AJP Asia Intelligence Agency

Busan-Masan Tunnel Collapse Caused by Pressure 20 Times Above Limit

The collapse of the Nakdong 1 Tunnel in the Busan-Masan double-track railway, constructed by SK Ecoplant (formerly SK Construction), was caused by ground reinforcement work that did not undergo pre-verification and excessive injection pressure, according to an investigation report. The construction company continued operations despite confirming signs of tunnel cracks and leaks, working under pressures that reached 20 times the limit.


On November 19, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport released the findings of the construction accident investigation committee regarding the collapse that occurred in March 2020, and announced plans for follow-up measures to ensure the safety of the remaining evacuation passage and the overall opening of the railway.


The Busan-Masan double-track railway is a private investment project led by Smart Rail, a consortium that includes SK Ecoplant. The construction of the second section of the Nakdong 1 Tunnel, where the collapse occurred, was managed by SK Ecoplant.


The accident took place around 5 a.m. on March 18, 2020, at the construction site of the evacuation passage for the Nakdong 1 Tunnel in Samrak-dong, Sasang-gu, Busan. During construction to prevent groundwater inflow, the tunnel collapsed, causing the ground to sink by 18 meters wide and 7 to 8 meters deep, damaging construction equipment. Fortunately, three workers evacuated just before the incident, and there were no casualties.


The investigation committee identified the main causes of the accident as the inappropriate application of the waterproof grouting method without pre-verification and ground displacement and structural damage to the tunnel due to excessive injection pressure. The waterproof grouting method involves injecting materials like cement into the ground to prevent groundwater inflow. At the accident site, CGS method was applied above ground, while SGR method was used inside the tunnel.


The investigation revealed that while the construction company selected the CGS method to enhance the groundwater blocking performance of the existing ground reinforcement (DCM), it failed to adequately assess the impact on the tunnel structure. It did not conduct the required impact assessments on underground structures as specified in the specifications, nor did it perform test constructions to determine appropriate injection pressure and volume.


As a result, the injected grout damaged the existing ground reinforcement and caused cracks in the segments of the main tunnel, leading to structural damage, according to the investigation committee. The actual injection pressure was found to have risen to 9,000 kPa, which is 20 times the limit of 450 kPa, considering ground destruction and deformation.


When the investigation committee analyzed the impact of excessive injection pressure on the tunnel structure under three load conditions, it found that all scenarios reached the limit values. Based on this, the committee concluded that excessive injection pressure was a decisive cause of the collapse.


The failure to adequately respond to abnormal signs during the construction process was also cited as a cause of the accident. After starting excavation of the third evacuation passage on March 1, 2020, the construction company implemented additional grouting work when leaks occurred.


On March 8 of the same month, signs of cracks in the main tunnel segments and leaks at joints were confirmed. However, instead of halting construction, they proceeded with additional waterproofing work both above ground and inside the tunnel. Despite ongoing leaks and soil outflow, and the expansion of structural cracks, the company continued grouting under high pressure, leading to accumulated ground disturbance and structural damage.


The investigation committee pointed out that if the additional waterproofing measures did not show improvement, the construction should have been stopped to analyze the causes and develop appropriate countermeasures.


Based on the results of this investigation, safe construction methods for the yet-to-be-constructed first and second evacuation passages were also proposed. The diameter of the evacuation passage was recommended to be reduced from the existing 3.6 meters to 2.0 meters, and construction should commence only after verifying groundwater blocking effectiveness through test construction.


Excavation should proceed only after confirming that the groundwater outflow is within permissible limits through detection pipes. The investigation committee analyzed that even with a reduced diameter, it is possible to secure disaster prevention safety equal to or greater than the existing design and improve structural safety.


Improvements to prevent recurrence will also be pursued. The investigation committee reported that the accident occurred due to improper implementation of related standards and procedures, and proposed strengthening public management and supervision of private railway projects and enhancing oversight of hazardous processes.


The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is pushing for amendments to the Railway Construction Act to expand the supervisory authority of the Korea Railway Corporation over private railway projects. Special inspections will also be conducted regarding pre-verification of grouting methods, management of construction conditions, and structural safety reviews during design changes.


The Ministry plans to proceed with the partial opening targeted for April next year as scheduled, while collaborating with the project implementers to complete the remaining processes and expedite the overall opening timeline. To this end, an advisory council was formed on November 17, consisting of members from the Korea Railway Corporation, the investigation committee, and experts recommended by the project implementers to support the safe design and construction of the remaining evacuation passages.





* This article has been translated by AI.