SEOUL, November 17 (AJP) - The upcoming consequential summit of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin is likely to produce little beyond a "big photo-op", and Trump may yet seek a tete-a-tete with Kim Jong-un in China to steal the show, according to his former security adviser John Bolton.
“I don’t rule out something possibly in China later this week,” said Bolton, who served as the National Security Adviser for Trump in his first presidency, in a video interview with AJP ahead of the three-way talks in Shenzhen on the sidelines of the APEC summit.
"It appears unlikely. (But) It appeared unlikely they would meet at the DMZ in 2019, but it happened nonetheless.”
“What Trump wants is publicity,” he said. “I think Trump wants a big photo opportunity like he wanted photo opportunities with Kim Jong-un.”
If Kim does agree to come, Bolton said, he would be seeking gains for himself rather than acting out of goodwill, because the meeting itself “would be another indication of the legitimacy of his regime.”
Trump and Putin have both signaled openness to Kim joining them if Xi extends an invitation. Pyongyang has yet to respond.
Bolton expects little of substance from the trilateral, given an agenda that could run from Ukraine and North Korea to the espionage allegations now shaking Nvidia.
Espionage on the table
Bolton said Trump should raise Chinese espionage with Xi. The issue has drawn attention through allegations surrounding Alice Huang, a former executive of Megaspeed, a Singapore-based buyer of advanced Nvidia chips that has been investigated over suspected diversion of those chips to China.
Huang has been reported to have had a relationship with Nvidia co-founder Jensen Huang, who stepped down as chief executive last week.
“I suspect that the problem of Chinese economic espionage is much greater than we expected,” Bolton said.
“China has built a business model on stealing foreign intellectual property from countries all over the world,” he said, adding that “what China is doing is a big threat not just to the United States but to all of its friends and partners as well.”
Megaspeed has disputed allegations about its operations and launched an internal investigation. Beijing has rejected the espionage allegations as groundless.
No new prize in Pyongyang
Bolton doubted that another Trump–Kim meeting would advance denuclearization. He saw no sign that North Korea was prepared to give up its arsenal and argued that Trump’s appetite for attention could produce another encounter without meaningful concessions.
Trump and Kim met in Singapore in 2018, in Hanoi in February 2019 and at the Demilitarized Zone dividing the Korean Peninsula in June 2019. In Bolton’s view, those meetings have left Trump searching for a new setting that could generate comparable attention.
“The only thing left to make new news is for Trump to go to Pyongyang, which I think would be a mistake,” he said.
He was equally skeptical that South Korean President Lee Jae Myung could reshape the diplomatic landscape with a dramatic initiative.
Asked about a possible diplomatic “Hail Mary,” a long-shot attempt to break out of Seoul’s limited room for maneuver, the American football enthusiast offered little encouragement.
“It is unlikely that any kind of Hail Mary pass that he might want to throw would be successful,” he said. “Given the nature of his administration, he might rely too much on North Korea being a good-faith negotiator, which I don’t think it is.”
Bolton argued that years of insufficient pressure had allowed North Korea to build up its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, leaving little reason to expect Kim to reverse course on his own.
His criticism of Trump’s diplomacy stopped short of the decision to walk away from Hanoi without a deal. Bolton defended that decision, saying the pressure to produce an agreement should never have outweighed the goal of preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons it could deliver against its targets.
“Before Hanoi, Trump realized that he should not feel under pressure to make an agreement with Kim Jong-un that would not advance the goal of preventing North Korea from achieving deliverable nuclear weapons,” he said. “I think he did the right thing in Hanoi by rejecting the proposal that Kim Jong-un put forward.”
The failure, he argued, lay in the sanctions campaign around the talks.
“The problem was that all the countries that were concerned about North Korea’s nuclear capability — the U.S., South Korea and Japan — did not really apply maximum pressure in the sanctions campaign,” he said.
He suspected that Russian and Chinese assistance to Pyongyang had grown in recent years, making it harder to constrain its weapons programs.
Bolton rejected the idea that Washington should accept verifiable limits on missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland while leaving intact the nuclear forces that threaten South Korea and Japan. Such a deal, he argued, would serve Pyongyang’s aim of splitting the United States from its allies.
“Trump made a mistake in 2019 by downplaying North Korean short-range missile testing even though it was in violation of U.N. Security Council sanctions,” he said. “You can learn a lot from a short-range missile test that you can use for longer-range missiles as well.”
Kim between Beijing and Moscow
Bolton did not expect an early end to Russia’s war in Ukraine to reduce Kim’s value to Moscow.
“I don’t see an end to the war in Ukraine in the near term,” he said, arguing that Russia remained determined to keep fighting. “Kim Jong-un has, unfortunately, done a good job of replicating what his grandfather was able to do to position the North between China and Russia.”
The decline of Russian influence after the Soviet collapse had left Pyongyang dependent on China as its main external backer, he said. Renewed ties with Moscow have restored Kim’s ability to play the two powers against each other, creating “a big advantage for Kim and a big problem for the rest of us.”
“I’m not sure there’s much to obtain in negotiations,” he said. “I think more pressure on the North is necessary.”
He argued that Kim’s turn toward Russia was partly an effort to extract more economic aid from both Moscow and Beijing. An earlier chance to work with China to pressure Pyongyang had passed, he said, but North Korea’s economic weakness at home remained potential leverage.
“We should not ignore the reality that the economic situation in North Korea for the overwhelming majority of its citizens remains very grim,” he said.
“That could be the leverage to bring down the Kim Jong-un regime, which I think should be the ultimate objective, because the reunification of the Korean Peninsula is the best outcome. That is unlikely to happen through the use of military force but could happen through continued economic pressure. I think it’s still a realistic objective.”
Nuclear deterrence in a three-power world
On deterrence, Bolton reaffirmed his support for redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. He argued that their presence would warn Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow against trying to change the regional status quo by force.
Such a deployment, he said, would force Kim to weigh the possibility of a nuclear response, including against his command post, if he launched a conventional campaign to reunify the peninsula under North Korean rule.
“It would solidify deterrence,” Bolton said. “Obviously, the South Korean government has to agree with that. I think, from the point of view of strategic defense analysis, there is a very strong argument for it.”
He argued that China’s expanding nuclear arsenal posed a strategic challenge that Washington and its allies could not afford to leave unresolved. Cold War thinking on deterrence, warhead numbers and arms control rested on a rivalry between two nuclear powers, he said. China’s rise is creating a three-power nuclear environment in which those assumptions no longer hold.
Bolton expected Beijing to resist any talks that could constrain its push to bring its nuclear capabilities closer to those of the United States and Russia.
Asked what the 1956 Suez crisis, which he studied as an undergraduate at Yale, could teach leaders heading into talks with Beijing and Moscow, Bolton returned to alliance solidarity. In his view, the split between the Eisenhower administration and Britain, France and Israel weakened Western influence and opened the door for the Soviet Union.
“The lesson of Suez for the U.S. is: Stick with your allies.”
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