KENOSHA, August 28 (AJP) - The terrible disaster of the collapse of the Afghanistan government and sweeping Taliban victory three years ago was a reversal for the United States and the international community and a serious leadership failure by the Biden administration. However, the collapse does not have to be a strategic defeat for the U.S.
Let me explain why. The current anniversary of the debacle is an appropriate time to do so.
The failure of the administration to adequately prepare for this scenario was devastating. The background of the debacle has been investigated, but not thoroughly or publicly.
The fact that the Democrats held majorities in both houses of Congress, along with the White House, means the party’s Congressional leaders did not pursue aggressive fact-finding hearings. However, the leaders’ power is limited, and the scale of a failure this significant provides a powerful incentive. Republicans now have a narrow House of Representatives majority and continue to press.
Most striking is that the American withdrawal from Afghanistan unfolded contrary to customary procedures, as well as common sense. Normally, civilians leave first, then the military, with a rear guard securing exits as long as necessary.
The explanation is that clearly, no one at the top of the administration believed Afghanistan’s government and military would disintegrate immediately. Consequently, there was no preparation for handling this terrible worst-case development.
Predictably, various agencies aggressively leaked to the media that they warned the White House this collapse was likely to happen. Skepticism is the right attitude toward such self-protection, especially in this case.
The Biden administration apparently failed to coordinate the withdrawal with our allies. A substantial international coalition overthrew the Taliban regime and occupied the country following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The U.S. led this UN and NATO effort, but many nations have been involved. This again is a prime topic for in-depth serious investigation.
There is also a challenge to learn and use this failure to strengthen as well as repair relations with our closest allies. We should devote sustained attention to working-level military and intelligence cooperation and make the priority public.
Reports are impressive of British and French military patrols in Afghanistan operating beyond the Kabul airport and successfully rescuing their citizens, Afghan nationals, and some Americans. Permitting American forces guarding the airport to join them should have been done. In April 1975, as South Vietnam collapsed, U.S. officials emphasized efforts to rescue our citizens and allies.
“Someone to talk to” is how McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s national security adviser, described Anglo-American rapport. Fundamental affinity helped forge an enduring special relationship during the total struggle of World War II.
Commentary on Afghanistan regularly referred to the disastrous Soviet invasion and ultimate defeat in the 1980s, but usually overlooked the earlier history of British engagement. During the nineteenth century, the British experienced military defeat, but eventually achieved influence. Condemnation of Biden by Britain’s Parliament provides powerful evidence for necessary repair of relations.
The two-decade occupation of Afghanistan has brought extensive economic and social modernization. That clock cannot be turned back completely, and economic aid to the nation provides useful practical leverage.
Electronic surveillance and human agents are essential to monitor the Taliban. No doubt this is happening but it should be a top priority.
The international effort to transform Afghanistan was misguided. In the future, patient realism, calculated diplomacy, and selective aid should guide policy – not failed utopianism.
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This article was contributed by Arthur I. Cyr, author of "After the Cold War -- American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia" (NYU Press and Palgrave/Macmillan). He has taught at the Universities of Chicago and Illinois, Northwestern University, and Carthage College (Clausen Distinguished Professor).
