President Lee Jae-myung on October 22 argued that abandoning oversight of investigative agencies would violate the Constitution and the Government Organization Act, potentially leading to impeachment. He stated that it is natural for agencies like the Public Prosecution Service and the National Police Agency to be under the direction of the President and the Prime Minister, and excluding the head of the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency from public meetings is unrelated to political neutrality. However, the existence of oversight authority and the appropriateness of regularly including agency heads in Cabinet meetings are separate issues. The appropriateness of exercising that authority is as important as the authority itself.
The Cabinet meeting is a venue for deliberating major government policies. While heads of external agencies may attend, not all agency heads are required to be present. This is particularly true for agencies responsible for investigation and prosecution, as the President and Cabinet members can also be subjects of investigation or prosecution. Regular attendance of investigative agency heads at meetings chaired by the President could raise questions about political neutrality. Even without specific directives regarding cases, it could create the impression of a closer relationship between power and investigative agencies. The fairness of the judiciary requires not only actual independence but also the appearance of independence that the public can trust.
Legal safeguards to ensure the independence of investigative agencies should not be taken lightly. The previous Prosecutors' Office Act stipulated that the Minister of Justice could only direct and supervise the Prosecutor General through specific cases. Similar provisions exist in the current Serious Crimes Investigation Agency Act and the Public Prosecution Service Act. This is to prevent investigative agencies from acting according to the will of the ruling power simply because they are part of the executive branch. The longstanding practice of not regularly including the Prosecutor General in Cabinet meetings is not unrelated to these concerns.
More sensitive is the fact that President Lee himself has faced criminal charges and is undergoing trials, along with his close associates. In this context, if the President regularly invites the heads of investigative agencies to discuss national issues, it is difficult to dismiss the possibility that it could exert pressure on those agencies, even without direct case directives. In a Cabinet meeting in June, President Lee reportedly told the acting Prosecutor General to “apologize and cancel if there are mistakes,” raising speculation about the potential for case dismissals. Regardless of the intent behind the statement, it could heighten concerns about the relationship between the President and investigative agencies.
The civic group Participation Solidarity has also urged caution regarding the regular attendance of heads of investigative and prosecutorial agencies at meetings chaired by the President, stating it could create political pressure. The political neutrality of investigative agencies should not be a principle that varies according to the ruling party's interests. The powers exercised by the current administration could also be wielded by future administrations. It is essential to prioritize systems that prevent arbitrary exercise of power over immediate convenience in governance.
Kim Ji-yong, head of the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency, stated that he would decide on attendance at Cabinet meetings after reviewing relevant laws and consulting with related agencies. However, the first consideration should be the necessity and appropriateness of regular attendance. If there is a need to share national policy directions, this can be communicated through the relevant ministers. Acknowledging the President's oversight authority does not automatically justify the regular attendance of investigative agency heads. The existence of oversight authority does not guarantee the necessity of regular attendance.
Investigative agencies, while part of the executive branch, must be guaranteed independence from power. Maintaining a balance between these two principles is the President's responsibility. Expanding authority solely because it exists is not a wise approach. The independence of investigative agencies must be demonstrated through systems and actions, and maintaining necessary distance between power and investigation is crucial for preserving public trust in a fair criminal justice system.
* This article has been translated by AI.
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