On August 26, a massive flood and debris flow struck the border area between Nepal and China's Tibet Autonomous Region. The disaster, triggered by glacier and rock collapses in Nepal's Rasuwa region, extended its impact across the border to China's Jilong, leaving nine South Koreans involved in local hydropower projects unreachable. In the same area, a rapid drainage of a glacial lake had previously caused the collapse of the Friendship Bridge connecting China and Nepal in July 2025. Following the disaster, controversy arose over the lack of advance warning, with claims that China had failed to adequately inform others despite recognizing the risks. China countered these claims by citing the complexities of the terrain and limitations in observation technology. However, the focus should shift from assigning blame to the actions taken afterward. Both countries have begun sharing real-time hydrological and meteorological data and enhancing early warning systems. This disaster underscores the importance of cooperation in reducing information gaps and accelerating responses, especially when predictive capabilities are limited.
Today, we live in a hyper-connected society where people, goods, capital, and information are intricately linked, including supply chains, digital networks, and environmental systems. While this connectivity serves as a foundation for exchange and growth, risks and shocks in one region can lead to social and economic costs in another country. South Korea and China are closely connected through air and maritime transport, supply chains, and financial and digital networks. Therefore, discussions on China-South Korea cooperation should not be limited to what can be gained together; they must also address the need to jointly mitigate risks that can impact each other and minimize potential damages.
In this context, several important issues warrant attention. Among them, nuclear safety is a priority. China is expanding its nuclear power plants along its eastern coast, while South Korea operates numerous reactors. If an abnormal situation arises in either country, accurate information is essential for assessing the impact on the other. Existing frameworks, such as the China-South Korea-Japan Nuclear Safety Regulators Meeting and joint disaster response drills, should be utilized to clarify notification standards and the scope of shared information rather than creating new agreements.
The Yellow Sea, where both countries are in close proximity, has seen practical cooperation. On May 28, South Korea and China conducted their first joint maritime search and rescue exercise, deploying two vessels and one helicopter. The drill simulated a fire on a fishing boat, testing communication of the incident, search and rescue operations, fire suppression, and marine pollution response. In real incidents, delayed initial responses can lead to greater loss of life and damage to marine ecosystems. Therefore, regularizing joint exercises is crucial to repeatedly assess communication systems, on-site command, and resource deployment procedures for rescue and pollution control. In the long term, expanding cooperation to include joint investigations and information exchange on marine debris, water quality, and fishery resources is necessary.
The most pressing area of concern is cyberspace, where information flows continuously across borders. Voice phishing organizations, servers, victims, and financial accounts are dispersed across multiple countries, making it difficult for any single nation to dismantle the entire criminal network. An MOU on cooperation against voice phishing and online fraud was signed during the 2025 South Korea-China summit, and now there is a need to establish practical systems for quickly tracking communications and financial flows, including freezing assets and preserving evidence when necessary. It is better to differentiate between issues involving national security, such as state-sponsored hacking, and transnational crimes targeting citizens, approaching areas where cooperation is feasible separately. While the nature of infectious diseases, drugs, and illegal weapons differs, early detection, information exchange, and rapid collaboration are effective in reducing harm.
However, merely establishing agreements or communication networks does not guarantee actual cooperation. Information related to disasters, health, and cyber issues often intertwines with national responsibilities, security, and industrial interests, which can delay information disclosure and sharing during crises. Structural conflicts, such as North Korea's nuclear program and U.S.-China strategic competition, also pose constraints on China-South Korea cooperation. Therefore, risk management cannot rely solely on the goodwill or political trust of the other party. If nuclear accidents, marine pollution, and transnational crimes are not effectively controlled, both countries will inevitably bear the costs, and this mutual understanding should serve as the foundation for cooperation.
What is crucial is not the continuous creation of new systems but enhancing the effectiveness of existing cooperative frameworks. Clear notification standards for different risk levels, a 24-hour communication network, and a minimum set of information that must be shared should be established, along with regular joint training to assess actual response procedures. Mechanisms to verify the reliability of information and compliance with agreements are also necessary. Cooperation that directly impacts the lives and safety of citizens must maintain at least minimal functionality, even if bilateral relations deteriorate.
China-South Korea cooperation should not be evaluated solely based on visible economic outcomes like trade expansion or increased investment. Preventing major accidents, swiftly blocking transnational crimes, and reducing the impacts of infectious diseases and marine pollution are also significant achievements. Moving forward, China-South Korea cooperation should evolve to manage cross-border risks and minimize potential losses while expanding mutual benefits.
Author's Key Background
▲ Research Fellow, AI Research Lab, Gyeonggi Research Institute ▲ Adjunct Professor, Department of Strategic Information, Hanyang University ▲ Member, Special Committee on Local Governments, Presidential Committee on Basic Society ▲ Evaluator, Overseas Institutions, Economic and Social Research Council
* This article has been translated by AI.
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