prioritization of budgets for welfare and security and the difficulty of quantifying the outcomes of cultural and artistic investments, such challenges cannot justify postponing governance restructuring. Rather, a clear governance structure is a prerequisite for efficient budget execution and performance management, making the current passive attitude a reversal of cause and effect.
Ultimately, the restructuring of governance for national cultural institutions is not a problem that can be solved by simply transplanting a model from another country. It requires designing a system that can incorporate Korea's administrative traditions, financial realities, and urgent demands for political independence. A framework based on France's public institution model or the U.K.'s non-departmental public body, enhanced with a performance management system for transparency, and a sophisticated approach that varies the degree of autonomy according to the nature of the institution is the direction that Korean cultural administration should pursue.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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