Imagine you are a tenant who has fallen victim to jeonse fraud, having filed a complaint with the police and now waiting for the investigation results. Each time the officer changes, you must explain the circumstances of your case again and wait for the review. Even after the case is transferred, you must wait for the prosecutor's decision, and if you receive a request for supplementary investigation, you gather and submit the necessary documents. The investigation continues indefinitely, while loan interest accumulates monthly, and you must also pay rent for a new place. For victims, delays in investigation translate into mounting practical costs and suffering in their daily lives.
On October 2, the 78-year-old prosecutor's office system will come to an end, giving way to the establishment of the Public Prosecution Service and the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency. The separation of investigation and prosecution marks a historic shift in South Korea's criminal justice system. However, questions arise about whether the original intent to alleviate the concentration of power and enhance the professionalism and accountability of each agency will effectively protect the rights of the public.
For instance, in a case disclosed by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, the investigation records were reviewed only about five times over nearly a year, until the officer changed after the prosecutor's second request for supplementary investigation. Approximately six months of that time saw no review of any investigation records. Even with a system in place for requesting supplementary investigations, the timely execution of necessary investigations remains a separate issue.
The burden of waiting also falls on the accused. Consider a business owner accused of embezzlement who submits explanatory materials but faces prolonged delays in receiving a judgment. Clients aware of the investigation may postpone contracts, forcing the business owner to invest time and resources in defense. Even if they are later exonerated, regaining lost business and trust is challenging. Timely and thorough investigations are essential for both victims and the accused.
Attributing investigation delays solely to individual police officers is simple and convenient. However, shifting the burden of systemic issues onto frontline investigators and then explaining the outcomes as personal incompetence or negligence is irresponsible.
Institutional reforms require time for personnel and case reallocation, record handovers, and adaptation to new procedures. Disagreements may also arise regarding the scope of supplementary investigations between investigative and prosecutorial agencies. It is crucial to examine how much additional time these delays add to the public's cases. If evidence collection is delayed, leading to lost video footage and faded memories of witnesses, even later efforts to expedite processing may prove futile.
First and foremost, sufficient investigative personnel must be secured. The police are also pursuing personnel reallocation and recruitment. However, simply assigning personnel does not immediately enhance investigative capabilities. Skills in tracking financial flows, analyzing digital evidence, and verifying conflicting statements require training and experience. The training of new personnel, retention of skilled investigators, and expansion of specialized staff must occur simultaneously.
If the reform is implemented without the police having the personnel and expertise to handle the increasing workload, it will be difficult to avoid criticism of being premature. Assigning more tasks to already burdened investigators while demanding shorter processing times will not mechanically speed up investigations. The quality of investigations must not be sacrificed to meet deadlines.
Alongside enhancing investigative capabilities, effective checks on investigative powers are also necessary. Investigations wield significant state power that deeply impacts individuals' bodies, property, honor, and livelihoods. Decisions regarding the subjects of investigations, the evidence to be secured, and the timing of case closures can change lives. Regardless of which agency exercises authority, errors and abuses must be monitored and corrected. This is why the separation of investigation and prosecution must function as mutual checks and balances.
The revised Criminal Procedure Act maintains the right to request supplementary investigations while establishing a general one-month compliance deadline and management procedures. In certain cases, it allows for the designation of other investigative agencies to request supplementary investigations. For these mechanisms to function effectively, compliance with requests and the thoroughness of investigations must be verified, and delays or deficiencies must be addressed.
Prosecutorial agencies must specify the issues and reasons for supplementation, while investigative agencies must thoroughly explain the review process and outcomes. Disagreements should be resolved swiftly, but records must be kept to verify each agency's judgments. The effectiveness of checks should be evaluated based on how accurately and promptly erroneous judgments are corrected.
If the new system requires time to settle, how to protect the rights of the public during this period must also be part of the reform. Ensuring sufficient investigative personnel and functional checks and balances is the responsibility of the state. Simply asking the public to wait cannot justify the time and opportunities lost in the meantime. The success of the reform will depend on whether the public can receive more accurate and timely redress for their rights.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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