On June 21, the United States and Iran held their first face-to-face negotiations in Switzerland following the signing of a ceasefire memorandum of understanding (MOU). According to a joint statement released by the mediating countries, Qatar and Pakistan, both sides agreed to establish a mechanism to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and prevent conflicts within Lebanon.
The central focus of the negotiations was Lebanon. Iran has shown particular interest in Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group that is part of the pro-Iran axis known as the "Resistance Front," throughout the negotiation process since the outbreak of war. The MOU signed last week explicitly stated in its first clause that military operations would be "immediately and permanently terminated on all fronts, including Lebanon," highlighting Lebanon's significance in the context of ending the conflict. While the world is closely monitoring issues related to the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear development, Iran has clearly prioritized the situation in Lebanon.
Although Lebanon does not share a border with Iran, Iran's intense focus on the country may seem puzzling. However, Iran views the security issues in Lebanon, the Palestinian situation, the situation in Iraq, and the entire negotiation process with the U.S. as an interconnected equation. The Iranian government has consistently maintained that agreements addressing only part of a crisis while neglecting other destabilizing factors are not sustainable, embodying the concept of "interconnected security."
From Iran's perspective, Hezbollah is a crucial pillar of its regional deterrence structure built over decades. With Hamas significantly weakened due to the war with Israel, Hezbollah is seen as the only entity capable of offsetting Israel's military advantage. Therefore, Iran perceives Israeli military pressure on Hezbollah not merely as an internal Lebanese issue but as a challenge that disrupts the balance of power across the Middle East.
Consequently, Iran's conditions for ending the war in Lebanon are largely aimed at Israel. Israel, which has consistently opposed U.S.-Iran negotiations, has conducted airstrikes against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon whenever favorable conditions for negotiations arise, undermining the talks.
Israel views military pressure on Hezbollah as essential for its national security. Since the outbreak of war with Hamas in October 2023, Israel has engaged in hostilities with Hezbollah, significantly escalating its offensive in September 2024 and again in March of this year. The March offensive was particularly triggered by Hezbollah's first attack on Israel in nearly a year following the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
On the same day as the first face-to-face negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israeli troops would remain stationed in southern Lebanon for the foreseeable future, indicating the possibility of military action. Karim Safieddine, a researcher at the U.S.-based Middle East Institute, stated, "Israel has no political, technical, or economic incentive to stop the war in Lebanon."
Michael Young, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center specializing in Lebanon, analyzed that Israel would likely attempt to "undermine the MOU and the U.S.-Iran negotiations" by continuing the war in Lebanon, as it does not want the negotiations to succeed.
However, as Iran prioritizes Lebanon in the ceasefire negotiations, the situation in Lebanon is emerging as a key factor that could influence the overall direction of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Iran, which already holds the negotiation card of the "Strait of Hormuz," now appears to have the "winning hand" of Lebanon as well.
If Israel were to initiate military action in Lebanon again, Iran could claim that the first clause of the MOU had effectively been violated, providing justification to withdraw from the negotiation table with the U.S. Conversely, if Israel halts military operations, Iran would gain the opportunity to expand its influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah. In either scenario, Iran does not find itself at a significant disadvantage.
Moreover, Iran may exploit the Lebanon card to target the rift between the U.S. and Israel. Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Israel. At the G7 summit in France last week, he stated, "Israel has been fighting Hezbollah for too long, and too many people are dying," indicating his dissatisfaction with how the Lebanon issue is being handled.
David Wood, a senior analyst for Lebanon at the International Crisis Group (ICG), noted, "The U.S. wants to separate the Lebanon issue from the Iran issue," suggesting that the U.S. could help Lebanon by pressuring Israel to implement a bilateral ceasefire agreement with Lebanon. He added that this approach could provide an opportunity for the Lebanese state to demonstrate its ability to exercise effective control over its territory through non-violent means rather than Hezbollah's armed resistance strategy.
Robert Satloff, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, remarked to Lebanese media outlet This Is Beirut, "If Iran succeeds in asserting its claims over Lebanon, it will be a victory over both the 'Great Satan' (the U.S.) and the 'Little Satan' (Israel)."
* This article has been translated by AI.
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