A question that has long been considered taboo in Taiwan has surfaced in public debate: How would Taiwan be governed if it unified with China? The bold inquiry was raised by Li Qizhe, an associate professor at National Changhua University of Education, who began posting on Chinese social media on August 29.
Li's premise was clear. He proposed to examine how much of Taiwan's democratic system, judicial framework, and economic structure could be preserved in the event of unification with China. He characterized his writings not as a call for unification but as a 'conditional institutional stress test.'
In his initial post on August 29, Li presented a detailed proposal. He outlined the powers that would be exercised by the central government in Beijing and suggested that the remaining powers be retained by Taiwan. He advocated for maintaining direct elections and a multiparty system, ensuring that Taiwan's courts would have final jurisdiction, and prohibiting any regression of fundamental rights.
Additionally, he proposed that no Chinese military forces be stationed in Taiwan during the initial stages of unification and that Taiwan maintain its own tax and foreign exchange systems. While diplomatic authority would be centralized, he emphasized that Taiwan's roles in international economic and cultural representation, as well as participation in international organizations, should remain intact.
Particularly noteworthy was his concept of the 'four locks.' These included: 1) establishing a peace agreement for unification and high autonomy discussions between the two sides; 2) incorporating special provisions for Taiwan in the Chinese constitution; 3) having the National People's Congress enact a 'Basic Law for Taiwan'; and 4) allowing Taiwanese residents to approve an autonomy charter through a referendum. He also introduced 'three keys' that would be required to reduce democratic institutions, judicial finality, and fundamental rights: a supermajority in Taiwan's legislative body, a public referendum, and approval from the National People's Congress.
Li's writings sparked significant interest in mainland China, garnering nearly 1,000 comments. Some netizens raised objections, particularly regarding the clause that enumerated central powers while assigning the rest to Taiwan. Critics argued that this could imply that Taiwan holds equal authority to the central government, which contradicts China's unitary state structure. Others questioned how to prevent Taiwan from maintaining military relations with foreign countries or reversing unification agreements due to changes in government.
In response, Li published a second post acknowledging many of these concerns. He clarified that he recognized China as a unitary state and revised his stance to state that Taiwan's high autonomy would be granted by the Chinese constitution and the National People's Congress. He argued, however, that the scope of autonomy should be protected by law.
The discussion also gained traction in Taiwan, with the Central News Agency reporting on Li's writings seven times and the Wang Bao newspaper publishing an editorial welcoming rational discussions on unification between the two sides.
The significance of this discussion is clear. For the first time, academia in Taiwan, rather than the political sphere, is addressing the post-unification scenario using concrete institutional language that encompasses judicial finality and tax authority, rather than abstract slogans. Whether this dialogue will serve as a catalyst for broader discussions on unification between China and Taiwan or fade into obscurity remains uncertain. However, once such voices emerge, they are likely to resurface as long as there is a realistic demand for them. This debate carries considerable weight.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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